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iThe Foreign Policy of Kenya 1963-1978
This thesis analyses Kenyan foreign policy between I963 and 1978 
and provides a case-study of foreign policy-making in a developing 
state. It shows how the colonial heritage influenced the orientation 
of foreign policy through political, economic and cultural means. An 
examination of the domestic political structure shows that an elite 
group around Jomo Kenyatta controlled the policy-making process and 
gave little opportunity to competing elites to alter the country's 
foreign policy and development goals. These goals were pursued within 
the framework of the former colony's dominant aid and trading patterns 
and thus raised questions concerning neo-colonialist control and the 
dependence of Kenya upon the West.
In East Africa, Kenya sought peaceful relations to maximise 
economic benefits. The country capitalised upon its predominance 
caused by colonial and settler policies and formalised its position 
in the East African Community. Its relative strength, however, 
combined with political differences unsettled its neighbours and 
contributed to the Community's demise. The unresolved territorial 
dispute with the Somali Republic, added to the difficulties with 
Tanzania and Uganda, presented major problems for Kenya's foreign 
policy in the region. In international organisations, the government 
aligned with Third World countries on many issues, but the political 
and economic constraints emanating from the neo-colonial nature of the 
state made sure that policies were pragmatic ones.
In the final chapter, a theoretical approach is utilised to 
explain foreign policy behaviour and this draws together the major 
factors which made this period the 'Kenyatta Era'.
il
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IChapter One
Colonisation and Independence
Introduction
This thesis presents an analysis of Kenyan foreign policy from 
the time of independence in 1963 until 1978» the year in which the 
'founder' of the Kenyan nation, President Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, died.
It is the first complete survey of Kenyan foreign policy and so provides 
a definitive case-study not only for scholars of Kenya but also for 
those interested in the wider fields of African politics and foreign 
policy analysis.
Scholarly work of any nature is difficult to accomplish, but a 
study of the political organisation of an African state presents extra 
problems to the student. The inadequacy and unavailability of sources 
and data throw a great responsibility on the student to sift very 
carefully through what material there is and to fill in the numerous 
gaps with intuitive thought. Allied to the unfavourable amount of 
literature on which to base one's study is the problem, faced by 
myself, that a student may be denied access to the country to under­
take research upon such delicate issues as foreign policy, thus forcing 
the student into the guise of an 'investigative tourist'. Given these 
drawbacks, then, this thesis presents an accurate and analytical study 
of the derivation, nature and direction of Kenyan foreign policy since 
the time of independence.
The study is undertaken in a thematic manner with the dual aims 
of shedding light on the major areas of policy and providing a solid 
base for future work in this field. The boundaries of foreign policy 
analysis, especially for developing countries, are difficult to
2delimit, but this work has operated from the loose definition that 
foreign policy analysis is concerned with the actions of the state 
towards the external environment and how and why such actions are 
formulated. Chapter two concentrates upon the domestic structure of 
Kenya in relation to foreign policy-making and shows how both the 
domestic and external environments are interrelated. The later 
chapters look in turn at the economic development of the country and 
its bilateral and multilateral relations, the policies pursued in the 
East African arena, and those pursued in international organisations, 
-with special reference to the Southern African problem. The final 
chapter pulls together the material in a more theoretical manner, 
focusing upon the determinants, rather than recipient fields, of 
foreign policy. Here the conclusions are reached that Kenyatta was the 
leading force in the formulation of Kenyan foreign policy and that his 
death closed a specific period in Kenyan politics. „
The continuation of similar foreign policy goals under the new 
President, Daniel arap Moi, lends weight to the view that Kenyatta's 
policies were proved in practice. It is also possible to say that the 
new leadership merely reflects the old because the elite group formerly 
around Kenyatta is continuing under Moi to control the country and to 
benefit from the spoils of office. This brings us to the central 
theme of the thesis, that Kenya is a 'neo-colonial' society in which 
political activities are constrained and circumscribed by the need to 
naintain links with foreign financial and political interests. The 
term 'neo-colonialism' here is used to mean the survival of the 
colonial system of economic exploitation after independence, and 
despite independence, with the connivance of a domestic elite who gain 
in material terms from such an arrangement.
3The existence of neo-colonialism in Kenya has a dominant 
influence on foreign policy. The thesis shows that at independence 
the aspirations of the African leaders in Kenya were, at least, 
compatible with and, at most, totally attuned to those of the out­
going colonialists. The foreign policy of the country in the years 
after 1963 was tentative and formative but displayed a tacit acceptance 
by the Kenyan elite of the parameters allowed it by the residual 
colonial interests. To understand fully the evolution of the neo­
colonial society and the composition and direction of Kenyan foreign 
policy after independence, it is necessary to sketch in the history 
of the country during the colonial period in order to illuminate the 
environment within which the Kenyan political character was moulded.
The initial Occupation
British involvement in Eist Africa gained pace in the 1880s *
mainly because of its strategic interest in controlling the headwaters 
of the Nile in order to protect Egypt and, in turn, the route to India. 
A civil war in Uganda forced the Imperial British East Africa Company 
into bankruptcy and caused direct British involvement resulting in 
protectorates being formed over Uganda and Buganda in 189**, and over 
the East African Protectorate (Kenya) in June I895. A railway was 
built to link Uganda with the coast. 1 Though the Asian was already 
prominent in East Africa because of trade, making the rupee the
I, For a more comprehensive study of the historical background see 
George Bennett, Kenya. A Political History. The Colonial Period 
(London, O.U. P., 1963); A. J. Hughes, East Africa» Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda (Harmondsworth, Penguin, I963, rev. 1969); Carl ¿osberg 
and John Nottingham, The Myth of *feu feu*. Nationalism in 
Kenya (London, Pall Mall, 1906); W.E.F. Ward and L.W. White,
East Africa, a century of change (New York, Africana, 1971).
The railway also fell neatly in line with the British legal 
obligation under the I89O Brussels Agreement to try to suppress 
the slave trade in Africa.
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5recognised currency, several thousands more Asians were brought in by 
the British to build the railway because the native African was 
considered lazy and unsuited to this type of work. The racial 
consequences of the importation of Asian labour (and the consequent 
influx of Asian traders and businessmen) were considerable, both for 
the European settlers who continually strove to maintain their racial 
superiority, and for the Africans who found their path to development, 
politically and economically, blocked by the Asians. Here was the root 
of the 'Asian problem' which was to cause great unrest in independent 
Kenya.
The railway, started from Mombasa in 1895» reached Lake Victoria
in 1901. There was no intention of continuing the railway any further
find so the British Government, for administrative efficiency, cut off
the Eastern Province of Uganda in April 1902 and transferred it to
2the East African Protectorate. This decision proved to be important 
because the area transferred included that of the 'Highlands', the 
most suitable land for European settlement. The British Government 
began to entice settlers to the Highlands in order to help pay the 
large costs of the occupation and the railway. Pressure immediately 
arose from the considerably larger Asian community to be allowed to 
settle in the Highlands, but this was blocked by the settlers and the 
British Government. In 1908» Lord Elgin, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, subtly reiterated the racial viewpoint of the British*
•It is not consonant with the views of His Majesty's Government to 
impose legal restrictions on any particular section of the community, *28
2. George Bennett, 'The Eastern Boundary of Uganda in 1902', Uganda 
Journal, March 1959» PP- 69-72.
President Idi Amin of Uganda was to raise the question of 
Ugandan sovereignty over this area in 19761 see The Times,
28 February 1976.
6"but as a natter of administrative convenience, grants in the upland
•3areas should not he made to Indians.
After pressing hard for political representation, the settlers 
were rewarded in 1907 when a Legislative Council was established with 
themselves in a prominent position. The settlers were, however, 
primarily concerned with their land, and their need for labour was 
acute. The African was unaccustomed to, and resentful of, the wage- 
labour system and so the settlers sought ways of tying the African to 
his work. The results were seen in the 'Resident Native Ordinance* of 
1918 and the 'Native Registration Ordinance' of 1920. The 1918 
Ordinance forced Africans 'squatting' on European land to provide 
payment only in labour, so compelling them to work for the settler and 
preventing any form of tenant farming. The I92O Ordinance provided 
for all Africans over sixteen years of age to carry identification 
papers, the kipande. so aiding the employer to hold the African to his 
contract.^ *
During the remainder of the colonial period, Kenya Colony (as it 
became known in July 1920) was the scene of a continual racial battle 
between European and Asian settlers. The British Government normally 
maintained the supremacy of the white settlers, but at the same time 
strove to promote the interests of the African. Though the settlers 
often took a more extreme line over African affairs than did the 
British Government, there was always the unifying belief that European 
cultural rule, however executed, was to the advantage of the African. 3*
V '
3. As quoted in Ward and White, op. cit., p. lift.
k , E.A. Brett, 'Development Policy in East Africa between the wars; 
a study of the political influences involved in the making of 
British policy 1919-1939' (Ph.D. thesis, University of London,
1966), pp. 166-182.
7Consequently, the governments desire to protect African interests never 
went so far as to clash head-on with the interests of the settlers 
whose leaders were, after all, men of aristocratic background with 
influential contacts in London. The results of this were significant 
in that the exploited Africans came to distrust not only the settlers 
but also the British Government, and realised that only through actions 
of their own would they be able to regain their freedom.
The African Response
The first African political movement became active in the early 
1920s. The Luo tribe in western Kenya began to form small associations,^ 
but the major activity centred upon the Kikuyu who felt the most 
threatened by the European occupation of the land. The East African 
Association (E.A.A.), and its predecessor the Young Kikuyu Association 
(Y.K.A.)? actively campaigned against the kipande, the hut tax and the 
not infrequent cuts in wages. The E.A.A. became increasingly aggressive 
until in March 1922, Harry Thuku, the E.A.A. leader, was arrested for 
sedition and sent into exile at Kismayu.^
In the following year, the British Government again stressed its 
concern for the African and declared in the White Paper Indians in 
Kenya (Devonshire White Paper)* 'Primarily, Kenya is an African 
territory, and His Majesty's Government think it necessary definitely 
to record their considered opinion that the interests of the African 
natives must be paramount, and that if, and when, those interests and 56
5. John M. Lonsdale, 'Political Associations in Western Kenya' in 
Robert I. Potberg and Ali A. Mazrui, Protest and Power in Black 
Africa (New York, O.U.P., 1970), pp. 589-638.
6. Harry Thuku, An Autobiography, with assistance from Kenneth King
(Nairobi, O.U.P., 1970). Kismayu is now in the Somali 31
Republic.
8the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former 
7should prevail.'
The Africans had already learnt not to accept the benevolent
intentions of the British Government until they had been put into
practice. Their caution proved correct because governmental policy
never came to terms with its goal. Indeed, the same White Paper
promised the settlers that there would be 'no drastic action or
reversal of measures already introduced ... the result of which might
be to destroy or impair the existing interests of those who have
8already settled in Kenya'.
The E.A.A., proscribed after Thuku's arrest, was regrouped as 
the Kikuyu Central Association (K.C.A.) during 1925» and three years 
later Kenyatta. became the Association ** secretary. The Kenya Govern­
ment confined the activities of the K.C.A. to the Kikuyu Reserves, and 
so there was little chance of the K.C.A. making any gains either with 
the other tribes or with the authorities. Abroad, however, there was 
great scope and freedom to present African grievances, and so in 1929 
Kenyatta left for London to continue the fight for African rights. 
Kenyatta did not return (except shortly in 1931) until after the second 
world war, and this period of self-exclusion kept him out of the internal 
battles within the African ranks and undeniably helped to foster the 
image of Kenyatta as a leading African politician - at least amongst 
the Africans.
Land was the burning issue of the colonial period, and the 78
7. Indians in Kenya Memorandum (Grad. 1922, London, H.M.S.O., 1923), 
p. 10.
8. Ibid.
9alienation of land by the Europeans was to cause serious problems 
during the negotiations for independence. The 'Kenya Land Commission' 
(Carter Commission) reported in toy 1934.^ The Commission added some 
3,5^8 square miles of territory to the Reserves, but the Africans 
complained that this was in arid and semi-desert areas virtually 
useless for habitation.The boundaries of the Reserves were not 
rigidly fixed as provision was made for them to be altered if and when 
European mining companies became interested in a Reserve area. The 
boundaries of the 'European Highlands' were defined within which the 
Europeans held their privileged position. Both the Asian and African 
were now legally excluded.^
During the second world war, African political rights improved 
even though the K.C.A. and two other tribal organisations were 
declared illegal as subversive in August 19*K). The year of 19*^ 4 was., 
significant in that the Kenya Legislative Council allowed for the first 
time one African official to represent African interests. Although he 
was to be chosen by the Governor and was to be one amongst forty 
officials, this was an important concession by the European minority 
to quell African discontent. In 19*<4, the Kenya African Study Union 
(K.A.S.U.) was established, a success«: to the banned K.C.A. In 
February 19^6, K.A.S.U. became K.A.U., the Kenya African Union, and *1
o. Report of the Kenya Land Commission. September, 1933 (Cmd. 4556, 
London, H. M.S. 0. ,1934).
10. Jomo Kenyatta, Suffering without bitterness (Nairobi, East African 
Pub., 1968), pp. 35-40.
11. Order-in-Council for the 'European Highlands' came into effect on
1 torch 1939» Europeans wanted the Highlands protected by law in 
order to prevent expansion of the African Reserves; Keesing's 
Contemporary Archives, vol. 3» 35^4C*
12. Jeremy Murray-Brown, Kenyatta (London, Allen and Unwin, 1972),
p. 226.
10
Kenyatta returned to an enthusiastic welcome in September 19^6, 'a 
living legend entering upon his inheritance',^ to take over K.A.U. 
and take up the African nationalist cause.
3h the early 1950s, growing tensions and frustrations over land 
overspilled into the violent 'Maui Mau' movement. The settlers 
considered this to be just another, though more serious, outbreak of 
tribal fighting led by dangerous and wicked men. 'Mau Mau', however, 
was a further outburst of African resentment to European domination
llfand a genuine symbol of the growing African political awareness.
The official view of 'Mau Mau' was presented in a White Paper in i960
written by P.D. Corfield, a white settler in Kenya. ^  The overwhelming
theme of the Corfield Report was that 'Jfeu Mau' was an unfortunate
disease of the African, a sickness to be cured. One extract from the
Corfield Report will suffice to illuminate the European's view of the
African and the battle to be fought by African political groups for
recognition and respectability*
It has been suggested that had the hand of co-operation been 
given to Jomo Kenyatta, history would have taken a different 
turn, and there would have been no Mau Mau. But all the 
evidence points otherwise. The overwhelming impression left 
on my mind ... is that without the freedom afforded them by a 
liberal Government, Jomo Kenyatta and his associates would have 
been unable to preach their calculated hymn of hate and to 
exploit, through the medium of perverted witchcraft and of 
intimidation, the almost inevitable grievances which must 
accompany the rapid evolution of a primitive society. Can 
anyone imagine what sort of African State would have arisen in 
Kenya on the foundation of Mau Mau...? 16
During the extent of the crisis, between 1952 and 1956, African
13. Ibid.. p. 22*f.
1*K Rosberg and Nottingham, op.cit.
15. Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau (Cmnd. 
1030, London, H. M. S.0., i960).
. Ibid., pp. 283-28^.16
11
political organisations were banned, while Kenyatta was imprisoned 
for alleged leadership (never fully clarified) of 'Mau Mau'. Other 
African politicians were either imprisoned or exiled. The vacuum in 
African politics was filled by the organised Trade Unions, the leader­
ship of which was taken over by a young man in his twenties, an able 
and ambitious Luo, Tom Mboya. When the ban was eased in 1956, there 
were the stipulations that political parties were to be allowed only 
at regional level and not at all in Central Province. This critically 
affected African politics as it prevented the Kikuyu from taking 
political action while it allowed the weaker tribes in outlying 
provinces to develop, with the Unions' assistance, political parties 
find policies of their own. The former political predominance of the 
Kikuyu was undermined, at least temporarily, and the centrifugal 
force of regional politics reinforced tribal allegiances by compelling 
politicians to seek support at a local level, thus halting any progress 
towards a full African nationalist party.
The British Government attempted to appease African protest by
means of the constitutional amendments contained in the Lyttleton^
18and Lennox-Boyd proposals, and by allowing the first elected African 
member on to the Legislative Council in 1956. But racial tensions 
prevailed and forced the British Government to convene a constitutional 
conference at Lancaster House, London, in January i960. The conference 
proved to be a significant watershed in Kenyan political history. The 
composition of the Council of Ministers was altered to make the African 
body the largest, though still within a multi-racial framework. The 
restrictions on African eligibility to vote were relaxed, and the new
17. Keeslng's Contemporary Archives, vol. 9, 13505A,
18. Ibid., vol. II, 16^35A.
12
electoral list comprised 20,000 Europeans, 60,000 Asians and 1,300,000 
19Africans. Independence was not far away. This was a staggering blow 
to the majority of settlers who still perceived Africans as incapable 
of maintaining responsible government.
Pre-independence p o litic s»  I 96O -I963
Though the Kikuyu and Luo traditionally disliked each other, their 
leaders saw their interests best served by uniting in the Kenya African 
National Union (K.A.N.U.) early in i960. K.A.N.U.'s leaders, namely 
James Gichuru, Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga (and later Jomo Kenyatta), 
sought to gain support from all African groups and become a truly 
'national' party. Suspicions of K.A.N.U., nevertheless, remained high 
and an opposing political party, the Kenya African Democratic Union 
(K.A.D.U.), was formed in June i960. K.A.D.U., under the leadership of 
Ronald Ngala, Daniel arap Moi and Masinde Muliro, was composed of these 
smaller tribes who felt their safety was in numbers, notably the Masai, 
Kalenjin, Somali and Coastal groups, as well as the Kamba who were 
represented in their own African People's Party. K.A.D.U. was a 
coalition of the fearful, a protective umbrella for the weaker tribes, 
but it embodied some opposing political views to K.A.N.U. The peri­
pheral tribes, particularly the Coastal and Somali groups, had always 
fought against direct control from the centre of the country. The 
central government had, in fact, always treated them as separate entities 
away from the mainstream of Kenyan life. A K.A.N.U.-K.A.D.U. clash over 
the future of the Highlands also seemed ominous, because the Kikuyu,
Luo, Kipsigis and Masai (and other smaller groups) all had genuine 
claims to land taken from them by the Europeans, land that was the
19. Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference. Held in London in 
January and February, 19fa0 (Cmnd. 960. London. H.M.S.Q.. lo^ol.
13
Table 1*2
Population Census 1969 « The Tribes
Kikuyu
Luo
Luhya
Kamba
Kalenjin
Kisii
Meru
Mijikenda
Somali
Turkana
Masai
Eabu
Taita
Others
2,201,632 
1,5a,595 
1,453,302 
1,197,712 
1,190,203 
701,679 
554,256 
520,520 
253,040 
203,177 
154,906 
117,969 
108,494 
498,594
10,677,079TOTAL
Source* Statistical Abstract 1975 (Nairobi, Ministry of Finance and 
Planning, 1975)»
most valuable in Kenya.
Foreign policy issues were important for K.A.N.U., whose members 
strongly supported Pan-Africanism and hoped to found an East African
Federation. Kenyatta's visit to Bigland in the 1930s had been a
foreign relations exercise, and it had provided a mouthpiece for the 
African movement abroad. Kenyatta had helped to foster criticism against
the treatment of Africans in the colony and so had brought pressure 
directly to hear upon the British Government. The K.A.N.U. Constitution 
of i960 contained in its 'Aims and Objects' three sections relating to 
foreign affairs:
f. To work with other nationalist democratic movements in Africa 
and other continents, with a view to eradicating imperialism, 
colonialism, neo-colonialism, racialism, and all other forms 
of national, racial or foreign oppression.
g. To support the United Nations Organisation and its various 
agencies and other international organisations for the 
promotion and consolidation of international peace and the 
peaceful settlement of international disputes, and to 
promote and encourage respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language or religion.
h. To strive for the closer Association of African territories 
and states, by promoting unity of action among the people 
of Africa and the ideal of Pan-Africanism. 20
The K.A.N.U. election manifesto of I96I confirmed these aims and
laid down specific policies for à future independent Kenya. K.A.N.U.
forcibly rejected the presence of any foreign military base in Kenya,
and proposed Africanisation of the civil service with only a minimum
amount of help from the most necessary expatriates 1
Our approach to foreign affairs will be on the lines of positive 
Independence and non-alignment with military or power blocks.
The African personality must be the basis of our approach to 
peace and human welfare. Neutrality which would compromise 
truth is not our policy. We reserve the right to oppose or 
support all issues on their merits. 21
K.A.D.U. politicians were generally less interested in foreign 
policy questions. K.A.D.U. was a defensive organisation which aimed 
essentially to protect its members inside Kenya. K.A.D.U. did, 
however, wish to keep the British bases in Kenya after independence, 
both to provide security and to collect the income from the British 
presence estimated at between £6-10 million every year. K.A.N.U.'s 201
20. The K.A.N.U. Constitution (Nairobi, anon., i960).
21. The K.A.N.U. Manifesto for Independence, Social Democracy and 
Stability (Nairobi, Patwa News Agency, i960).
15
hostility to the concept of a foreign military presence after independ­
ence and the party’s calls for a strong central government gained support 
from other powerful nationalist groups in East Africa. Links forged 
in the Pan-African Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central and Southern 
Africa (P.A.F.M.E.C.S.A.) were maintained.22 For the 1963 election, 
T.A.N.U. of Tanganyika supplied eleven Land Rovers to help canvassing 
and also financed the K.A.N.U. manifesto. The U.P.C. of Uganda was 
generous with funds as were the governments of Egypt, Ghana, Algeria 
and Ethiopia.2"^ After many years of colonial rule, Kenyans wanted their 
country to play a strong role in African and world affairs. This gave 
K.A.N.U. a distinct advantage and gave little opportunity to K.A.D.U. to 
take any new initiatives of its own.
The British Withdrawal
Vhile many observers focused their attentions upon the political 
struggle between K.A.N.U. and K.A.D.U., few contemporary observers 
grasped the true nature of the British withdrawal. Recently two 
excellent books have been published which probe deeply into the actions
o /iof the British at this time. It is not the intention here to cover 
this ground again, except where it affects our understanding of foreign 
policy. It is now evident that the Corfield Report did not command 
complete acceptance from European settlers when published in i960.
Quite a large proportion of liberal settlers were already looking 
towards some form of broad-based alliance with moderate African leaders. *V
22 Richard Cox, Pan-Africanism in Practice! p. A.F.M.E.C.S. A._l%j8 - 
196^ (London, O.U.P., 196^).
V Clvde Sanger and John Nottingham, 'The Kenya General Election of 
3’ 1 * 3 J, U . U . 3 ., 2. 1(19*0. PP.
2 >^ Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya. The Political Economy of 
Neo-Colonialism 196^-1971 (London, Heinemann, 1975).
— Gary Washerman. Politics of Decolonization! Kenya Europeans and 
the Land Issue I96O-I962 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976).
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K.A.D.U. provided potential allies in the early I960-I96I period.
Its leaders were agreeable to close links with the métropole, most 
noticeably so in the retention of British troops in Kenya after 
independence. In terms of strategic and economic interests, Harold 
Hacmillan*s ’wind of change* was to blow through the country with little 
serious threat to British interests. However, the nationalists of 
K.A.N.U. proved that they, with or without Kenyatta, commanded majority 
support in the country and British interests reconciled themselves with 
this fact. By 1962, the British Government and liberal settlers in 
Kenya backed K.A.N.U. and desired early independence. Investments in 
the country and the economy in general had run down since i960 and quick 
independence and a return to stability held out the only hope for 
European settlers and investors.
The crucial issue affecting peaceful withdrawal was that of land.
The New Kenya Party (N.K.P.), the most influential settler group, had
stressed the importance of land in its Plan for Successt
The Party recognises that many European farmers have grave doubts 
as to whether their individual mixed farming enterprises will be 
able to survive ... The whole weight of our efforts will 
therefore be thrown into policies designed to create conditions 
in which European farming enterprises can continue and prosper. 25
Directly opposed to the settlers were the former *Mau ffeu' fighters who 
called for free land distribution after independence. Such an occurr­
ence would have caused the flight of Europeans front Kenya and short-term, 
if not long-term, falls in agricultural production, the mainstay of the 
economy. Needless to say, other European investments in the country 
would have suffered and disappeared along with the farming interests.
K.A.N.U. politicians accepted the viewpoint that there were dangers 35
35. plan for Success (Nairobi, New Kenya Party, I960), pp. 14-15.
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in a rapid take-over of land without due financial payment to 
Europeans. They decided to buy the land from those settlers who 
wanted to sell at market prices with loans granted by the British 
Government and the World Bank. The Kenyan elite gained by such a move 
because vast numbers of landless were resettled quickly on to small areas 
of land while large fertile farms were reserved for the rich Kenyans 
who could afford them. Potential unrest was nipped in the bud and 
the elite stepped into the shoes of the outgoing Europeans. Provision 
was also made far Europeans to stay if they wished. By agreeing to buy 
the land, the Kenyan nationalists turned their backs upon their ideology 
which stated that the land had been stolen from them by the Europeans. 
They accepted the colonial situation virtually without modification.
This was to have serious consequences, because the options open to 
Kenyan leaders in foreign policy matters became linked to the evolving 
neo-colonial situation. The land transfer programme, the position in 
power of the Kenyan elite, the development targets of the country, all 
these came to rest upon the relationship of Kenya with the West, and in 
particular with Britain.
Many European settlers found it difficult to cast off their doubts 
about Kenyatta and saw in him the cause of their downfall. Gradually 
there was a change of attitude, perhaps best exemplified by Sir Patrick 
Benison who, in the early 1960s, was Governor of Kenya. In Iky I960, 
he had said}
Jomo Kenyatta was the recognised leader of the non-co-operation 
movement which organised 'Mau Ma.u*. *Mau feu', with its foul 
oathing and violent aims, had been declared an unlawful society. 
He was convicted of managing that unlawful society and being a 
member of it .... Here was the African leader to darkness and 
death. 26 26
26. Murray-Brown, op. cit.. pp. 300-301.
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Renison believed that the future prosperity of Kenya depended upon the 
co-operation of all races which, in simple terms, meant that an 
independent Kenya had to have a tacit partnership between Africans and 
Europeans. And as Renison stated, 'I have at present no evidence 
whatsoever that Jomo Kenyatta will help in these aims
Barely a year later, however, Renison had reversed his opinion
and personally sanctioned the release of Kenyatta from detention.
To support his views, Renison wrote to the Secretary of State in London«
... Kenyatta has given every indication that he is now in no 
way irreconcilable to the maintenance of law and order and to the 
association of all peoples of Kenya with its progress to 
independence in an East African setting based on a sound 
economy. 28
A ’sound economy' was obviously one which respected European interests
and this showed that the Kenyan leader was willing to accommodate the
various interest groups in independent Kenya. This was not only a
sign of Kenyatta's compliance with foreign interests, but showed also
a change of perception by the British Government and settlers. The
realisation grew that Kenyatta was not really Jomo. the 'burning
spear* of African radicalism, but had been a conservative nationalist 
29all along. 17 He was a man who bore few grudges and could write of his 
Suffering without bitterness. a man who had spent many years living 
in England (and had been educated at the London School of Economics) and 
who had assimilated the values and aspirations of the West and wanted 
the West's assistance to achieve similar goals in Kenya. 2789*
27. Ibid.
28. Despatch from Governor, Kenya to Secretary of State for the 
Colonies. Release of Jomo Kenyatta (Cmnd. 1459. London. H.M.S.O.,
1961), p. 3.
29. Donald C. Savage, 'Kenyatta and the Development of African 
Nationalism in Kenya', International Journal, vol. xxv, no. 3, 
Summer 1970» PP* 518-537» Jomo means 'burning spear' in Kikuyu.
30, Kenyatta, op.cit.
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By 1962, then, the British Government and settlers had clearly 
switched their support from K.A.D.U. to K.A.N.U., but it remained to 
be seen to what extent K. A.N.U. could enforce its authority over the 
weaker party.
K.A.N.U. versus K.A.D.U.
With the solid support of the British Government, K.A.N.U. during
1963 gained control of the political apparatus of the country. The
party won an overwhelming victory in the election of May 1963 despite
31serious internal squabbles. On 1 June, Jomo Kenyatta took office
as Prime Minister within the framework of internal self-government.
The new constitution had, in most parts, been settled a year earlier
32at the second Lancaster House conference, but it had not been 
published until April I963 owing to problems concerning constituency 
delimitation and the Northern Frontier District. It was the most 
complex constitution ever written for any British colony approaching 
independence, thus exemplifying the difficulties encountered in gaining 
the agreement of all the interested parties. Kenyatta, unconditionally 
released from detention in August I96I, had led K.A.N.U. in obtaining 
a constitution with a strong central government under the leadership 
of a Prime Minister who held a majority in the Lower House, the House 
of Representatives. K.A.D.U.'s fear that the 'Westminster model' gave 
too much power to the majority, however small, was catered for by 
having an Upper House, the Senate, composed of members from each of the 
regions of Kenya. Six (later seven) Regional Assemblies were established 
to devolve power away from Nairobi. 312
31. Sanger and Nottingham, op.cit. Also, Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru 
(London, Heinemann, 1968), pp. 193-238.
32. Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference. 1962 (Ctend. 1700
London, H.M.S.O., 1962). ‘ *
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Under the constitution, the Governor remained in charge of Defence, 
External Affairs and Internal Security, but on 30 Kay the Governor, 
Malcolm MacDonald, acted within his powers of discretion and passed 
on these functions to Kenyatta. On the surface this presented a rather 
anomalous situation because Kenya's colonial status meant that in 
international law only Britain could act for Kenya in foreign affairs# 
But in reality, the British Government knew that its interests and 
those of the Kenya Government coincided, and so it risked nothing by 
such a magnanimous gesture, indeed, the Governor confirmed that Jomo 
Kenyatta was very co-operative during this period to the extent that 
all government papers, irrespective of content, were sent to him for 
inspection without request. ^
In mid June, discussions were held in London to prepare the way 
for a final conference to settle the constitution which was to operate 
in Kenya after independence. Tom Mboya, the Minister for Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs, made it clear that the Kenya Government wanted 
specific dates both for the forthcoming conference and for independence 
itself. Independence was desirable before the end of the year, 
particularly to achieve two foreign policy goals, namely admission into 
the United Nations that session and to facilitate the continuing talks 
between Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika concerning possible federation.^ 
Mboya repeated K.A.N.U. *s pledge to have a Bepublio immediately at 
independence with an executive President. Finally, he requested inter*- 
governmental talks with only token K.A.D.U. representation, so reflect­
ing the political situation in Kenya.
33*. Interview with i&lcolm MacDonald on 8 August 1978.
3*f. It appeared later that the federation issue was being used to 
hasten Kenyan independence rather than the goal of federation 
itself; see chapter four.
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The British Government decided in July-^ that independence was
to be granted on 12 December 1963 and that a conference to finalise
the constitution was to be convened in London at the end of September.
The third constitutional conference opened on schedule with Duncan
Sandys, the Colonial Secretary, in the Chair. The Kenya Government
had twelve representatives, with K.A.D.U. having half of that figure
and the European settlers a quarter. The gulf between the government
and K.A.D.U. over the constitution was apparent at the first session.
Kenyatta made clear the position of his government*
We cannot agree that merely because the present constitution was 
the result of agreements at the last Lancaster House conference, 
it is sacrosanct .... The fact is that the present constitution 
was the subject of massive compromises, artificial feelings 
of mistrust and fear and arbitration by the Secretary of State. 
It failed completely to satisfy the majority of people whose 
lives it was supposed to govern and has brought contention 
after contention. In the interest of harmony in Kenya, and in 
recognition of the majority opinion in the country, the 
constitution must be amended. 36
The British Government informed the conference that it had no 
intention of changing the constitution after having spent so much time 
balancing the various interest groups. Pressure from the K.A.N.U. 
delegation forced a reversal of this position, highlighting Britain's 
commitment to Kenyatta's government, but this was not before K.A.D.U. 
had tried to exert its own pressure on London. On 9 October, K.A.D.U. 
leaders in Kenya produced a map of a secessionist 'Kenya Pepublic'.
The 'Bepublic* consisted of a horse-shoe of K. A. D.U.-controlled 
peripheral regions, with really only the Central and Western Regions 
left to the K.A.N.U. government. The map was signed by twenty-five 
Senators and M.F.s, including Daniel arap Moi, the K.A.D.U. Chairman.' 
The new state was to have Nakuru as its capital, and was to be
35. Kenya* Preparations for Independence (Cmnd. 2082, London, H.M.S.O.
36. The Times, 26 September I963.
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represented and governed by Ngala (President), Moi (Vice-President)
37and Muliro (Prime Minister). That secession was a possibility cannot 
be doubted, but it was not a very real one. It seemed more likely 
that this gesture was aimed to generate support for the K. A. D. U. 
negotiators in London, and perhaps to provoke government arrests in 
order to mobilise the angry smaller tribes.
The plan backfired on K.A.D.U. Ngala and Muliro dismissed the 
plan for secession out of hand, and they sent one of the party rushing 
back to Nairobi to discover exactly what the plan was and to urge
all K.A.D.U. members to bide their time and wait for a settlement in
38London. The British Government remained unimpressed and, if anything,
became even less partial to the minority's views. Oh the day following
the secession threat, Kenyatta made a radio broadcast calling on all
39Kenyans to 'keep calm', 7 though most remained so throughout the 
discussions. The continuing deadlock forced the Acting Prime Minister, 
Joseph Murumbi, to take his own action on 15 October. In a cable 
sent to Kenyatta, he saldi
It is the unanimous desire of Kenya to call off the London 
constitutional talks in view of the Secretary of State's 
deplorable attitude which is a deliberate insult to the Kenya 
nation. In our opinion there is no need for the formality of 
* an Independence Bill to be passed in the British Parliament.
The nation wishes to declare 20 October as Independence Day 
for Kenya. We deplore the half-measures, vacillations, and 
double-dealing in the talks. Please come back in time for the 
full independence oath of office on 20 October. ¿K)
37. Ibid., 10 October 1963.
38. mast African Standard, 11 October 1963.
39* .Ibid.
40. The Times, 16 October 1963. 20 October is 'Kenyatta Day' which
commemorates the day Kenyatta was arrested in 1952 during 'feu feu*.
23
This was overt pressure upon the British Government to settle 
the constitution immediately. K.A.D.U.*s threat of secession had 
not carried much conviction, "but the Kenya Government's plan for 
immediate independence, with or without formal blessing, was a more 
serious threat. A unilateral declaration of independence would have 
had disastrous consequences for British interests in Kenya and so had 
to be avoided. The British Government had agreed in principle to 
Kenyan independence in December and so there was little reason in 
British obduracy at the conference. Furthermore, bargains had been 
struck on all the important economic matters and so there seemed little 
sense in becoming bogged down in debates on constitutional details.
The government had the support of three-quarters of the Kenyan 
population, and this made it unrealistic for the British not to lean 
towards the K.A.N.U. viewpoint. Duncan Sandys acted quickly and, 
having overruled K.A.D.U. *s objections, made the decisions public.**1
The amendments to the constitution were of two types, namely 
those which had been agreed upon by all sides and those which, in 
effect, had been forced upon the K.A.D.U. minority by the two govern­
ments. Those amendments in the first group were not of a particularly 
serious political nature and concerned such things as the availability 
of Kenyan citizenship, the appointment when necessary of a Special 
Commissioner for the regions, and the bringing of statutes for Weights 
a wA Measures under the central government. Those amendments in the 
second group were clearly against K.A.D.U's interests and gave the 
party grounds for complaint. All were clearly aimed at reducing the 
threat which the Kenya Government believed regionalism held to national 
unity. Conversely, K.A.D.U. perceived national unity in the government's
41. Kenya Independence Conference I963 (Cmnd. 2156, London, H.M.S.O.,
I9S37:
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terms as a threat to its own existence and interests. For example, it 
was decided that tribal origins were not to be specified when making 
an application for employment. The government considered this to be 
for the sake of national unity while K.A.D.U. saw it as a ploy for 
the Kikuyu and Luo to maintain their domination of the top positions.
No attempt was to be made to aid the disadvantaged regions in balancing 
out employment ratios. As concessions by the government, however, the 
regional nature of the constitution, with all its safeguards, was 
accepted and the call to have a Republic at independence, with a 
strong executive President, was dropped.
After the conference, a leader in The Times spoke of the 'Broken 
Covenant' of the British Government to the people of Kenya, but was, 
nevertheless, hopeful of a just and lasting solution. Duncan Sandy3 
held similar hopes«
I know that there are some who will consider it wrong of the 
British Government to approve any departure whatsoever from the 
provisions previously agreed. I fully understand their feelings» 
and I can assure them that before taking any decision we most 
earnestly considered our obligations. As a result we came to 
the clear conclusion that it was our duty to do what was in the 
best interests of Kenya in the years ahead. 43
The arrangements were also clearly in the best interests of the British
Government and European financial interests in the country because the
backing of a strong central government provided some hope for a quick
return to stability. The British gambled that regionalism in Kenya
was not the same force it was in other parts of the continent, such
as in Nigeria. With hindsight, this appeared to have been a safe bet
because the opposition party fizzled out within a year and the majlmbo
or regional constitution for which the party had fought so hard was 423
42. The Times, 21 October 1963.
43. Kenya Independence Conference 1963. op.clt.. annex A, section 31,
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scrapped when the country because a Republic in December 1964. K.A.D.U. 
leaders, as we shall now see, were then brought into the government 
and presented no further challenge to national unity.
The Outlook at Independence
At independence, contradictory forces appeared to be at work in 
Kenya. A strong nationalist party haul wrestled independence from the 
British and stood ready to implement policies which aimed to change 
the country from an underprivileged colony to a strong and egalitarian 
African independent state. It seemed that this would force the new 
leadership to clash with traditional settler interests and so cause 
a setback in the economic position of the country. As it was, the 
British had managed to steer their way through the tangled web of 
nationalist movements and constitutional conferences and came out in 
1963 relatively unscathed. The desire of the nationalists to maintain 
close links with Britain, even if it meant compromising their political 
ideology, gave a further positive impetus to the British position.
Within Kenya, the government faced the task of building a viable 
nation and forging unity within the country, which meant that any 
ethnic or secessionary pressures had to be dealt with swiftly and, 
if possible, justly in order to prevent their reoccurrence. Linked 
to this was another major goal of providing for the welfare and 
development of the people. Unless everybody felt that they were gaining 
something from the government, internal dissension was likely to grow. 
The possibility that development would reflect the relative influence 
of the various ethnic groups caused concern to many in 1963. Elspeth 
Huxley had felt in March 1963 that 'Kenya's gravest lack is in 
constructive African leadership able to transcend the deep-seated 
factionalism based on race and tribe. Uhuru could peter out like a
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clogged river in a welter of distrust, argy-bargy and hatred - and
44-even in the ultimate civil war.• The East African Standard had 
written in a similar vein shortly after the achievement of internal 
self-government t 'What Kenya needs to cultivate is unity, not the 
prolongation of tribal differences through a sharpening of the regional 
system which, in the beginning, was agreed by both parties and the 
British Government in order to allay these very fears.
Initial fears that K.A.D.U. would not co-operate with the 
government were soon dispelled. The voluntary dissolution of the 
party in 1964 highlighted the fact that there were few, if any, 
ideological differences between the governing elite and the K.A.D.U. 
elite. Both favoured capitalist development in association with 
western countries and both hoped to gain, at a personal level, from
t
such links. At a wider level, there were also benefits in supporting 
the government because this increased the chances of the K.A.D.U. 
tribes gaining their fair share of development funds. The raison 
d 'etre of K.A.D.U. was to gain whatever was possible for its supporters 
and, after 1964, this could be achieved more easily without the formal 
party apparatus.
A much more serious threat to the domestic and foreign policy 
orientations of the government was to emerge from the fact that it 
was difficult to implement the reforms originally promised by Kenyatta 
and still maintain the neo-colonial arrangements. In 1966, Jomo 
Kenyatta's close friend and the country's Vice-President, Oginga 
Odinga, broke away from K.A.N.U. and established the Kenya People’s 45
44. Bast African Standard, 8 March 1963.
45. Ibid., 14 June 1963.
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Union (K.P.U.). The K.P.U. called, for a radical transformation of 
Kenyan society and an end to the dependence upon the West. Though 
the K.P.U. was pushed hack largely on to a Luo tribal base, it 
formalised opposition on ideological grounds and represented altern­
ative viewpoints on development and foreign policy which were prevalent 
throughout the 1970s, even after the party's proscription.
The problem of secession was also a serious one for the government
to face. The amount of patience and severity, the use of carrot and
stick, with the smaller tribes would be important if they were to
be brought into the nation. The major difficulties, however, emanated
from outside of Kenya's borders. The frontiers with Uganda, Sudan,
Ethiopia and Tanganyika were accepted by all and caused little concern.
Two areas of contention remained to be settled. Firstly, the Kenya
Protectorate, better known as the Coastal Strip, was historically
linked to Zanzibar. Since the 1890s, the British Government had paid
a rental for use of the strip to the Sultan of Zanzibar. The Sultan
laid vague claims to sovereignty over the strip, but Kenyans opposed
these claims. The strip, with the important trading port of Mombasa,
was in e x trica b ly  linked to the rest of Kenya. An agreement was reached
in October I963 whereby full sovereignty was granted to Kenya on the
L6attainment of independence. The Sultan's bargaining position had 
been a weak one, not helped by Zanzibar's heavy dependence upon British 
aid. Nevertheless, before the Sultan had agreed to relinquish his 
claims, he had received from Kenyatta a note committing the government
Kenya Coastal Strio» Agreement between the Government of the United 
Kingdom, His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar, the Government of 
Vpnva and the Government ox’ Zanzibar (Cmnd. 2161,' London, H.M.S. 0., 
I963y* Also, The Kenya Coastal Strip. Report of the Commissioner 
(Cmnd. 1585, London, H.M.S.O., 1961)} Report of the Kenya Coastal 
Strip Conference 1962 (Cmnd. 1701, London, H.M.S.O., 1962).
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to safeguard the interests of the Arab community in the strip.
The territorial dispute with the Somali Republic over the 
Northern Frontier District (N.F.D.) was a much more difficult problem 
to solve. The government always stated th*t the Somalis living in the 
N.F.D. had the right to be integrated into the country as a whole, 
and the dispute tested not only the finite resources of the new state 
but also the difficulties of moulding an ethnic conglomeration into 
a viable, meaningful nation. This dispute will be dealt with in 
detail in chapter three.
The foreign policy to be pursued in major international arenas, 
in particular the United Nations and the Organisation of African 
Unity, was influenced to a large extent by the country's own experience 
of, and revulsion with, colonialism. The government followed the 
common African path of a highly moralistic foreign policy, as well as 
a firm commitment to non-alignment, which was to allow the country's 
leaders to judge each issue on its individual merits and not how one 
or other of the power blocs wanted them to judge it. In practice, 
this policy of non-alignment was undermined to a large extent by the 
country's close economic relationship with the Vest. Certainly,
European investment and settler interests were strong enough to influence 
Kenyan policies if and when necessary, but it was evident, and became 
increasingly evident throughout the years, that Kenyatta and his 
colleagues favoured these links not just for their own benefit (the 
thrust of the neo-colonial thesis) but because they sincerely believed 
that everybody in Kenya was to benefit from such links.
IConclusion
The colonial period witnessed a gradual hardening of attitudes
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against the settlers by the African majority, a process which led 
eventually to independence for the colony. The assimilation of European 
values and aspirations by the African leaders during this period, rather 
than causing a rejection of the colonial links at independence, 
provided the stimulus for a pro-western orientation in foreign policy 
and development priorities. Britain's decision to axe the colony 
without any apparent bitterness laid the foundation for a friendly co­
existence. Tensions between the two governments rapidly dissolved.
The transfer of power was eased by the agreement to buy out the settlers 
at full face-value for their land, while trade between the countries 
remained as important as ever. In short, rather than break with the 
past, Kenyatta decided to continue and strengthen the links with the 
West in order to provide for the development of the country.
The effects of the close association were far-reaching as will 
be shown in future chapters. Foreign policy options became limited 
by western influence, and as the freedom for manoeuvre was confined 
to fixed parameters in foreign policy, so domestic unrest became 
apparent. In the East African arena, the economy, boosted by multi­
national interests, was too strong for the comfort of the country's 
partners and this problem lay at the heart of the East African 
Community's demise. Kenya's professed drive for capitalist growth, 
with European backing, led to unequal growth in the region.
Kenya's reliance upon the West for its military requirements in 
the Ehst African and Indian Ocean arenas helped leave the country with 
one of the weakest military capabilities in the region, as well as 
the continent as a whole in Gross National Product to population terras. 
The war in the Horn of Africa in 1977-1978 and the perception that the 
West was backing the country's enemy, the Somali Republic, shocked
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Kenyan leaders and forced them to reassess the country's position in 
relation to the West. This thesis shows the extent to which Kenya 
was dependent upon the West and thus highlights the difficulties 
which the country had. and will have in the future, in formulating a 
truly independent foreign policy.
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Chapter Two
Donestic Structure and Foreign Policy
The development of foreign policy analysis as a subject in its own 
right has caused, and has been a cause of, a growing awareness of the 
interrelated nature of the domestic and external environments. Foreign 
policy analysis has added a further dimension to the traditional fields 
of political science and international politics by helping to explain 
the interaction, or linkage, of the two.
The aim of this chapter is to examine how the domestic political 
and administrative structure of Kenya shaped the content of foreign 
policy. This is not a straightforward exercise because it is often 
difficult to pinpoint from where a certain policy originated and whether - 
domestic considerations affected external ones or vice versa. Further­
more, when the decision-making process is masked by extreme secretive­
ness, as is the case with Kenya, the problems of analysis are increased. 
It then becomes easy to accept the popular view that the domestic 
structure consists of a charismatic President and nothing else.
Although there is more than a grain of truth in this assertion, it is 
by no means the complete picture of the decision-malting process.
The importance of a variety of internal factors in the shaping of 
the foreign policies of less developed countries (L.D.C.s) has been 
doubted for many years, but has recently been recognised as worthy of 
study, ^ This is not to say that the internal political structures of 
African states are as complex or as important as those in more developed 1
1. Christopher Hill, 'Theories of foreign policy making for the develop­
ing countries' in Christopher Clapham, Foreign policy making in 
developing states (Farnborough, Saxon House, 1977) pp. 1 '»
32
countries, but that they should, nevertheless, be studied. This chapter 
looks, in turn, at the role of the governing elite group composed of the 
President and his Cabinet, the bureaucracy, the National Assembly, the 
Armed Forces, Trade Unions and business interests, and the media. The 
second part of the chapter discusses events within the domestic 
political arena during the I96O3 and 1970s. This draws upon the 
material presented earlier to put into perspective the domestic sector 
and to show its relevance in the formulation and implementation of 
Kenyan foreign policy.
The governing elite» the President and his Cabinet
It is now commonly accepted that, in all countries, responsibility 
for foreign policy decision-making rests largely on an elite group 
within society. This elite group rationalises decisions taken to be in 
the interests of the nation as a whole, but often they are mainly to 
their own advantage. The 'elite* of Kenyan society can be seen in 
terse of a number of overlapping groups - military, business, 
administrative - but with the governing political elite wielding the 
most influence.
By far the most dominant actor within the political system was the 
President himself. In terms of domestic politics, his role was to hold 
the centre of the stage and bring together, as well as at times keep 
apart, the various competing groups within society. He had an equally 
important role to play in the formulation of foreign policy. It is 
interesting to consider how Jorao Kenyatta was able to achieve and 
maintain this prominence in the political system. The discussion can 
be framed around the words of Fred I. Greenstein who, writing on the 
impact of personality on politics, said in one section that 'the impact 
of an individual's actions varies with (1 ) the degree to which the
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actions take place in an environment which admits of restructuring,
(2) the location of the actor in that environment, and (3) the actor's
2peculiar strengths or weaknesses'.
It can be concluded that Kenyatta was able to capitalise on all 
three qualifications and so take on the most influential role in the 
political system. The time of independence provided an excellent 
environment for restructuring the political nature of the state, 
although less so the economic, because of the residual colonial 
interests. Joao Kenyatta's status as the nationalist hero, the 
•burning spear', gave him the popular backing to control the government 
however he wished. His control over the spoils of office assured him 
the support of the majority of his colleagues. Finally, Kenyatta's 
shrewdness and ability, combined with his 'charisma*, made him a very 
powerful political figure, and one against whom a serious political 
rival had very little chance of success.
During Kenyatta's long period in office, there were never any 
serious contenders for his position. The only two potential opponents, 
Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga, could not match the strength of Kenyatta, 
and oily Odinga tried. Kenyatta's personal impact upon policy gave the 
country an overwhelmingly pro-western orientation. Kenyatta was a 
conservative, and so was happy to chart out foreign policy within the 
parameters of a loose association with the West. As far as day to day- 
affairs, his advanced age made him reluctant to be personally involved 
in all but the most important decisions. He, nevertheless, was the 
final arbiter, f&lcolm MacDonald, Britain's representative in Kenya
2. Fred I. Greenstein, 'The Impact of Personality on Politics* an 
Attempt to clear away underbrush', The American Political Science 
Review, vo l lX i ,  no. 3, September I967, pp. 633 - 634.
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during the 1960s, witnessed this facts
... he delegated a lot of the less important things to 
his ministers. Actually, if I may say so, he kept his 
eye on them, and they knew his eye was on them* and if 
they did something he disapproved of they would be 
ticked off. But he left them free in that sort of 
atmosphere to get on with the job. If they weren't 
sure whether the old man was going to agree with what 
they meant to do, then they mentioned it to him, and he 
said Yes or No, and that was the decision. But he 
himself concentrated on the major matters ... 3
Even on very important matters where Kenyatta personally took charge,
he usually preferred to seek Cabinet backing for his plans before
implementation.
The Cabinet, composed of selected ministers from the National 
Assembly, could be classed as the widest extension of the governing 
elite responsible far policy-making. The Cabinet was itself open to 
a series of pressures, notably bureaucratic and ethnic. The civil 
service is discussed in detail below, but it will suffice to say here 
that the administrative organisation of Kenya gave top civil servants 
direct access to the President and the Cabinet, and so they proved to 
be powerful in the domestic political structure.
Ethnic factors also played an important role in the decision­
making machinery, at times uniting the various sub-groups into an 
homogenous unit and other times keeping these groups apart. The 
Cabinet itself was a symbol of the attempts made by Kenyatta to forge 
unity in the nation. All the various ethnic groups were represented in 
order to offset any doubts that certain groups were being favoured more 
than others in the development process. So, for example, after Tom 
Mboya’s assassination in 19&9, three other Luos were promoted in the 3
3. *Kenyatta* The Man I Knew*, Commonwealth. December — January 1979, 
P» ^5« *
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Cabinet to appease the discontented tribe.^
The Cabinet formally held the initiative in formulating foreign 
policy but in practice often proved too large and mvieldly for either 
quick or crucial decisions. Within the Cabinet there developed an 
Inner Cabinet of a handful of Kenyatta's closest friends and colleagues 
who usually discussed and moulded a policy before it went on to the 
full Cabinet. The composition of the Inner Cabinet was also influenced 
by ethnic as well as political considerations. Those closest to the 
President, his confidants, were Kiambu Kikuyu - the Attorney-General, 
Charles Njonjo, the Minister of State at the all-important Office of 
the President, Mbiyu Koinange, and the sometime Foreign Minister 
personal physician of Kenyatta, Njoroge Mungai. Two others could be 
designated in this intimate circle as dose colleagues, even though 
they did not share the same ethnic background - the Finance Minister, 
Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu but not from Kiambu, and the Vice-President and 
Minister of Home Affairs, Daniel axap Moi, a Kalenjin.
It would be a miscalculation to lay too much emphasis upon ethnic 
considerations, certainly as far as foreign policy decision-making was 
concerned. There was a slight breach between Kenyatta's closest 
colleagues, re-emphasised after his death when the new President 
arap Moi spumed both Mungai and Koinange, though not Njonjo, end 
brought Kibaki in as Vice-President. Also, certain groups, especially 
the Luo, felt that the links with external capital were monopolised 
by the Kikuyu so leading to greater development in Central Province 4
4. Financial Times, 25 July 1969*
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than in Nyanza.^ But so far as the major orientations of foreign 
policy, the capitalist development programme, the retention of close 
economic and political links with the West, support for the U.N. and
O.A.U. on the southern African problem, these and other fundamental 
policy matters caused little dissent among the governing elite who all 
shared similar aspirations and goals with the President,
The homogeneity of the Cabinet, as witnessed by the absence of 
major splits or defections (except Odinga) as well as by the permanency 
of most of its members, allowed ministers to have freedom to act because 
Kenyatta felt whatever decision was made would reflect his own views. 
Despite this freedom, Kenyatta maintained a decisive position in policy­
making, as well as the power of patronage within the political system. 
His strong position made him by far the most important actor in foreign 
policy decisions and gave him the opportunity to stamp his own
*•* >
personality onto the nation's political and economic plans. Kenyatta 
and the governing elite group as a whole were responsible for foreign
policy, but they were open to pressure from other groups within society 
to which we shall now turn.
The Bureaucracy
The role of the bureaucracy or administrative organisation in 
foreign policy-making has increasingly attracted the interest of 
scholars. Whereas complex organisational models5 6 were drawn up to
5 .  Donald S. Rothchild, 'Ethnic Ihequalities in Kenya» t 7 m  i c „ , 
(1*9). PP- «89-711, David Court and Kenneth S u  7’
Region in Kenya» a note on Politicai Learnimr' T h * \ . ? + Ì v e r s u s  
of Politi** scianca, voi. 4. * *  i . ^ u ^
£ £  ^  S - o e r t ^ o i r t o a  (Boston, LitUe.
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explain the position of the bureaucracy in developed countries, little 
thought was given to similar models for the developing countries where 
it was for a long time felt that the bureaucracy had an insignificant 
role to play in policy-making. For example, one scholar felt that the 
lack of information available in the bureaucracy of a developing 
country persudded the President to consider any advice to be suspect 
and led him to act on his own judgement. However, to counter this, 
our awareness of perception and imagery can tell us that on many 
occasions the bureaucracy in a developed country could also be ignored
O
by a President or policy elite group.
In recent years, the balance has shifted in favour of studying
the role of the bureaucracy in the decision-making process of develop- 
oing countries. It has already been stated that the charismatic 
President. Jorao Kenyatta, was the principal actor in the decision-making 
apparatus, but he was dependent to some extent upon information and 
advice from those directly involved in foreign affairs. Consequently, 
we need to look at the organisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
its ability to collect accurate information on events outside of the 
country, and its role, along with other interested ministries, in the 
formulation of foreign policy.
An examination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as shown in
7 Joel S. Migdal, ' Internal Structure and External Behaviour* 
'* Explaining the Foreign Policies of Third World States', International 
Relations, vol. iv, no. 5, May 1974, pp. 510-525.
« v«tpr R. Baehr, 'Small States* A Tool for Analysis', World Politics,
* vol. xxvil, no. 3* April 1975. PP. 456-466.
o. Ibid.; Hill. on. clt.* Franklin B. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Foreign 
Policy in Indonesia. An Approach to the analysis of Foreign Policy 
in the Less Developed Countries1, World Politics, vol. xxiv, no. 3, 
April 1972, PP. 356-381. *
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Table 2tl
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Decision-Making Structure (1977)
NJB. Number of personnel in each division in brackets
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Table 2x1, provides a breakdown of the various divisions or areas of 
interest. The largest division, after protocol, was concerned with 
economics and trade, thus highlighting their central importance in the 
country's foreign policy. The central pivot as regards the flow of 
information was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was in a position 
to absorb information presented by the divisions as well as by other 
ministries, and then represent these views in the Cabinet or personally 
with the President. In turn, the Foreign Minister passed on the 
decisions made on a specific issue to the division concerned for 
implementation.
The combined processes of information-collection and policy- 
implementation were carried out abroad by the country's embassies.
As can be seen from Table 2x2, most of the Kenyan missions were to be 
found in the West and in Africa, and this quite obviously reflected 
the country's interests and necessities. Further missions were to be 
found in Kampala and Dar es Salaam, though Community practice did not
T a m e  zxz
Kenyan Hissions Abroad 1977
WEST AFRICA INTERN ATICNAL----— ------ OTHERSORGANISAT! CITS
U.K. Egypt Ü.N. (New York) U.S.S.R.
U.S.A. Somalia F.A.O. (Rome)
W, Germany Zaire
France Ethiopia i
Sweden Zambia
- Nigeria
Sourcex Directory of Diplomatie Com.,. ^  ^  (Nalro„
allow for them to be regarded as diplomatic missions. The government 
was clearly disadvantaged by the absence of missions in countries 
outside of the western orbit, and this affected the amount of inform­
ation available on which to base foreign policy. Given this situation, 
it was unlikely that the prevalent image held by the governing elite 
of the non-western world would be changed, and there was little 
evidence to suggest that the government was concerned about a re- 
evaluation of these relations.
In 1973, the Kenya Government announced it was opening more 
embassies as suited its requirements, but apart from reopening diplo­
matic relations with the People’s Republic of China after a break of 
over a decade, there was little surprise in the choices of Japan,
Canada and the European Economic Community (Brussels) .10 * Additional 
information upon which to base policy decisions was forthcoming from 
the large number of foreign diplomatic missions accredited to Nairobi. 1 1  
This provided the government with a greater variety of diplomatic 
contacts than could have been gained, or warranted in financial terms 
abroad.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while formally charged with the 
tasks of developing and implementing the country's foreign policy, was 
not engaged in policy-making on its own and was joined by many other 
ministries, notably Finance and Planning, Commerce and Industry, 
Defence, Agriculture and Education. This means that to understand the 
bureaucratic structure as it concerned foreign policy-making it is
iO. A.R.B., 1978, p. 5100.
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necessary to look at «any ministries acting together rather than one 
ministry, that of Foreign Affairs. It would be difficult, however, to 
draw up an accurate scenario of the interaction between the various 
ministries because of the secrecy in which the decision-making process 
was carried on as well as the fluidity of the machinery. It is 
possible, though, to isolate some measure of conflict between ministries 
over certain aspects of policy. For example, the decision not to break 
off diplomatic relations with Britain over Rhodesian »independence* in 
1965 clearly upset'the Foreign Ministry which had supported the move at 
a previous O.A.U. meeting. It is clear that on this occasion the 
lobbying by commercial and business groups within the decision-making 
structure won the day. Another two examples can be noted from the mid 
1970s. Firstly, the question of whether to support »dialogue' with 
South Africa produced conflict within the civil service, with the 
Attorney-General leading the protagonists of dialogue against the 
Foreign Ministry. A second example can be seen concerning how to 
deal with the East African Community, where the Foreign and Finance 
ministries tried to influence those other sections of the bureaucracy 
which were less keen to maintain the links. 12
These examples can provide us with tentative conclusions to show 
that there were times when different ministries clashed oyer what 
should be the nature of foreign policy, and so these bureaucratic 
»inputs» were important considerations in the formulation of policy, 
in general, there appeared to be a common set of principles and goals 
which provided a unifying influence on both the bureaucratic and the 
governing elites. This set of values was largely a result of 
conditioning during the colonial period. Kenyatta realised at the time
12. See chapters four and five for in depth dlscuaslona of these issues.
of Independence that to rule the country efficiently it was necessary 
to have a strong civil service. To facilitate this, he adopted more or 
less the same administrative structure which had been present during 
the colonial period and, to attract personnel, kept the same life-style 
and salary levels that Europeans had held previously. Of more 
importance in political terms, Kenyatta allowed the civil servants to 
hold effective power in the country rather than the elected represent­
atives of the people. This assured the top administrators direct 
access to the President and an important position in the domestic 
political scene.
David Apter summed up his opinion of the importance of the 
bureaucracy in the political structure of developing countries as 
follows*
Civil servants, through their expertise and their modes of 
organization, comprise the single most important group for 
the translation of government policy into social practice.
But they are a difficult group for political leaders to deal 
with or assimilate because, on the one hand, they are 
generally better educated than the politicians, with a 
subtler awareness of their own position, and on the other, 
they have a greater security of tenure, which creates a 
totally different outlook. 13
In the Kenyan case, however, the relative permanence of the governing 
elite provided the opportunity for a strong partnership between the top 
civil servants and the government, though not the rank and file 
politicians. Two other factors can be added to exemplify the common 
outlook between the two elite groups, firstly, the Ndegwa Report of 
1970 allowed civil servants to take an active role in business as well 
as administration. This gave rise to many top administrators becoming 13
13 . David E Apter. The Politics of Modernization (Chicago, University 
of Chicago, 1965)» P- io7. See also Cherry Gertzel, 'The Provincial 
Administration in Kenya', Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies 
vol. iv, no. 3» November 1966, pp. 201-215. ----------- -------*
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wealthy businessmen, so wishing to maintain the status quo in re­
lation to the close links with western capitalism. Secondly, the 
presence of a sizeable minority of expatriate personnel helped to 
shape policies followed as well as moulded the ideas and values of 
their indigenous colleagues around them.1^
To sum up, then, the civil service had a significant role to play 
in the collection of information as well as the presentation of policy 
alternatives. At times, conflict occurred between various ministries 
over which policy decision to adopt, but generally there was a
consensus with the governing elite which, in any case, held the final 
word on the selection of policies.
The National Assembly
The. level of influence which any legislature exerts over foreign 
policy is fairly small, though the governing elite normally pays lip- 
service to the principle of accountability, which is itself often 
formally limited. The status of the National Assembly in the decision­
making structure in Kenya was that which could be expected, with the 
elite group shaping policies for the legislature to approve. The 
position of M.P.s was further undermined by their comparative political 
weakness vis-à-vis the civil servants of the administrative elite.
This was noted by one scholar who commented that 'viewed from a 
national development perspective, one is especially struck by the 
general inability of politicians to effectively shape the public policy 
process in Kenya and to impose on administrators an instrumental
14. J.R. wexj-is, -iucpaxnaxes in the Government of Kenya', Journal 
• Commonwealth Political Studies, vol, xi, no. 3» November 1973 
pp. 2 5 1 - 2 ^
orientation of service'.1^ The government preferred to lay emphasis 
upon an association with senior civil servants rather than with 
politicians, bit there was a need t a r  the government to have an under­
standing with the M.P.s if only to get policies approved without too 
inch rancour, though approval was almost always forthcoming.
Originally, the National Assembly was composed of two Houses, the 
Upper House or Senate, which had had membership on a provincial basis, 
and the Lower House or House of Representatives, which held M.P.S 
directly elected on a normal constituency basis. The government was 
always opposed to the establishment of the Upper House because it was 
tacit recognition of the need to cater for the fears of the minority 
tribes. In 1966» therefore, Kenyatta decided to amalgamate the two 
Houses in order to help forge national unity. Before this event took 
place, the opposition party, the Kenya African Democratic Union, had 
already been dissolved, tho3 leaving the country as a de facto one- 
party state.
The one-party state allowed some measure of free speech and 
discussion on policy alternatives, but the initiative rarely lay with 
the Assembly. The power of the government was further increased by 
the steady decline in influence of the ruling party, the Kenya African 
National Union. The party presented an opportunity for grass-roots 
feelings to be carried through the political machinery to the highest 
levels, but its inactivity further weakened the ordinary M.P.'s 
chances of modifying or moulding the country's foreign policy. *
1<5 Robert H. Jackson, 'Administration and Development in Kenya* A 
Review of problems Outstanding' in Goran Hyden, Robert Jackson and 
John Gkumu (eds.), Development Administration. The Kenyan 
jgjgjerience (Nairobi, O.U.P., 1970)» P* 32^»
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that K.A.N.U. was dead were often made,16 and elections for national 
offices were postponed by Kenyatta in 1972, 1976 and 1977 before 
President arap Moi finally held them after Kenyatta's death.
Table 2 t 3
Membership of the National Assembly
Speaker (ExOfflcio with Ministerial status)
Attorney-General ( * " » )
Elected Members 
Nominated Members
1
1
158
12
m
Source* Statistical Abstract 1975 (Nairobi, Ministry of Finance 
'"andplanning, 1975)«
K. A.N.U. *s demise was no doubt due to the fact that it was given 
little role to play in formulating the country's policies, and 
consequently support from within the country was not forthcoming. The 
most serious Jolt to K. A.N.U., the National Assembly and the country in 
general came in I966 when the Vice-President, Qginga Odinga, resigned 
from the government and formed an opposition party, the Kenya People's 
Union (K.P.U.). The impetus for the party's formation came from a 
rejection of the government's development strategy and the country's 
courting of western neo-colonial interests. The K.P.U. *s manifesto 
stated the principal aims and objectives*
a) To fight for the economic independence of the people 
of Kenya.
b) To promote national consciousness and to safeguard 
against foreign interference.
For example, in 1969 Honald Ngala resigned from the executive 
10* ^«mittee of K.A.N.U. saying that the party was 'meaningless, dis­
respected* and ineffective'; The Times, 25 March 1969.
c) To serve as a genuine weapon for removing racial 
and social discrimination and all other forms of 
exploitation and oppression. 17
The K. P. IT. failed to make an impact as a 'competing elite1 group 
and 'brought no change to the entrenched preferences in foreign policy. 
That the party was allowed at all was significant in that it showed the 
government was willing to tolerate sane criticism of its policies, but 
the government's patience soon ran out and the K.P.U. was hounded out 
of existence in 1969. This ambivalence towards opposition in the 
political system also manifested itself in the government's handling of 
elections and party dissidents. Given the accepted restrictions of a 
one-party state, the elections held in 1969 and I974 were quite 
remarkable in that on average two-thirds of the sitting members were 
ousted in both elections.
Working against this presence of democracy in the country were the 
increasingly cynical manoeuvres of the President as he tried to crack 
down on those criticising him and his policies. An early example of 
this came in 1963, when the government managed to prevent 1,890 K .P .U . 
candidates from taking part in the local government elections on the 
grounds that their registration forms were incorrectly completed,'*'®
The culmination of these moves against the K.P.U. came in 1969 when the 
party was banned and its leaders imprisoned without trial, Kenyatta 
defended his actions against the K.P.U. on the grounds that it was a 
purely tribal organisation, but he found it more difficult to defend 
his actions in the mid 1970s when he acted against members of his own 
party, K.A.N.U., as well as closing down the National Assembly on 178
17. Constitution of the Kenya People's Union (Nairobi, I966).
18. nadly Telegraph, 6 August 1968.
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several occasions without explanation. His actions, as will be shown 
below, were clearly aimed to muzzle the more outspoken members of the 
Assembly and make M.P.S accept government policies, if not without 
question, then certainly with less criticism.
This situation of being a quasi-democracy1^ allowed some room for
M.P.S to become involved in the policy-making process, though only as 
peripheral actors. They did have the opportunity to challenge the 
government on domestic and foreign policy, and this they did on 
occasions, though not always with success. For example, a majority of 
the National Assembly favoured federation within East Africa, but the 
government ignored their appeals. Most M.F.S also wanted more positive 
actions taken against Britain in 19^5» tout the government rode out that 
storm also. On some occasions, especially concerning the regime of 
President Idi Amin in Uganda, verbal attacks by a majority of M.?.s 
on Amin were given tacit support by the government where it was unable 
to take any positive steps itself for fear of economic disruption.
Many M.P.S were not afraid to attack the government on controver­
sial issues, such as when ministers awarded themselves tax-free 
gratuities in 196919 20 21 txr following the assassination of J.M. Kariuki 
in 1975» Yet on the whole their power to influence policy was 
limited and their willingness to stand up strongly to the government 
was diminished after 1975*
19 . This is a term used in S.E. Finer, Comparative Government
(Sgarmondswarth, Penguin, 1970). ~~
20. The Times, 28 June 1969 and 18 JUly 1969,
21. The Assembly 'accepted' rather than merely 'adopted' the report on 
the assassination despite strong opposition from government 
ministers 1 The Standard.' 12 June I975.
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The Armed Forces
In a continent renowned for its military coup d'etats. the Armed 
Forces in Kenya were conspicuous if only for their comparative absence 
ffcoa political affairs. This could be partly explained by the success­
ful record of President Kenyatta in maintaining domestic stability as 
well as keeping the army, navy and air force relatively contented.
As far as external policy during the period of study, there was 
little reason for a massive build-up in the strength of the Armed Forces, 
Admittedly, the threats from the Somali Republic in the I96O3 and from 
Uganda in the 1970s (as well as Somalia in the mid 1970s) were suffic­
ient to cause concern in the government, but as will be shown in the 
next chapter, Kenyatta preferred to look for assistance from Britain 
in times of crisis to the other option of increasing the strength of 
the army.
Kenyatta's desire to limit the army's strength emanated mainly 
from major domestic considerations. Owing to the colonial government's 
reluctance to arm and train its natural opponents the Kikuyu, the 
colonialists preferred to enlist members of other tribes, notably the 
Kamba. At independence, this left the Kikuyu-dominated government with 
Armed Forces of dubious loyalty, underlined by the mutiny at Lanet less 
than a month after independence. To have engaged in a rapid enlist­
ment of Kikuyu men into the Armed Forces would have sparked off dis­
content among the other tribes, and so the government had to be satis­
fied with a steady increase in Kikuyu numbers.^ 23
22. Ali A. Masrui and Donald Rothchild, 'The Soldier and the State in 
Bast Africa» Some Theoretical Conclusions on the Army Mutinies of 
1964'* The Western Political Quarterly, vol. xx (I967), pp. 82-96.
23. Cynthia H. Enloe, 'The Military Uses of Ethnicity', Millennium«
Journal of International Studies. vol. 4, no. 3, Winter 1975-76 
pp. 2 2 0 - 2 3 5 . : ‘ ’
Table 2}4
Kenyan Armed Forces 1977
Population}
Military Service}
Total Armed Farces} 
Estimated GNP I9751 
Defence expenditure 1976} 
Army} 6,500
Navy: 400
Air Force} 800
para Military Forces
14,360,000 
voluntary 
7.700 
#2.8 bn.
294 a. shillings (#35 ®.)
1,800 police
Source} The Military Balance 1977-78 (London, The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977)»
Even in 1971. following a half-hearted putsch, a Kasha Chief of Staff 
was replaced by another Kaaba and not a ¡cikuyu.2^
»e government further Bought to limit the Influence of tha Armed 
Forces In the domestic structure by maintaining a large number of 
expatriate, mainly British, officers on secondment in Kenya. Although 
nominally for training purposes, the presence of expatriates gave the 
government the opportunity to hold the ranks in place as sell as have 
people on hand to hear of any impending disaffection. The government 
did not pereeive tha presence of expatriate officers to he any threat 
to political stability. At the earn, time as limiting the independent 
action and influence of the military, the government set about the 
establishment of a para-military unit, the Ceneral Service Unit (Q.s.o.)
24. The Times. 7 Jhly 1971.
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which was more under the sway of Kikuyu influence and so was a counter­
weight in the domestic arena to the military. The G.S.U. was heavily 
implicated in the assassination of Kariuki in 1975, ^  and a special 
airborne anti-cattle rustler branch was involved in an abortive 
coup d'ltat immediately after Kenyatta's death in 1978. ^
However much the government tried to improve its insecure grip on ' 
the military, it was still left with the necessity to appease the Kimba 
in order not to give them a reason for disaffection. The success of 
this appeasement was seen in the apolitical stance of the military, 
while some record of the methods used could be witnessed in the govern­
ment’s favourable handling of the Kamba’s foremost representative,
Paul N&ei. Ngei had shown his capacity for independent action when his 
African People's Party broke with the government in 1963.2^ Brought 
back into the government fold in 1964, he was heavily implicated on 
corruption charges in the Maize Marketing Board in 1966,28 but with 
government support he was able to overcome that problem.
A far more serious and cynical manoeuvre took place in the mid 
1970s. Rail Ngei was found guilty in court of gross electoral mal­
practices in the 197^ election (including threatening to kill his 
opponent) and his seat was taken from him. 29 Kenyatta quickly acted to
25. It was the chief of the G.S.U. who was last seen with
he was picked up outside the Nairobi Hilton Hotel. iuki h n
26. 'Assassination H o f ,  Africa, no. 88, December I978, pp. 29-33.
27. This was immediately prior to the Third Lancaster - *and so at a very crucial stage. f a s t e r  House conference,
2 8 . Report of the Maize Commission of v* -Printer, bhlgter 12.'---— !^  (Hairobl. Covernaent ,
29* The Times, 20 November 1975.
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have an act passed which allowed hia retrospectively to pardon any M.P. 
found guilty of electoral malpractice. Paul Ngei was the first to 
benefit from this act, and following a second election, he took up 
his seat in the National Assembly as well as hia Cabinet position as 
Minister for Co-operative Development,^0
The military, then, played a negative role in the decision-making 
process in that the Armed Forces were not a major influential force in 
domestic politics and had little role to play against external enemies 
of the state. The comparatively peaceful and stable nature of Kenya 
gave no real cause for a military takeover, and the small size of the 
army, the attempts to appease the Kamba, and the relatively strong 
counter-balancing forces all helped to nullify the position of the 
military in the country.
Trade Unions and Business
With economic growth and development the highest priority in 
Kenya, the position and influence of the trade unions and the business 
community were important considerations in the political structure of 
the country. Although one would have expected major clashes between 
the two groups, regular government intervention precluded t M a  to a 
large extent and helped to provide a fairly stable economic base.
The unions played a significant role in agitating for the independ­
ence of Kenya, just as union movements did in other African countries. 
The absence of strong national parties in the 1950s because of govern­
ment restrictions gave a further stimulus to the political prominence of 
the unions, which gradually became the power base of one of Kenya's 
most formidable politicians, Tom Mboya. Kboya used the unions to good
30. Ibid., l*f January 1976.
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effect during the struggle for independence and then used then to 
consolidate his own political position. However, just as the political 
arena witnessed a division between the 'radicals' and 'conservatives', 
to he discussed later, so the union movement began to split into fact­
ions. toe faction, patronised by Mboya, favoured association with 
external groups closely linked to the United States of America, while 
the second faction favoured a more independent line, both against Mboya 
personally as well as neo-colonial influence in the country, and looked 
to Oginga Olinga and socialist countries for assistance.
The ideological rivalry in the early years within the union move­
ment not oily disrupted economic relations in the country but also high­
lighted the incapacity to prevent foreign interference in the economy 
and politics of Kenya. After a fatal clash between the rival factions 
in 1965, the President stepped in to enforce unity in the union ranks. 
Through legislation, one central union, the Central Organisation of 
Trade Unions (C.O.T.U.) was established and all foreign affiliations 
and external funding of unions were outlawed by the government. 
Furthermore, Kenyatta strove to eliminate economic disruption by making
strikes illegal and by making the leadership of C.O.T.U. a governmental 
31appointment.
Kenyatta's strong action served to mask rather than cure the 
ideological split in the labour ranks. The formation of the opposition 
K.P.U. party in 1966 confirmed this fact, and internal divisions re­
appeared. In 1966 the government introduced a preventive detention act 
under which the first to be imprisoned without trial were pro-odinga 
unionists. Kenyatta continued to undermine the position of those who 31
31. David 0. Brownwood, T rade unions in jfenv* (Occasional w  „
Nairobi, Kenya In3ituse or Administration, 1969), pp. n°* 2*
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opposed his domestic and foreign policies, and in 1969 he detained 
Winga and proscribed the K.P.U. The final outlet for radical unionism 
was sealed, and so protest was pushed underground. Support for a re­
orientation in economic thinking was forthcoming from students at the 
University of Nairobi, but the government again silenced its critics by 
proscribing the students* union.
The central importance of economic development, in association with 
countries from the western world, in Kenya's foreign policy will be 
detailed in the next chapter, but certain points concerning the 
position of the business community in the domestic structure can be 
made here. The business community was not a single homogenous unit, 
but was composed of several diverse groups. The moat important of 
these was the elite group concerned with large-scale enterprises. These 
people were interlinked with those of the governing and bureaucratic 
elites, and frequently were themselves members of those elite groups, 
haring business interests alongside their official duties. Conse­
quently, there was a harmony of interests between the groups and this 
provided support for the maintenance of the association with the West 
within the framework of neo-colonialism, because it was through these 
links that the greatest benefits were achieved.
Of less significance in the political structure were those people 
working in smaller economic concerns. The desire by this group to 
advance themselves was accomodated by the government either by allowing 
some to join the ranks of the elite, thus gaining from the neo-colonial 
relations, or else by diverting them towards areas customarily held by 
Asians. The Asian community held most of the positions in commercial 
enterprises and so were a useful scapegoat towards which the governing 
and business elites could deflect the claims for economic advancement.
&The residual group of the small-scale self-employed and underemployed 
could gain little by way of change in the government's economic 
strategy. This left them as an underprivileged majority and so made 
them an angry and dissatisfied group who will, in future, become 
increasingly significant in Kenyan politics.
The Media
The role of the media - the press, radio and television - in any 
country is difficult to assess accurately as the extent to which the 
media influence, or are influenced by, the government cannot really be 
gauged. However, it is poaaibie to make some comments about the role 
of the press, as well as radio and television, in Kenya. In eontraat 
to these institutions in nany other African countries, there was a 
large measure of freedom in Kenya for the media to tackle any issue 
except a full-scale assault ou the President. Most attention was 
concentrated upon domestic rather than foreign policy issues, and when 
foreign affairs were discussed, the emphasis mas upon what was happen­
ing in those countries rather than what Ktoyan policy towards them was.
Die provision of foreign news came from the major international 
news bureaux represented in Kairobi. local news was collected by the 
Kenya Hews Agency (K.H.A.) which served the press and the Voice of 
Kenya (V.O.K.). The V.O.K. was responsible for the radio and television 
services, and was under the control of the Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting, tte number of television receivers in Kenya was small, 
with around 36,000 in 1977, but radio receivers totalled one and one! 
quarter million.38 Although nominally government-controlled, the radio 
and television were not afraid to voice an independent opinion on
32. The Europa Yearbook 1978. a World Survey (London, Europa, 1978).
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issues* So, for example, in 1978 the Voice of Kenya was very critical, 
of members of the National Assembly who were calling for exorbitant 
pay increases. The M.P.S complained of these attacks, claiming that 
the V.O.K., as a nationalised institution, ought not to attack them. 
The Attorney-General, however, said that the V.O.K. ought to be free 
to do, within reason, how it wished.^
Table 2:5
Foreign News Bureaux in Nairobi 1977
Agence France-Presse
Agenzia Nationale Stampa Associata
Ceteka
Deutsche Eresse-Agentur 
Ghana News Agency 
Reuters
United Press International 
Tass
Source: The Europa Yearbook 1978. A World Survey* op.cit.
The major newspapers in Kenya also made significant contributions 
in informing the public of what was going on in the country as well as 
trying to formulate opinions on certain issues, though their effect on 
the government was probably marginal. Both the largest daily English 
language papers were foreign owned, a rather strange occurrence in a 34
34. The Standard was 100 per cent, owned by Lonrho, while the Daily 
Nation was oO per cent, owned by the Aga Khan. - ---*
33* The Standard, 21 July 1978.
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continent ffcll of nationalised presses. The biggest selling daily 
newspaper, with a circulation of 80,000 copies in 1977,3-5 was the 
Pall i a t ion, which normally was closest to the government for accurate 
views and opinions. The other major English language paper, The 
Standard (before 1974 the East African S t a n d i , ^  a circuiatioa 
of 30,000 copies daily,35 6 and had been in the pre-independence period 
the most important settler newspaper. Of the vernacular press, the 
largest was the svahili paper Taifa Leo, which had a similar circulation 
figure to The .S tandard's. These three newspapers taken together, 
accounting for the assumptions that nobody bought more than one news­
paper and that at least three people read each paper, only give a total 
readership figure of 420,000 people, or less than 5 per cent, of the 
population. The major Sunday newspaper, the Sunday Nation, had a 
circulation of 80,000 copies in 1977.3^
The newspapers played important roles in both explaining govern­
ment policies and criticising them. Ch some occasions, the papers were 
muted in their criticism because of the need to avoid an explicit 
attack an the President. When Kenyatta prorogued the National Assembly 
in 1974 less than one hour after it met following the elections, The
to express unhappiness but gave the President the 
benefit of the doubt that he knew what he was doing. 38 Early ^  l9?^  
The Standard strayed fro* the knife-edge of independent journalism by 
criticising the state of the country following the assassination of 
J.M. Kariuki. Kenyatta took this as an attack upon himself and
35. The Europa Yearbook, op.cit.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. The Standard. 7 November 1974.
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deported the leader writer back to Britain and forced the newspaper
to print an apology to him.^ If attacks upon the governing elite
were dangerous in that the effects were unknown, then similar attacks
upon M.P.s were quite comae« and acceptable within the domestic system.
One example, taken from the Daily Nation, should suffice to show the
newspapers' ability to criticise M.P.si
Some perform well; others - many say the majority - 
cut a pathetic figure in the august house. Many 
hardly ever speak. Many attend only occasionally, 
else how can one explain the pitiful attendance and 
the many occasions when there is no quorum? Just a3 
our M.P.s are the custodians of the people's interest, 
the people themselves, who elect these M.P.s, have the 
right to call them to question. 40
The role of the press in the domestic structure was an important 
one, but was circumscribed by the small readership level as well as 
its limited capacity to influence. The newspapers normally only 
devoted marginal space to foreign policy issues, but one exception to 
this was the Nairobi Times, a Sunday paper started in October 1977 
under the editorship of Hilary Ng'weno, which followed the format 
of the 'quality' British press and gave over more space to international
issues.
As a final point in this section, it is necessary to consider the 
position and influence of foreign newspapers and broadcasting in Kenya. 
This is an area in which only speculative answers can be made, but it 
should be regarded as an important one. Through their respective 
external services, foreign governments hoped to influence the policies
39* A.B.B., 1975, P. 3628.
40. Dally Nation, 14 July I978.
ifl. 'David and the press Goliaths', Africa, no. 80. Aoril
pp. 60-61. ' * Oj
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of the Kenya Government, though this was not always made explicit. As
one scholar has pointed out over the British Broadcasting Corporation*
The B.B.C. itself cannot be used by the Government 
as a direct instrument of its foreign, policy, and 
it is precisely this lack of complete governmental 
control which has won the B.B.C, respect and makes 
it such an effective means for projecting Britain 
favourably abroad .... the international environment 
in which Britain makes her foreign policy is 
influenced in her favour, k z
This is perhaps true, but in the Kenyan case the government was more 
receptive to information expressed through the western media than 
•disseminated* through the media of the Soviet bloc, and so the 
perception of the recipients is a very important consideration in 
weighing up the case of foreign broadcasting and newspapers.
The Political Arena
The aim of this concluding section is to draw together material 
presented above to give a balanced overview of the relationship between 
the domestic political arena and the nature of foreign policy. The 
crucial factor to note about the foreign policy decision-making struct­
ure i s  that it was elitist. The President was at the heart of the 
system and though he was the most important actor, he was open to 
suggestions and advice from small groups of people around him, whether 
from the Cabinet, civil service or other significant groups. However, 
the fact that the people gathered around the President stored his over­
whelmingly conservative and pro-western sympathies made sure that the 
country's foreign policy remained on its fixed course.
ïî» decision to promote economic development within the framework
kZ* Janes O.H. Nason, 'International Broadcasting as an Instrument of 
Foreign Policy', Millennium* Journal of International 
yoI. 6, no, 2, Autumn 1977» p. 137, “ ----*
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of neo-colonialism brought protest from certain spheres In the domestic 
arena. In the 1960s, when the political system was more fluid, an 
opposition group emerged around Oginga Odimga. The Kenya African 
Democratic Union had quickly disappeared after independence having no 
ideological differences with the governing party, and so until 1965, 
the governing party allowed internal rivalries to form around the two 
poles of the ’radicals' and 'conservatives'.^ From this time Kenyatta 
and his colleagues acted to preserve the prevailing political philos­
ophy of the country and set out on a steady campaign to destroy all the 
centres of opposition to his government.
With hindsight, it is possible to link these events in a of
repressive actions, although some, notably the assassinations, cannot be 
linked to anyone in person. In 1965, Odinga’s main tactician, Pio 
Pinto, was assassinated, thus leaving Odigna without adequate guidance.^ 
In the same year the Lumumba Institute was closed, apparently because it 
was communist-inclined, and in 1966 Odinga was humiliated at the Limuru 
Conference and felt he had no alternative but to resign. By forming 
his own party, the Kenya People’s Union, Cdinga left himself open to 
farther pressure from the government. The defecting M.P.S were forced 
to fight a ,'little general election * J far their seats in 1966, and the 
K.P.U. only won a handful of seats in Oiinga’s home area. This allowed 435
43. Cherry Gertzel, The Politics of Independent Kenya (London, 
Heinemann, 1970), PP. 32-72; also Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru 
(London, Heinemann, 1967), Pp. 253-315.
44. The Kikuyu man found guilty of the murder referred to 'big men' 
behind the scenes, but nothing more came of the case. The author 
expresses his thanks to the Pinto family for allowing him to look 
at collected family papers.
45. Gertzel, op.clt., pp. 73-124. Also George Bennett, 'Kenya's
"little general election"', The World Today, vol. 22. no. 8 
August 1966, pp. 336“343. *
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Kenyatta to claim that the K.P.U. was a Luo, tribal organisation rather 
than an ideological party opposed to the policies of the governing
elite* The K. P.U. suffered increasingly severe harassment htvM  i n  
mas finally outlawed in 1969*
The circumstances of the party’s proscription are interesting to 
note. The assassination of Tom Mboya in mid 1969 sent a shock wave 
through the Iuo people. Hboya was the government’s prominent spokesman 
and had done the most to undermine Gdinga's strength, but Mboya was a 
Lao, and so the assassination was perceived to be a direct attack upon 
the Luo by the dominant Kikuyu tribe. The President did nothing to 
deny the tribal connotations, and his government was seen to be defend­
ing predominantly Kikuyu interests. The unrest and rioting by the 
disaffected Luo led Kenyatta to act.
IT laidng such a stand, Kenyatta allowed Kikuyu interests to be 
regarded as government interests. His shrewdness allowed hin to hold a 
snap general election at the end of 1969 which saw two-thirds of ths 
sitting M.P.S renewed. This 'bloodless coup d'Staf ■ as one consent- 
ator called it, gave the people the opportunity to let off steam 
without damaging the fahrio of the neo-colonial state. Through the 
early 1970s, political opposition was not too vocal, but the governing 
elite continued to pursue policies which appear* to suit Us prefer­
ences rather than those of the masses. The strength of the Gikuyu,
Briu and Kara Association (C.E.M.A.) was noticeable in all political 
and economic spheres, where it represented the interests of the various 
elite groups. The growing awareness of the wealth of the 'Kenyatta
¿(6. Colin legum, 'a  new chance for Kenva* re-Service. 8 December 1969. nya * Observer Foreign News
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Royal F Mily’also provided for discontent. The nanner in which the 
money was gained - shady deals concerning land, hotels, nines, ivory,
charcoal, as well as more legitimate methods'* . taught condemnation 
from abroad and at home.
Opposition to the government's political policies surfaced again 
in 1975 following the assassination of an outspoken M.P., j .m , Kariuki. 
Kariuki had resigned from his junior minister's position in 1974
complaining of Cental torture s '*8 and though the government k .---, ^
his campaign rallies for the 297't election, he won his seat with a
IfO
large majority. His assassination in torch 1975 came as a great 
shock to the country, but the circumstances surrounding the killing 
remained shrouded in mystery. People close to the President were 
implicated in the murder and the •cover-up*, but no satisfactory 
results emerged.
Kariuki *s assassination sparked off widespread protest and led to 
further arrests by the government of »dissident* M.P.s, the radical 
scholar Ngugi wa 3Mong*o, and also to the prorogation of the National 
Assembly on several occasions. Kenyatta's actions left no room for 
doubt that he would not allow any serious opposition to the domestic 
and foreign policies which the country was following. His cynical 
handling of political dissent tarnish«! the reputation of Kenya for its 47
47 A good account was given in a newspaper series; The Sunday Times. 
'*  IQ 17 and 24 August 1975« Also see Peter Edwards, 'duby Scandal 
highlights Kenya's Corruption Problem*, Observer Foreign News Service» 4 October 1974.
48. fhft standard. 1 October 1974.
40 This can be contrasted with the fact that the President's sen,
peter Kenyatta, only just won his seat by 260 votes; The Times.24 October 1974.
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prosperity and stability, and critics began to question who exactly was 
prosperous in Kenya and whether stability at any price was desirable*
By not tackling these fundamental features of the Kenyan political 
system, Kenyatta left an inheritance of problems for his successor.
>
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Chapter Three
Economic Development and Foreign Policy
The aim of this chapter is to explore in detail the relationship 
between economic development, trade and aid, and foreign policy. The 
interrelated nature of these factors is quite obvious, in that trade 
with foreign countries forms a natural branch of external relations, as 
do questions of foreign aid in national development. The first half of 
the chapter deals with the broad issues of development goals, trade, 
tourism, and foreign aid and investment. The remaining sections take 
a geographical perspective and examine Kenya's foreign policy towards 
Britain, the West in general, the communist countries, the Kiddle East 
and Africa, and with multilateral donors of aid. The conclusion to 
the chapter provides some answers as to the level of development 
achieved in the country as well as the level of dependence of the 
economy.
development Goals
The issue of 'development1 is undoubtedly a complex and contro­
versial one, as there is disagreement as to how the concept should be 
defined. A working definition for our use can be as follows t 
development is a process of social change which
1 . increases the total benefits availablei
2. distributes new benefits in some inverse ratio to the 
distribution of benefits already acquired;
3. offers some assurance of being a process that can be sustained 
over time.
If the first of these requirements is translated into economic 
growth and the second is translated into equity in the 
distribution of wealth and income, these are the elements of 
the definition which are most easily discussed in universal 
terms.•• 1
1. John White, The Politics of Foreign Aid (London, Bodley Head 1974) 
p. 30. * * '
This definition is itself open to interpretation as to the exact path 
of 'economic growth' to be followed, or in the decision as to which 
•benefits' should be acquired or redistributed before others.
The development strategy of Kenya was explicitly stated in the 
government's Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1963/65 entitled African 
Socialism and its application to planning in Kenya. 2 The desire for 
economic growth was clear, as in the first section of the paper it 
was stated, «With independence, Kenya intends to mobilise its resources 
to attain a rapid rate of economic growth for the benefit of its 
people. ' 3 The government believed that »the only permanent solution 
to all problems rests on growth'. 4 The growth of the economy in the 
period under study was quite impressive. In the period 196^-72, the 
gross domestic product (G.D, P.) rose at an average rate of about 7 
per cent, a year. This rate allowed some absolute benefit to the 
country an top of the high population growth rate of over 3 per cent, 
a year. The government's feith continued in the I97V 78 Development 
Plan when the target of 7  A  per cent, was set, but the oil crisis and 
inflation on a world scale pushed this figure out of reach with 1 .2  
per cent, growth recorded in 1975 recovering to 5 per cent, in 1976.
The policy document also spelt out the immediate objectives of
the government's development strategy*
In Kenya today, the pressing problems include the rapid develop 
meat of agricultural land, laying a basis for accelerated growth 
of industry, attracting capital, domestically and from abroad
2. Afrlcan Socialisa and its applieaM™ to plannin/r *
(Sessional ifeper No. 10 o'f I963/65. ln ywfliTw1965). ^  *  Waxrobl» Government Printer,
3. Ibid., section 1.
4. Ibid., section 53.
while ensuring that It is used in a social desirable way; 
modifying the tax structure in the interests of equity and 
larger revenues; guarding foreign exchange reserves; providing 
for a fuller participation by Africans in an expanding economy; 
relieving unemployment; removing idleness; reconciling pressures 
far expanding welfare schemes with the need to grow rapidly; and 
conserving our natural resources of land, water, and forests. 5
The achievement of these goals depended largely upon the finance
provided by the growing economy. The government felt that it was
necessary for the economy to remain as unchanged as possible by
independence in order not to disrupt its capacity. As Jomo Kenyatta
said in a major speech in I9&ts
The Government realises that Africans must be integrated into 
the commercial and industrial life of the nation. We are 
therefore instituting measures which will enable Africans to 
take an ever-increasing part in these fields.
But we are determined that the development of African business 
and industry should he carried out without damaging the existing 
fabric of the economy. 6
The fact that the independent government continued to implement 
economic policies comparable with those of its colonial predecessors 
provides two vital points to note, firstly, the economy developed 
upon openly capitalist lines with the emphasis upon continual growth. 
The political repercussions of this act were many, but included the 
increasing inequalities in wealth within the country, the protection 
of foreign investments and interests, the postponement of full-scale 
Africanisation and, in general terms, the problem of independent action 
in a 'neo-colonial ' setting. Secondly, and closely linked to the 
previous point, evidence shows that the leadership preferred the 
maintenance of the intimate relationship with the West in economic and 
political sphères to a total rejection of the past. This choice was 
made both for the practical benefits of keeping the economy geared to
5, Ibid., section 17.
6 . Jomo Kenyatta, Suffering without /„ , ..nib-. 1968), p . l 37. * -------~  emeS5  <KltroM. Eaat Africa*
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the West and also for ideological or philosophical reasons, because
Kenyatta and his colleagues were happy with this compatible association 
and saw little reason to break it*
The most prominent difficulty at independence wan to provide the 
right balance in economic planning between, the vested interests of the 
settlers and the aspirations of the Africans. The problems in the 
business sector will be treated later on in the chapter, but the 
foundation of the government's policy in the agricultural sector was 
the land settlement programme in which land was bought at a pace 
acceptable to the settlers. Sections of the African community, 
notably the more radical nationalists such as Cginga Odinga and some 
of the former *Kui mu' fighters, opposed this policy because they felt 
it pandered more to the wishes of the European minority than to them. 
This resentment became open in 1966 with the formation of the opposition 
party, the Kenya People's Uhion (K.P.U.).
By Beginning the settlement programme before independence, Kenyatta 
«as assured that those Africans in posssssioa of land would support him 
in opposing any subsequent free distribution of land as called for by 
the •radicals '. to implementing this policy, Kenyatta turned his hack 
on the nationalist ideology, for which he was largely responsible, 
which stressed that the Europeans had stolen the land from their 
ancestors and so could not expect any repayment. Most significantly 
in terms of ths country's foreign policy, Kenyatta •implicitly
acknowledged his inability to prevent Europeans from fan,___
people's political strategy by manipulating the country's economy'.?
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At independence, Kenyatta appointed Mr. Bruce McKenzie, a settler 
of South African origin, as Minister for Agriculture and Animal 
Husbandry in order to satisfy the demands of the settlers for 
assurances. Kenyatta also stood firm against the claims by the landless 
and unemployed for free land and, with substantial foreign financial
g
assistance, managed to resettle some 500,000 Africans by I970 on two 
million acres in the former scheduled ('white') areas. The final 
European mixed farmer was to be bought out by 1979, “but even by the 
mid 1970s four million acres of valuable ranching and plantation land 
was owned by non-citizens, a sign that the government did not wish to 
upset the large international companies and prosperous individuals 
still present in this sector.^
The pursuit of other developmental goals was similarly constrained 
by the need to maintain the * neo-colonial ' economy. The self-helu or 
harambee^ schemes were perhaps exceptions as they were usually financed 
from local contributions, but the major demands of total Africanisation 
and internal control of the economy were not met. While small-scale 
development projects could be fairly easily achieved, it was dear that 
a transition to the egalitarian society proposed in the populist 
policies of the development programmes was not to take place without 
a radical shift in the emphasis of government policy.
8. Up until 1969, the British Government had provided K£20 million,
* which was two-thirds of the total money utilised. Other sources
were West Germany, I.B.R.D., C.D.C., and the Kenya Government;
An Economic Appraisal of the Settlement Schemes 196^/65 - 1967/68 
‘(para Economic Survey deport No. 27, Nairobi, Government Printer, 
1971), P. 8.
9, Colin Leys, Uhderdevelotment in Kenya, The Political Economy of 
Weo-Colonialism 1964-1971 (London. Heinemann. 1975). uuT 6W & .
in. 'Harambee' is the swahili motto of the country meaning 'let's 
pull together'.
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Trade >
Kenya was typical of other African or Third World countries in 
that exports consisted of mainly primary products, while imports were 
expensive manufactured and industrial goods, as wall as foodstuffs.
The fluctuation of prices far primary products made Kenya's economic 
base an insecure one and weakened its capacity t a r  political and 
economic independence. Table 3*1 provides a general impression of the 
country's exports. It should be treated with some caution because it 
can provide a slightly distorted picture owing to the fluctuating world 
market prices. By the mid 1970s, tea production had become the largest 
expanding sector of agriculture, which was itself the backbone of the 
economy in terms of numbers employed and export earnings, and in I976 
the country stood as the world's third largest tea producer. The Kenya 
Tea Development Authority (K.T.D.A.) made special efforts to help small­
holder development and met with some success, but two-thirds of total 
tea production remained in the hands of large multinational corporations 
and this provided the government with the problem of outflow of profits 
from the country, 1 1 ,
The government aimed to strengthen the country'3 economic 
position by concentrating upon import substitution, and a fair measure 
of success was achieved with the establishment of medium-range indust­
ries such as in leather goods, food processing plants and pharmaceut­
icals, In May 197^t the government introduced the Local Manufacturers 
(Export Compensation) Act which allowed for a 10 per cent, bonus to be 
paid whenever goods were exported outside of the East African region,1 2
11, 'Coming of the little man', Africa, no. 75, November 1977, pp
*-55» Employment. Incm.es and Equality. A Stratemr for lncr'«.-.W 
productive employuenx in Kenya (geneva, I-T..n., ~ 9 r> ), ri Ifo;----a
12. The Standard, 23 May 1974.
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Table 3il
Domestic Exports» Principal Commodities as a Percentage of Total Value
Item 1222 2 2 &
coffee, unroasted 31.1 23.6
tea 17.7 11.9
petroleum products 11.4 16.1
eisal fibre and tow 2.6 10.4
meat and meat preparations 4.0 2.8
pyre thrum extract and flowers 3.0 3.3
hide and skins 2.3 2.7
cement, building 2.3 2.4
others 25.6 ■26.6
100.0 100.0
Source» Statistical Abstract 1973 (Nairobi, Ministry of finance and
Planning, 1975)»
and this attempted to switch the emphasis away from import sub­
stitution to exports.
By far the most important trading partners were, as Table 3» 2 
shows, countries in Western Europe which received a large proportion 
of the country's exports and provided Kenya's imports of industrial 
and manufactured goods. Although East Africa was relatively better 
off, the problem of communications within Africa as a whole limited 
the development of further trade in the continent. This lack of 
trade was reinforced by the fact that Kenya had little to trade in 
with other African states, because its major requirements could only 
be provided by the developed world, which naturally wished to maintain
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Table 3?2
Kenyan Trade Figures» 1973-76
IMPORTS
2m J2Z1 1 m
A 118,644 177,136 1 6 2 ,965
B 5,847 10,903 3,496
C 17,259 27,022 33,928
D 62,009 141,968 134,527
E 15,733 18,731 12,489
F 9,060 5,449 15,270
EXPORTS -
A 61,983 76,018 7 1 ,6 8 5
B 2,225 2,968 2,299
C 10,145 U.395 13,501
D 18,848 24,522 2 3 ,5 6 7
E 55,703 73,478 7 3 ,9 7 3
F 12,472 22,900 30,099
VISIBLE BALANCE
A (minus) 58,611 101,118 91,280
B (minus) 3,622 7,935 1,197
C (minus) 7,114 15,627 20,427
D (minus) 43,161 117,446 110,960
E (plus) 39,970 54,747 61,484
F (plus) 3,412 17.451 14,829
K£*000
1976
182,553
3,742
30,069
170,696
16,594
3,3^ 3
138,529 
3,301 
24,519 
29,450 
84,073 
38,786
44,024
441
5,550
141,246
67,479
35,443
A - Western Europe 
G - North & South America 
E - Africa
B - Eastern Europe 
0 - Asia
F - Others (incl, Australasia)
Source« Kenya Statistical Digest (Nairobi, Ministry of Finance and 
Planning), vol. xv, no. 4, December 1977,
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this dependent relationship. ' Trade deficits were recorded with all 
regions except Africa and ‘Others' (mainly Australasia) but the 
largest deficits were with Western Europe, Asia (reflecting oil 
supplies) and the Americas, Trade with the communist world of Eastern 
Europe and the People's Republic of China (within Asia figure) wa3 
negligible, Kenya's largest surplus was with the continent of Africa, 
but at least half of this surplus came from trade with the country's 
partners in the East African Community, Tanzania and Uganda, and the 
remainder from other countries within the region, as well as Egypt,
Foreign policy aimed to improve the country's trading position 
with the developed world, but also made provision for the visible 
balance of payments deficit to be covered by 'invisible' earnings.
The major areas of invisible earnings were the provision of services 
and tourism, as well as the influx of foreign aid and investment.
All told, invisible earnings rose steadily throughout the years and 
in 1975 stood at K£57»5 million. In tens of services, Mombasa was • 
an important port for the region's trade, and the carriage of goods by 
road and rail across the country brought in further revenue. The 
landlocked countries of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Zambia, as well 
as the eastern region of Zaire were the major users of these services. 
The growing competition to Mombasa from Tanzania's Dar es Salaam 
it important for Kenya to maintain good relations with these countries 
and provide easy transit facilities in order to keep this trade. The 
open break in diplomatic relations with Tanzania in 1977 and the 
closure of the border between the countries seriously damaged the 13*
13
13, See Kathryn Morton and Peter Tulloch, Trade and Developing 
Countries (London, Croom Helm/Overseas Development Institute, 
1977).
Economic Survey 1976 (Nairobi, Government Printer, 1976),
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transit trad© because it made it very difficult for goods to reach 
Kenya through the normal route of northern Tanzania.
Tourism
The tourist industry was m e  of the largest in black Africa, 
capitalising upon almost ideal climatic and geographic conditions.
Its growth rate brought in increasing amounts of hard convertible 
currency to the country and provided an example for other countries, 
such as Gambia, Ivory Coast (which itself came to boast of le tourlsme 
vrai) and Tanzania, which gradually became competitors. Between l96*f 
and 1972, gross earnings from tourism increased at an average rate 
of l^ .^ f per cent, a year,1"* and in 1977 reached a peak figure of 
Kf^+8.7 million.1^ The Development Plan of 197^-78 set the growth rate 
at l6 per cent, and this target fell just within reach.^
The government had little reluctance in 'selling* the country to
the rich, white tourists of the developed world, from where two-thirds
of the total number originated. The susceptibility of tourism to
political uncertainty helped to influence the government to pursue
moderate policies both within East Africa and the wider international
arena. It is known, for example, that the war in the Horn of Africa
and the proximity of Uganda kept many North American tourists away from
18the country in later years. This was because of the political 
uncertainty itself as well as the fact that the normal continental route 
of the American visitor was blocked. This was a setback to the industry 15678
15. Development Plan 197^78 (Nairobi, Government Printer, 197*0* vd, 
1 , p. 20.
16. 'Nation Economic Report 1978/79'» supplement in Daily Nation.
I k  July 1978, p. 23.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
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because it was estimated in 1972 that North American tourists spent 
on average fiY l a day as compared with only f>25 a day by Europeans.^
The closure of the border with Tanzania in I977 also seriously 
affected tourism and invisible earnings in the country. Cb average,
20 per cent, of total visitors^ to Kenya were Tanzanians, and so 
this was a large slice of earnings lost. Furthermore, the game parks 
in the south of the country were linked to those in northern Tanzania, 
but most tourists started and ended their safaris in Nairobi, thus 
giving the lion's share of the income to Kenya. The Tanzanian 
Government plans to keep the border closed to tourists in the future 
and has embarked upon its own large-scale tourist programme, Tanzania's 
opening of its game parks to hunters was perceived to be a deliberate 
attempt to get a step ahead of Kenya where hunting remained banned« The 
Sudanese have learnt their lesson from Tanzania and have prevented 
their parks in the south from being linked to the Kenyan circuit.
. To some extent, then, these external political problems affected 
tourism in the country, but the steady growth rate and increase in 
earnings in this sector showed that the problems were only of a 
relative nature and were not really damaging to the economy. At the 
domestic level, tourism was a major political issue. The comparative 
luxury of the hotels, catering quite often for white tourists, and the
t poverty of the rural and urban areas showed up the inequalities of 
life to Kenyans. At present, they tend to show a complete disregard 1920*
19. New York Times, 31 January 1972. . ,
20. Visits for tourism or business are included in one figure.
21. The Standard, 21 July 1978; also Brown Lenga, 'Tanzania goe3 it 
alone on tourism', Commonwealth. August-September 1978, p, 53,
Kenya banned all hunting and trade in ivory in 1973; see 
African Standard. 1 September 1973. — —
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for the conspicuous tourists, but if and when pressure grows for a 
redistribution of wealth within Kenyan society, then the tourist 
industry could be the first to suffer.
Along with the export commodities of coffee and tea, tourism was 
one of the largest money earners for the country, and so it is very 
significant to note that the government allowed the tourist industry 
to be Controlled mainly by non-citizens. Since I966, the development 
of tourism has 'officially' been in the hands of the Kenya Tourist 
Development Corporation (K.T.D.C.), but it was only in 1972 that the 
first tentative steps were made to speed up Africanisation by not 
allowing non-citizen tour operators to expand unless (a mere) 15 per 
cent, of their shares were held by Africans. At this time of the 
ninety licensed travel agents in Kenya, half of them were completely 
owned by non-citizens. The government invested K£30 million in 
1974 to accelerate Africanisation and by 1975 the K.T.D.C. had invested 
K£4.25 million, but the latter recognised the problem that 'there are 
not many Kenyans with the resources and expertise to go into business'.2*^
It was difficult, therefore, for the government to act positively 
against non-citizen operators because they were largely responsible 
for bringing the tourists to the country, and action against them 
would only have led to a decline, if only temporary, in national 
income. As a result, the government was content to allow this 
situation to continue, but remained committed in the long-term to the 
goal of Africanisation.
22. East African Standard. 25 November 1972. 23
23. Kenya hosts IT.N.E.S.C.O. General 
Kenyatta Foundation, Í97¿), p. 99Conference 1976 (Nairobi, Jomo
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Foreign Aid and Investment
Foreign aid and investment cannot be regarded as ^
such but, in general terms, they helped either to boost earnings by 
increasing potential, by balancing the budget, or by allowing money 
to be freed and invested in another sphere. To this extent, aid and
investment remained very important for the country's economic develop-
24ment.
The 'aid debate' provides a minefield of explosive arguments for 
the political scientist to analyse. The aim here is to tread warily 
through this field, risking to stop only when necessary. The term 
•aid', as one author has defined it, is 'used to cover any transfer 
of resources from rich countries to poor countries which the former 
choose to call "aid", i.e. any transfer the effectiveness of which is 
publicly assessed, though perhaps hypocritically assessed, in terms 
of the benefit to the recipient'.2-* To explain the nature of aid, 
therefore, requires an understanding of both the 'donor* and the 
'recipient*. Similarly, private foreign investment (i.e. non­
governmental) calls for an investigation into the reasons behind the 
investments as well as the effects of them. This section deals with 
the questions of aid and investment in general in Kenya, and then 
turns to a specific appraisal of Kenya's relations with individual 
countries or groups of countries. 245
24. Robert Lacey, 'Foreign Resources and Development' in Goran Hyden,
Robert Jackson and John Qfcumu (eds.). Development Administration. 
The Kenyan Experience (Nairobi, O.U.P., 1970}, pp. 6>S7.------ *
25. White, op.cit., pp. 22-23. For a critical account of aid see 
Teresa Hayter, Aid as Imperialism (Harmondsworth, Penguin.
1971).
For a spirited defence of the intentions of one major donor 
state, the United States of America, see Lloyd D, Black, The 
Strategy of_Foreign Aid (Princeton, Van Nostrand, I968). *--
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Kuch of the foreign aid received vent towards development 
schemes rather than recurrent expenditure« In the early years after 
independence, foreign aid accounted for some 95 per cent, of the 
total development budget, but by 1970 this had been cut to under 40 
per cent, and was cut down further during the I9?0s. The fact that 
the government allowed such a large measure of foreign aid is important 
to note, but the sources of the aid, as shown in Tables 3s3 ^  3s4-, 
prove that Kenya was firmly aligned with the Vest.
Table 3:3
Donors of Aid 1963-1978 (Percentages)
Vest 61.45
Vorld Bank (A afflls.) 3^*65
East 4.4
Africa/Middle East 2.5
100.00
K.B. 'East* refers to U.S.S.H., Eastern Europe and nMw*.
Source* Mwai KLbaki, Minister of Finance and Planning, reporting to 
National Assembly* The Standard. 19 July 1978.
Formal non-alignment in economic matters was made explicit in 
the government's seminal document, Sessional paper No. 10. Section 
23 of that document stated*
The third conditioning factor is the need to avoid ng 
development in Kenya dependent on a satellite relationship 
with any country or group of countries. Such a relationship 
is abhorrent and a violation of the political and economic 
independence so close to the hearts of the people. Economic 26
26. Employment. Incomes and Equality, op.clt.. pp. 569-577.
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non-alignment does not mean a policy of isolation, any more 
than political non-alignment implies a refusal to participate 
in world affairs. On the contrary it means a willingness and 
a desire
(i) to borrow technological knowledge and proven economic 
methods from any country - without commitment;
(ii) to seek and accept technical and financial assistance 
from any source — without strings; and
(iii) to participate fully in world trade - without political 
domination. 27
The pitfalls in receiving aid were clearly acknowledged by the 
qualifications to each of the three statements. However, there was 
a great difference between the rhetorical position of the government 
and the policies pursued in practice. Fears that an independent 
Kenya would leave the western fold evaporated as the leadership 
showed little enthusiasm for change. Over the period I963 to 1978, 
by the government's own admission, the aid received from donors 
showed a clear political bias with over 90 per cent, of aid coming 
from western countries and the World Bank. Specific levels of aid
1
did vary over the period, but not the basic pattern. So, for example, 
Britain provided 4? per cent, of the country's total aid in 1966, but 
this figure was cut in half by 1972. Similarly, the largest increase 
in the proportion of bilateral aid was from the 'non-committed' 
nations of Europe — Norway, Sweden, Denmark and West Germany — whose 
relative share trebled during the same period. Disbursements from 
multilateral agencies also increased dramatically in this period from 
16 per cent, to 4-3 per cent., as Table 3i*f shows.
A significant proportion of aid was received in the form of 
technical assistance personnel (T.A.P,), whose job it was to help 
with projects and planning throughout the country. According to one 27
27. African Socialism and its application to planning in Kenya. 
op.cit., section 23»
78
survey, of the total number of T.A.P. in Kenya in I971 almost 
60 per cent, were British and a further 10 per cent. North Americans. 
Nellis also undertook a study of the number of posts held by Europeans 
in government ministries in Nairobi in 1972 and, though he admitted 
the possibility of his figures being slightly inaccurate, he found 
that Europeans occupied one-fifth of the posts in Education, and almost 
one-third in Agriculture, Works, and Finance and Planning. No names, 
however, were European in those ministries concerned with Defence and 
Foreign Affairs.
2d
Table 3*4
Source of Total Aid Disbursements (Percentages)
«1 1966 1222
Canada 1.9 2.2
Denmark 0.2 5 - 2
Netherlands - .5.3
Norway 0.7 3.5
Sweden 2.2 7.3
U.K. 47.4 22.6
U.S.A. 2^.3 4.7
West Germany 6.3 4.7
Other bilateral 1 .1 1.5
I.B.R.D. 9.9 29.6
I.D.A. 4.3 5.5
U.N.D.P. - 3.5
Other multilateral 1.7 4.3
100.0 99.9
Source* Gerald Holthaa and Arthur Hazlewood, Aid and Inequality in
Kenya, British Development Assistance to Kenya (London, Croom 
Hein/Overseas Development Institute, 1976), p. 50»
28. J.R. Nellis, 'Expatriates in the Government of Kenya', Journal of 
Commonwealth Political Studies, vol. xi, no. 3» November 1973*
pp. 23-L“26^,
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The influence of T.A.P. on policy-making decreased gradually 
through the years as more Kenyans came to occupy prominent positions. 
By the mid 1970s, Kenyans began to realise that many Europeans were 
not in fact »experts» at all, but had come to the country only to 
learn« Despite this, their role in society was important as they 
helped shape the development programme and, by inference, helped 
perpetuate western influence in the country. It would be misleading 
to see T.A.P. wholly as malevolent manipulators of Kenyan decision­
makers, as both European and African elites shared similar ideas 
and objectives for the country. If and when they did differ, however, 
the patronising benevolence of T. A. P. possibly distorted the policies 
which the government and civil service had wished to follow. The 
dependence, certainly in the 1960s, upon T.A.P. led to greater 
efficiency in programmes, but left Kenya less self-reliant than it 
should have been. It was only in the 1970s that more control over 
aid programmes was taken and efforts were made to decrease the dep­
endent status and divert money to where it was wanted.
A major policy of the government throughout our period of study 
was to attract investment from overseas to assist economic develop­
ment. Again, this restricted Kenya's freedom of action because 
investments had to be protected and had to be capable of realising 
profit. In 19^» the Foreign Investments Protection Act^° was passed 
which protected foreign investors from arbitrary nationalisation and
\
allowed them, after payment of a ¿JO per cent, profits tax, to remit 2930
29. 'Controversy Again on Expatriate Issue', New African, no. 132, 
August 1978, pp. I8-I9.
30. Foreign Investments Protection Act. 1964 (Act No. 35 of 1964, 
Nairobi, Government Printer, 1964).
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their earnings abroad. Jomo Kenyatta called upon Kenyan businessmen 
to 'reassure your associates overseas that it is the Government's 
intention, not only to continue to work together with private 
enterprise, but also to promote conditions in which private enter* 
prise can thrive'.^
Evidence shows that many areas of the economy remained dominated 
by foreign interests and out of the control of the central government. 
In 1967, of the 'Top Fifty' people holding the most directorships in 
Kenya, only nine were Kenyans, and of them only five were African.*^ 2 
In commerce and industry between I9#f and 1970, a jjO per cent, increase 
in output and a 100 per cent, increase in the annual level of invest­
ment accrued to foreign interests,-^ In the early 1970s external 
investment in the manufacturing sector accounted for some 65 per cent, 
of the total amount, while cement production was completely dependent 
upon foreign finance. As a final example, in 1972 the multinational 
conglomerate, Lonrho, could boast of more than fifty subsidiary 
companies in Kenya,
The prevalence of foreign capital in Kenya, then, had many 
serious effects. At the East African regional level, the preference 
of investors for Nairobi as the centre of their regional operations 
helped to accentuate the pattern of unequal growth as perceived by 312*5
31, Kenyatta, op.clt., p. 238.
32, Who controls industry in Kenya? (Nairobi, National Christian 
* "Council of Kenya/i&st African Pub., I968), pp. 14.5-146.
33, Leys, op.cit., p. 118.
3fc, Baployment, Incomes and Equality, op.cit., pp. 437-444.
35. S. Cronje, M. Ling and G. Cronje, Lonrho. Portrait of a Multi­
national (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1976), pp. 36-38«
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neighbouring countries and was a contributing factor to the demise 
of the East African Community. At the domestic level, the political 
difficulties of managing external capital encouraged the government 
to accept the status quo. The growth of Nairobi caused massive 
social problems of congestion and unemployment and provided the 
breeding ground for discontent and political unrest. Cali,« for 
rapid Africanisation of the economy were outward signs of this 
frustration, but the government was content to pursue piecemeal 
Africanisation and retain the links with foreign capital. The 
following sections will consider the country's economic, political, 
and at times military, relations with the outside world.
The Special Relationship» Britain
Kenya's relationship with its former coloniser, Britain, would 
have been 'special' whatever form and content it took, but it was 
evident that the government favoured very close ties with the former 
metropole. Britain, far its part, was equally pleased to continue 
its dose association with Kenya.
The exact nature of the aid received from Britain has been
36detailed in a recent study, but it is necessary here to present the 
most significant facts again as well as add further information in 
order to understand fully the nature of Kenya's foreign policy. As 
Table 3*5 shows, on average Kenya received more bilateral aid from 
Britain than any other African country. This can perhaps partly be 
explained by the influence of the white settlers acting as a pressure 
group upon both governments, but also points to a measure of compat­
ibility between the indigenous leaders and those of Britain. The 36
36. Holtham and Hazlewood, op.cit
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British Government had further cause to maintain a friendly relationship 
with Kenya owing to the favourable balance of trade with the country, 
as Table 3*6 shows, as well as to provide a better atmosphere for 
British investors.
The relative stability and durability of the governing elite 
combined with its dominant pro-western philosophy assured Britain of 
a continued close association with Kenya. Political unrest h»-h  
the mid 1970s did little to deter British support for Kenyatta because 
it was perceived that problems in Kenya were not comparable with 
those of other African countries, and so there was little need to 
break the existing economic relations. Earlier in March 1973, a 
high-powered Kenyan delegation visited London and gained an extra 
£17 million in aid over the following three years.^ In 1976, Britain 
gave a r.cn-repayable gift to Kenya of S&8 million,^® on top of other 
smaller amounts to help immediate balance of payments problems. The 
Kenya Government was aware that this favourable treatment was not with­
out political strings in terms of maintaining a ‘modérate • position 
in domestic and foreign policy and providing ‘reasonable' economic 
opportunities in the country for British interests. These unwritten 
conditions were, however, acceptable to the Kenyan elite who had 
little opposition to an association which was considered to be an 
important foundation for the growth and strength of the Kenyan economy.
A good example of the privileged position held by the British 
in Kenya can be seen in the case of important railway contracts 
awarded in 1976. In August of that year, it was reported that Kenya 378
37. Financial Times, 6 March 19731 The Times. 10 torch 1973.
38. Dally Telegraph. 3 April 1976.
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Table 3:5
U.K. Bilateral Aid (Disbursements) to African countries
£ million.
Country 1968 1970 1972 Ì2ZÌ
Kenya 11.0 ll.l 10.6 16.4
Tanzania 1.8 2.0 1.7 1.5
Uganda 3.9 4.4 3.3 0.4
E.A. Community 2.0 1.0 2.0 2.7
Malawi 7.8 7.7 8.2 8.1
Zambia 10.8 2.6 4.2 8.4
Nigeria 6.3 11.0 6.5 6.0
Others 30.0 21.1 22.5 31.1
TOTAL 73.6 60.9 59.0 74.6
Sources U.K. Annual Abstract of Statistics 1976 (London, H.M.S.O.
Central Statistical Office, 1976).
Table 3s 6
Trade with U.K.
Imports Exports
KE '000 
.. Visible
Balance
1968 36,110 15.879 -20,231
1970 41,459 15,585 -25.874
I972 30.560 20,392 -30,168
197** 63.9*19 18,702 -45,247
1976 77.043 35.398 -41,645
Source« Statistical Abstract 1971 (Nairobi, Ministry of Finance and 
Planning, 1971)l Statistical Abstract 1975 (ibid,. 1975)j 
Kenya Statistical Digest (Ibid.), vol. xv, no. 1, March 1977.
Railways had agreed to sign the contracts with the Uhited States of
America, West Germany, Sweden and Japan. Britain was expected to
get a paltry £7 million order for steel rails, and so some intense
lobbying was undertaken by the British Government. By early 1977, the
whole composition of the contracts had been altered, with Britain
awarded the major contract worth £*fO million.2*0 Protest against this
reversal was articulated by some academics and politicians even though
the decision had obviously received official sanction. One M.P.,
Mr. George Anyona, pressed for an inquiry into the whole affair, but
in early May he was placed in jail under the preventive detention 
niact. The Kenya Government closed the case.
The close economic relationship which the country enjoyed with 
Britain provided the impetus for a continuing military association 
after independence. Despite K.A.N.U. 's pledge to ma^iyha^ a completely 
non-aligned stance in political and military affairs, after independ­
ence Kenyatta decided to keep the country's armed forces closely 
associated with those of Britain. Such a situation was favourable to 
the British Government. Kenya's strategic position on the Indian 
Ocean made the country an important ally to have, especially as events 
unfolded in the mid 1970s with the independence of Mozambique and the 
war in the Horn. The British also, no doubt, hoped to play a moderat­
ing role in the armed forces, so diminishing the chances of political 
unrest and economic losses.
The Kenyan elite of Kenyatta and his close colleagues also 39*41
39. Financial Times. 18 August 1 9 7 6 ,
ItO . Dally Telegraph, 12 March 1977* The Sunday Times. 13  March 1977.
41. The Times, 6 May 1977.
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perceived their best interests to be in maintaining the country’s 
military links with Britain. It is not difficult to say that had the 
Kenya Government wished to break this relationship, it could have been 
done with the minimum disruption. Examples of similar moves in other 
African countries exist. For example, the Anglo-Nigerian defence 
pact was abrogated by the Nigerian Government in I962 without any 
economic consequences. Similarly in 196**, Julius Nyerere was quick 
to relieve British troops of their position in Tanganyika following 
the mutiny there, again with no significant effect upon economic 
relations between the countries.
It must be concluded, therefore, that these military links were
willingly maintained by the Kenya Government. Two other factors can
be presented to support this view. Firstly, as shown in the previous
chapter, the loyalty of the army was in doubt after independence. The
Kikuyu had been deliberately excluded from the colonial army, which
had consisted mainly of Kamba and Kalenjin men. It was difficult for
Kenyatta to correct the ethnic balance too quickly for fear of
increasing tribal antagonisms. The mutiny in January 196*f at Lanet
Barracks, Nakuru, served to  heighten the fe a rs o f the Kikuyu e lite  and
allowed the opportunity far British troops to be recalled to quell
the mutiny. The British Government, under Sir Alec Douglas-Home, was
only too pleased to assist, fearing 'communist subversion* in the 
42country.
if2. Ali A. Mazrui and Donald Rothchild, 'The Soldier and the State in 
East Africaj Some Theoretical Conclusions m  the Army Mutinies of 
1964', The Western Political Quarterly, xx (1967), p. 95. Britain's 
obsession with communism in Africa was again highlighted in I965 
when the government presented a report on it to the West European 
Union; see A.R. B., 1964, p. 259, This report incensed the more 
- radical members of K.A.N.U.; see Qginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru 
(London, Heinemann, I967), pp. 29*1-296.
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The second argument which can be put forward concerned the 
perceived threat of attack from neighbouring countries. Certainly in 
the 1960s, there was no threat of attack from any neighbouring country 
except Somalia, The Somali threat, though, was a very serious challenge 
to the stability and composition of the whole country. The fact that 
Kenya did not radically strengthen its army, preferring to rely upon 
British military assistance, allowed the country to allocate more Df 
its funds to economic development, and also showed the extent to which 
Britain would go to protect its own economic interests in Kenya,
British forces were widely deployed in the North-Eastern province 
during the border war with Somalia in the 1960s, and finance from
L'>
Britain helped to keep Kenya in control of the situation. J As late 
as 1966, there were still an estimated 300 British officers on second-
hJi
ment in the Kenya Armed Forces, and expatriates in 1972 still 
commanded the Air Force and Navy. ..
More subtle assurances of support by the British Government for 
the Kenyan elite can be isolated during the 1960s and 1970s. British 
troops were present in Kenya in November 1969^  during the elections 
which were especially tense following the assassination of Tom Mboya, 
the consequent Luo riots and banning of the opposition Kenya People's 
Onion. The Conservative Government sent 700 British troops on 'routine 
training exercises' to Kenya in January 1971. Though they were *456
*0. See Chapter Four.
44-. David Wood, The Armed Forces of African States (Adelphi Paper No. 27 
London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966).
45. Christian Science Monitor. 5 August 1972.
46. Njoroge Mungai and Bruce McKenzie had been secretly to Britain 
in July 1969 probably to co-ordinate actionst The Guardian.
19 July 1969. ---------- *
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stationed in Mombasa, it was assumed that they were there to protect
British property in case of riots when Britain announced its renewal
of arms deals with South Africa at the Singapore Commonwealth 
toConference* Other, more speculative reasons can be proposed. For 
example, Prince Charles and Princess Anne paid a visit to the country 
in that month and the troops could have been for their protection. 
Alternatively, there was the possibility that rumours had been heard 
of the forthcoming coup d'état in Uganda, and that troops were on hand 
for any eventuality. Whatever the reason - and it is difficult to say 
which was the real one - it can be stressed that the Kenya Government 
showed little reluctance or embarrassment in inviting British troops 
into the country in large numbers. The British Government, for its 
part, showed little hesitation in responding to requests of assistance. 
The appearance of around 200 troops in the country immediately after 
the assassination of J.M. Kariuki in 1975 again demonstrated explicitly
hO
the support of Britain for Kenyatta *s government.
To sum up, then, it is quite obvious that the relationship with 
Britain was a special one. The government was happy to pursue its 
economic development programmes with a large measure of assistance from 
Britain in the way of aid and private investment. The country's trade 
pattern changed little over the period of study, thus providing further 
evidence of satisfaction with the existing association with Britain,
The military factor, with Kenya receiving virtually all its weaponry 
as well as physical assistance in times of crisis, underpinned the 
whole fabric of economic relations between the countries. As an edit­
orial in The Standard entitled 'Britain's record of generosity' put it, 478
47. Ibid., 19 January 1971.
48. The Times, 18 March 1975« Also A.R.B., 1975* P» 3562.
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'the concrete and highly valuable projects which Britain has assisted
in Kenya ... will forever remain monuments to the friendship existing
Ziobetween our two countries'. 7
Western Europe and the United States of America
The marked preference of Kenya's leaders for dealing with the 
West developed primarily from a similarity of values and goals, although 
the strength of the western economies gave little opportunity for Kenya 
to break away and still maintain in the short term a good rate of 
economic growth. The large numbers of western states willing to trade 
with the country and provide it with aid gave Keayatta and his colleag­
ues considerable scope for choice. Foreign governments, and investors 
from those countries, were in competition with each other to capture 
Kenyan markets. The view that western capitalism was linked in a 
conspiracy against Kenya did not ring true, though the belief that 
it did could have influenced decision-makers. Che general study of 
the aid process stated that 'some coordination between donors takes 
place, but not much. Xn the main, each donor goes its own way, choosing 
its own beneficiaries and applying funds according to its own criteria, 
with little account taken of what other donors are doing. '^° There is 
little evidence, in any case, to suggest that the government accepted 
the conspiracy argument, although at times of popular unrest it became 
a convenient political scapegoat.
As was shown in Table 3*^, Western Europe (excluding Britain) 
provided 25 P®r cent, of the total foreign aid for the country in 1972. 
In terms of trade, the countries of Western Europe balanced Britain's 
share of exports and imports to and from Kenya, and no country was 4950
49. The Standard, 21 July 1978.
5 0 , George Cunningham, The Management of Aid Agencies (London, Groom 
Heln/Overseas Development Institute, 1974), p. 1.
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really significant for trade as all had similar small-scale relations.
In later years Kenya showed an increasing interest in improving 
relations with thé 'non-committed • European countries, that is, those 
not tainted by colonialism. Terms of aid agreements were often softer 
from the Scandinavian countries, perhaps partly because of humanitarian 
motives as well as the desire to get a foothold in the African markets. 
In 1978, it was Sweden, Norway and Switzerland, as well as Britain, 
which moved to write off aid debts owed to them by Kenya to the total 
cost of KC21.69 million.“^ ’ The government also became increasingly 
interested in developing stronger links with the European Economic 
Community as well as the interrelated goal of breaking the 'franco­
phone ' barrier to gain closer links with Prance. It was no coincidence 
that the first official visit by President Moi in 1978, was to Paris 
and Brussels.-^
Kenya had fairly small, but still relatively significant relations 
with the United States of America. Aid received through the U.S.
Agency for International Development (A.I.D. ), an agency of the U.S. 
State Department, steadily decreased as a percentage of the whole, while 
trade remained at about one-quarter the volume of that with Britain. 
America's role in the country in the early years after independence 
hfta been covered in an interesting account by a former ambassador in 
Nairobi, William Attwood, in his book The Reds and the Blacks, A 
Personal Adventure. I t  is evident from the book that Attwood, and 
one assumes the U.S. Government, perceived Kenyan politics in terms of 
a struggle between 'us* and 'them', the United States and Britain on 5123
51. The Standard. 19 July 1978.
52. The Guardian Weekly. 19 November 1978.
53. William Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks. A Personal Adventure
(London, Hutchinson, 1967). “ ~
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the one hand and the Soviet Uhion and China on the other j whereas 
the communist states only aimed to manipulate and subvert the govern­
ment, the American role was one of enlightenment and complete non- 
involvement*
This was a rather naive, as well as negative, view of Kenyan 
politics and gave less than fair justice to the independent position 
of the government. Jomo Kenyatta was not as obsessed with communism 
as Attwood suggested, and publication of the book was not well 
received in Nairobi. However, what can be gained from the account is 
the accurate impression of the Kenyan elite being more responsive and 
attuned to the policy orientations of the U.S.A. than to those of the 
communist states. The Kenya Government's relations with America 
remained significant despite the early traumas of the Stanleyville 
operation in the Congo, where Kenyrnz perceived American action to be 
a direct insult to the President, who was Chairman of an O.A.U. 
committee mediating in the matter. The government took the pragmatic 
view that the economic links with the U.S. were too important to be 
jeopardised by this political dispute. This came from the realistic 
calculation that any economic action taken would more seriously affect 
Kenya than it would the United States.^
The common interest shared with the United States in maintaining 
a close economic relationship was, as with Britain, strengthened by a 
military association. The border crisis with Uganda in the mid 1970s 
prompted the government to look to the United States for military 
assistance. This was forthcoming,^ which by itself is not very *
5^. Ibid.. pp. 191-236.
55» See Chapter Five.
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significant, but in December 1976 American planes flew past in the 
independence celebrations, the first time that any country had been 
given the honour. This symbolised Kenya's uninhibited friendship 
with the West and the government's policy of defending the country, 
whenever necessary, with support from the West. In turn, it showed 
the extent to which the U.S. was willing to defend its economic and 
political interests in Kenya.
The Communist World
Relations with Eastern European countries and the People's Republic 
of China were quite cordial at the time of independence. Kenyan 
embassies in Moscow and Peking were among the first to be announced 
and there was little sign of the overt conservatism such as there was, 
for example, in Nigeria, where in i960 Prime Minister Sir Alhaji 
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa refused to have an embassy in Moscow. The 
communist countries had hopes of friendly relations with Kenya because 
of its turbulent past and'mu P&u* movement. In November 196-4., Kenya 
agreed to several Soviet aid projects, including a cotton mill, a 
radio station, a fish canning factory, a processing factory for fruit 
and vegetables, and a hospital. Of these projects only one, the 
hospital in Kisumu, was ever finished, and the other plans were 
cancelled by Kenyatta in 1966. ^
Trade with Eastern European countries, as shown in Table 3i7, was 
very small. This showed that there was not a complete abandonment of 
the communist world by Kenya, but that there was little that those 
countries could offer to entice Kenya away from its intimacy with the 56*
56. Christopher Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa (London
Macmillan, 1976), p. Til ------- * v *
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Vest. In terns of aid, the major donor to consider was the Soviet 
Union, whose projects were cancelled in 1966. The Kenya Government 
was initially dissatisfied because local costs of projects were to 
be financed by commodity credits, which meant that goods were sent 
from the U.S.S.R. and the Kenyans sold them and kept the money. Some 
of the Soviet commodities were already produced in Kenya and only
served to flood the market. The government preferred direct cash to 
cover local costs.
The demise of the Soviet tiiion *s fortunes in Kenya in the mid 
1960s could be directly attributed to the fall from power of Oginga 
Odinga, even though the Kenyans sent a high powered delegation to 
Moscow as late as January 1966.57 This is not to say that the Soviet 
Union could not have continued to co-operate with Kenyatta's government 
after 1966, but in the eyes of the conservative leaders, Odinga's 
radicalism was only an extension of Soviet subversion in the country.58 
The first major snub of the Soviet Uhion came in April 1965 when a 
shipment of Soviet arms (troop carriers and T3*f tanks) arrived at 
Mombasa. The arms had been requested in the previous year, probably 
with Odinga *s lead, but the government was apparently surprised by 
their arrival. After a close inspection of the arms, the government 
rejected them as being obsolete and sent the ship away.59 This 
episode pointed to the declining influence of Odinga in the country, 
and this was confirmed later in I965 with the closure of thè Lumumba 
Institute. The Institute had been opened in December 196^ with a 
contribution of *8<f,000 from the U.S.S.R. and was aimed at providing
57. Daily Nation, 8 January 1966.
58. Attwood, op.clt., pp. 237-270. For Odinga*s own version see Odinga, 
op.cit., pp. 253-315; also Cherry Gertzel, The Politics of 
Independent Kenya (London, Heinemann, 1970), pp. 32-?2.
59. Stevens, op.clt., p. 157, A.R.B.. 1965, p. 2$+.
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Table ~3i7
Trade with Eastern Europe (including U.S.S.R. ) and the 
People*s Republic of China
K£'000
Imports Exporte
Visible
Balance’
U.S.S.R. ^96 302 - 194
East Germany 203 18 - 185
Yugoslavia 449 249 - 200
Cz echoslovakia 1.459 457 - 1,002
Rest E. Europe 1,496 412 - 1,084
China 1,213 1,618 + 405
, i za
Imports Exports
Visible
Balance
U.S.S.R. 256 414 + I58
East Germany 331 1 - 330
Yugoslavia 607 1,054 + 447
Czechoslovakia 1,913 1,258 - 656 (sic.)
Rest E. Europe 7,603 241 - 7,361 (sic.)
China 4,186 1,787 - 2,399
notes Best Eastern Europe includes Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Poland and Rumania,
Source* Statistical Abstract 1975 (Nairobi, Ministry of Finance 
and Planning, 1975).
9^education and training for K.A.N.U. members. Within the first year 
of its operation, criticism of government policies from the 
Institute's students provoked the government into closing it down.
Relations with the Soviet ttaion since 1966 remained formal and 
cool. The differences between the two communist 'camps' had little 
influence on Kenyan policies because both were perceived as explicit 
supporters of Odinga. The close friendship which the Chinese had with 
Tanzania and the Somali Republic in the 1960s, together with the 
favourite comment of the Chinese that Africa (and Kenya) was 'ripe for 
revolution', did little to endear them to Kenyatta. Early in 196^, a 
consignment of Chinese arms en route from Tanzania to Uganda wan 
stopped in Nyanza, Odinga's home territory. Though the arms were 
legitimately for Uganda, it appeared that the Kenya Government was not 
aware of the transit of the goods across the country, and rumours ».f 
Odinga's subversive aspirations began to spread around the country.
As bad occurred with the Soviet aid deals, a Chinese agreement signed 
in June 196^ for equipment and machines, worth $18 million to Kenya, 
was cancelled with Odinga's departure from the government.^0 Follow­
ing this, relations between the two countries worsened until Kenya 
broke off diplomatic relations in 1967* This break continued right 
through Kenyatta's period of office and was not healed until 1978. ^
It would be wrong to see Kenya's relations with the communist 
world solely in terms of a West versus East confrontation where 
Kenyatta responded to prods from the western countries to freeze out 
the Soviet Uhion and China. Kenyatta was no doubt aware of the 601
60. Alaba Cgunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa 1958-1971 (Cambridge
Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 163-164. *
61. A.B.B.f 1978, p. 5076.
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benefits 6f such a stance, and was encouraged to Maintain it by 
the West, but internal political considerations as well as the 
political ideology of the majority of the government were influ­
ential factors in shaping relations with the countries of the East. 
These countries were disadvantaged in Kenya, because movement of 
their diplomats was more restricted than that of western countries ' 
staff, and also they were more likely to be expelled for 'political' 
activities in the country. On the whole, then, the communist
countries were able to maintain some links with Kenya, but the level
*
of influence and warmth in these relations were low.
The Middle East and Africa
During the 1960s, most of Kenya's attention was fixed upon 
trade with the developed countries of the world, but in the 1970s 
the government aimed to increase its trade with the less developed 
countries (L.D.C.s) of the Middle East and Africa, Both regions 
provided a mirror image of the other in relation to trade. For 
example, in 197^ Kenya's deficit with the Middle East was K£66.3 
million, but it had a surplus with African countries of K£6l.l 
million.
The deficit with the Middle East was almost wholly attributable 
to oil imports from Iran and Saudi Arabia. Very little else passed 
between Kenya and the region, although some attempts were made in 
the mid 19?0s to increase exports of small manufactured goods. The 
large increases in oil prices after 1973 forced foreign policy to 
become attuned to the interests of the Arabs and Iranians, though 
this was by no means easy. In November 19731 the government broke 
off diplomatic relations with Israel because of that country's
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Sz•aggression* in the Yon Kippur war. This act cane as rather a shock 
to many Kenyans, especially as the country had been tipped to provide 
troops for U.N. peacekeeping duties in the Middle East. At the end 
of the month Dr. Njoroge Mungai, the Foreign Minister, said quite 
bluntly that he now hoped for cheaper oil, more loans from the 
Middle East to Kenya, and greater support for the liberation move- 
ments in southern Africa. J Favourable reactions from the Middle 
Bast were not forthcoming which provoked tensions in Kenyan political 
circles, where talk of 'selling the Nile* and using the 'charcoal
fliweapon' was increasingly heard.
The desire for economic benefits continued to persuade policy­
makers in Nairobi to take account of Arab interests. In January 
1975# permission was granted for an office of the Arab League to be 
opened in the capital with full diplomatic immunity.^ In September 
1976, the country was successful in gaining million for agri­
cultural development from the Arab Bank for Economic Development,
66the first such aid to Kenya by the Bank. In 1977, the Palestine
Liberation Organisation was allowed to open an office in Nairobi
and, in the same year, an agreement was signed with Sudan for greater
co-operation in the economic field including a road link between the 
67r two capitals.0'
Combined with these economic motives for an association with *63457
62» East African Standard, 2 November 1973.
63. Ibid., 22 November 1973»
64. A. R.B.. 1974, p. 3139.
65. Egyptian Gazette, 23 January 1975«
66. Ibid., 17 September 1976.
67. International Herald Tribune, u  july 2977
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the Arab states was an undercurrent of, at times, conflicting political 
calculations. The Kenya Government perceived that the establishment 
of a strong anti-communist bloc around the north-west of the Indian 
Ocean, with Kenya in alliance with the conservative Arab states, would 
add to the overall security of the nation. However, this foreign 
policy goal suffered several major setbacks in the 1970s. Firstly, 
in 1976, Kenya's 'assistance' to Israel in its raid on Ehtebbe Airport, 
Uganda, upset many Arab (and African) countries. The second factor 
concerned the role of Somalia in the war in the Horn of Africa during 
1977 and 1978. Although Somalia's Arab status was questioned by some, 
the country's position in the Arab League gained it the support.of 
most Arab states in its confrontation with Ethiopia in the Ogaden.
This was also implicit backing for Somalia's territorial claim to the 
North-Bastem Province of Kenya.
In February 1978» the Air Force intercepted an Egypt Air plane 
over Kenyan territory and upon inspection at Nairobi, the plane was 
found to be carrying weapons to Mogadishu. This unsettled the govern­
ment whose problems were increased when, following a verbal attack 
upon Iranian support far Somalia, the Iranians closed down their
embassy in Nairobi and put a large question mark over economic links
68between the countries. As a final complication for policy-makers, 
the global implications of the dispute in the Horn caused a reappraisal 
of the country's close dependence upon the West because of the West's 
support for Somalia against the Marxist regime of Ethiopia. This 
prompted the Foreign Minister, Dr. Munyua Walyaki, to comment that the 
government would welcome Soviet and Cuban assistance to defend Kenya 68
68. 'Kenya fires broadside at Arabs and the West', New African, 
no. 128, April 1978, p.
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Table 3t8
Country Imports
M 2
Exports
KS'OOO
Visible
Balance
Tanzania 6,196 16,286 +10,090
Uganda 7,706 16,507 4* 8,801
Zambia 383 3,884 + 3,501
Rwanda 1 946 + 945
Sudan 1 462 + 461
Egypt 42 - 42
Zaire 742 904 + 162
Somali Republic ao 840 + 760
Others 1,419 5.931 + 3,612
TOTAL 16 ,5 7 0 44,860 +28,290
Country Imports
1976
Exports
Visible
Balance
Tanzania 12,406 22,995 +10,589
Uganda 818 26,871 +26,053
Zambia 824 7,400 + 6,576
V
Rwanda 765 4,857 + 4,092
Sudan 136 1,807 + 1,671
Egypt 57 2,637 + 2,580
Zaire 4io 1,975 + 1,565
Somali Republic 103 2,030 + 1,927
Others 1.075 13.501 +12,426
TOTAL 16,594 84,073 467,479
Sourcei Kenya Statistical Digest (Nairobi, Ministry of Finance and
Planning), vol. xv, no. 4, December 1977«
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against aggression (from Somalia),^ but little positive was done to 
alter the relationship with the West in the short term.
The economic relations with the rest of Africa were very 
important for the balance of payments, as Table 3:8 shows. As was 
noted earlier in the chapter, geographical as well as economic factors 
limited dealings to those countries in the eastern African region, 
and half of the visible surplus in trade resulted from links with the 
partners in the East African Community, namely Uganda and Tanzania. 
Kenya’s economic relations in this arena were not without political 
difficulties and these will be discussed in depth in the next chapter.
It can be stated here, though, that foreign policy within the continent, 
and specifically within the region, was geared to the maintenance of 
friendly relations in order to facilitate increased trade and economic 
benefits. '
Multilateral Aid
Following the sections on the bilateral economic relations of 
Kenya, it is necessary finally to turn to discuss the status of 
multilateral aid. The amount of multilateral aid received increased 
gradually in the years after independence. To draw from the figures 
of Hoi than and Hazlewood, multilateral aid increased as a percentage 
of total aid from 15*9 Per cent, in 1966 to 4-2.9 per cent, in 1972.^° 
This increase from multilateral sources helped to alleviate the 
embarrassing political difficulty of relying too heavily upon one or 
two states for assistance. It also helped to minimise the chances of 
manipulation by foreign governments, although it has already been 6970
69. Ibid.
70. Holtham and Hazlewood, op.cit.. p. ¡Q ,
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stated that the Kenya Government did not feel unduly threatened by 
external interests.
By far the most important source of multilateral aid was the 
World Bank. As a global organisation, the World Bank projected 
itself as a non-political body, but the government was well aware of 
the political nature of the aid. The overall effect of taking money 
from the World Bank was that it pulled the country into the inter­
national financial ‘system* and forced the government to abide by 
the rules of the system. This meant that prerequisites for aid were 
the promise of repayment, a 'steady* aconomy and the minimum amount 
of political unrest. Over the period in question, the government 
showed itself willing to meet these requirements. Kenyatta also 
showed little unease at other features of the World Bank, including 
the 23 per cent, vote of the United States and the fact that 40 per
cent, of all financial loans given by the Bank were spent in the
71United States, Britain and West Germany.
The government's desire to work with international agencies was
further underlined by the decision to have the International Labour
Organisation make a full-length report on the Kenyan economy, partic-
72ularly in the area of employment. In many places the report was a 
harsh one, but the government accepted most of its recommendations 
and decried critics who claimed it would not.^ Acceptance was not, 
however, implementation and many of the worst aspects of the under- 7123
71. Encyclopaedia of the Nations. United Nations (London, New Gaxton 
Library, 1976), pp. 173-101.
72. Employment, Incomes and Equality, op.cit.
73. The Guardian, 22 August 1973 and 8 September 1973; Financial Times.
29 November 1973« --------- - ---
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Table 3:9
Multilateral Aid t A Sample of Projects
^ million.
Year Donor Amount Project
1968 I.D.A. 16.4 agriculture and roads
1969 I.B.R.D. 26.1 roads and forestry
1970 I.B,R.D, 8.3 Nairobi water supply
I.D.A. 18.7 education and roads
I.P.C. 1^.7 pulp and paper mills
V.H, 0. 0.9
1971 D* 23.0 Tana River (electricity)
V.H. 0. 1.0
U.N.E.S.C.O. 0.01 studies
1972 D* 29.0 Nairobi Airport dev.
I.D.A. 28.0 small farmers and roads
I.F.C. 2.4 tourism
W.H.O. 1.0
U.N. E.S.G.O. 0.01
F«A« 0* 1.7
1973 I.B.R.D. 34.0 roads, Industrial
Development Bank
I.F.C. 2.8 tourism
1974 I.B.R.D. 10.4 tea factories
I.D.A. 33.5 livestock development,
population project
I.F.C. 1.7 pulp and paper mills
1975 I.B.R.D. 473.8 education, oil pipeline,
. power, farms, balance of
- payments
I.F.C. 9.1 textile mill
U.N. Yearbook (New York, United Nations), various years*
A.R.B., various editions; Hoithan and Hazlewood, op.cit., 
p. 68,
Source;
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employment problem remained prevalent. A second report on the country 
by the World Bank' in 1975 reiterated many of the I.L.O. *s points and 
criticised governmental policy, but showed, nevertheless, that the 
government was willing to remain open to advice and assistance from 
international agencies.
Multilateral aid was also forthcoming from regional organisations.
In the previous section, it was noted that aid was received from the
Arab Bank for Economic Development. By 1978, three small loans had
been received from the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(O.P.E.C.),^ and it was hoped that larger amounts would be granted
later. Since 1969» Kenya and its East African Community partners had
been associated with the European Economic Community, and this provided
another source of assistance in terms of aid as well as preferential
76treatment in trade.' The association with the E.E.C. was reconfirmed 
with the signing of the Lomé Convention in 1975. Although the gains 
from this were not as great as expected, the government continued to 
seek multilateral aid in order to promote the economic development of 
the country.
Conclusion} Dependence or Independence?
The aim of this chapter has been to plot the course of Kenya *s 
economic development since the time of independence and relate it to 
f o r e ig n  p o l i c y • It has shown how foreign policy affected the develop-
74. Kenvat Into the Second Decade (Baltimore, I.B.H.D./john Hopkins,
19W T
75. A.R.B, (E.P.T.), 1978, p. 4973.
76. Simon M, Mbilinyi, 'East African Export Commodities and the .
Enlarged European Economic Community', The African Review vol ** 
no. 1, 1973, PP. 85-110. . “ :---------- ;—  * ’
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ment of the economy and, vice versa, how the requirements'and 
necessities of the capitalist development programme helped to shape 
foreign policy postures. It would he difficult to say without 
reservation whether the country's economy was a dependent or independ­
ent one, because this would partly he influenced hy one's approach to 
the question. Furthermore, since the 'O.P.E.C, revolution' of 1973, 
it has become evident that states are interdependent in the global 
economic system and that complete economic independence is not possible 
in normal circumstances.
Having stated this, it is clear that some states have more room 
for independent economic action within the framework of interdependence 
than others. Even within a relatively underprivileged continent such 
as Africa, there is a great disparity in the relative strengths of 
states* This chapter has provided some answers as to status of the 
Kenyan economy by studying the country's trading partnerships and 
channels of foreign aid and investment. It has also examined the 
aspirations of the governing elite group to show how its wishes were 
transformed into economic policy.
In essence, Kenya possessed a neo-colonial economy. There was a 
considerable amount of choice open to the government so long as it 
kept the economy - and the country as a whole - within the orbit of the 
West. It is debatable where the dividing line fell between pressure 
from abroad and friendly advice, between subversion through aid and 
genuine assistance, between leaders wanting help and having it thrust 
upon them. What must be stressed is that western countries, when acting 
in a loose association, had the capacity to prevent Kenyatta from 
changing dramatically the economic and political direction of the 
country.
10k
The Kenya Government made some moves to ease away from too heavy 
a dependence on any single country by increasing the amount of multi­
lateral aid it received as well as by improving relations with West 
Germany, the Scandinavian countries and the European Economic Community 
as a whole. The donors, for their part, appreciably increased the level 
of true 'aid* within their aid, by providing more for rural programmes 
than for impressive, industrial projects which benfited fewer people.
Ctt the other hand, it can be convincingly argued that aid, in whatever 
form, helped to tie Kenya to the donor country; and further, it was 
possibly in the best interests of the donors not to encourage large- 
scale industrial expansion as this would have detracted away from 
Kenya's dependence upon developed countries to provide these facilities 
and goods. The conclusion upon whether or not 'development' took place 
in the country is a value-laden one to make. It would be fair to say 
that some absolute improvement in the living conditions of the majority 
took place, but that this was counteracted by the increasing inequal­
ities between the various social and economic groups, a problem which 
threatened the political and economic structures of Kenyan society.
The Africanisation of the economy was potentially the most
damaging farce affecting foreign interests, but the government's
actions in this field were low-key. Opposition to rapid Africanisation
came from such diverse quarters as a high-powered committee at the
77University of Nairobi, to Qginga Odinga, who saw that rapid African­
isation would only increase African unemployment rather than the 
reverse because the economy could not withstand the consequences of 
such actions.^ The Asians, rather than the Europeans, bore the brunt 78
77, Financial Times. 11 March I968.
78. Donald Rothchild, 'Kenya's Africanization Program; Priorities of 
Development and Equity', The American Political Science Review. 
vol. lxiv, no. 3, September 1970, p. 7k6,
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of the Africanisation which took place because they controlled the
small managerial, and commercial areas into which African entre-
79preneurs could easily move. 7 The stated goal of the Kenya Govern­
ment was complete Africanisation of all sectors, but it must be asked 
whether this was really attempted, and, in philosophical terms, 
whether it should have been attempted considering the cosmopolitan 
nature of the society.
The conclusion one must draw is that Africanisation was only 
pursued in those areas which would not upset foreign interests. 
Government policy showed that moderate Africanisation and a continuing 
dependent relationship with the West were not incompatible. The long­
term contradiction of such a relationship did not affect Kenyatta 's 
period of rule to any great extent excépt perhaps after the mid 1970s, 
It will be left to future governments to deal with the mounting 
popular pressure against external control and 'neo-colonialism' in 
the economy and to deal with the problem of the *f00,000 landless 
migrants (as of 1976) and the 250,000 new job seekers every year.^
It is unlikely that the Kenyan economy will be strong enough, or the 
government willing enough, to reject totally the influence of the 
West in the foreseeable future. 7980
79. Donald Rothchild, 'Ethnic Inequalities in Kenya', T.J.M. A.S.. 7. k
(1969), pp. 689-7U .  . .
80. A.R.B. (E.P.T.), 1978, P. **812.
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Chapter Four 
The East African Arena
The regional environment of East Africa is the focus of study in 
this chapter. Given the limited resources and interests of Kenya,
East Africa was a very important arena for policy-makers, and one in 
which it was hoped the country could play a dominant role. Colonial 
policies were partly responsible for the faster growth and develop­
ment of the country as compared with its neighbours, while the coastal 
location of Kenya made the country an important actor in the movement 
of goods to and from the landlocked states in the interior.
This chapter analyses the foreign policy towards the countries 
in the 'core' of the region, namely Tanzania and Uganda, as well as 
with those in the wider eastern African arena. 1 This provides quite 
a large field of enquiry for a single chapter, but it has been necessary 
because of the related nature of both geographical areas, Kenya's 
membership of the East African Community developed from out of a plan 
to be associated with all of the countries in the wider region, and 
these designs were rekindled following the demise of the Community in 
1977. Similarly, Kenyan foreign policy and economic relations with 
countries such as Zaire, Zambia and Mozambique were markedly affected 
by the prevailing political climate of the Community. Kenyan foreign 
policy, therefore, was forced to take account of the interaction 
between the various sub-units of the East African region.
1. 'East Africa' normally refers to Kenya, Tanzania (Tanganyika before 
196*0 and Uganda, while 'eastern Africa' refers to those countries 
which form the sub-group of the U.N, Economic Commission for Africa 
- Burundi, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Malagasy, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Rwanda, Somalia, Tanzania, Zambia. Countries technically from 
outside this region - Central African Republic, Congo, Mozambique, 
Sudan, Zaire r  will be taken as within the 'wider eastern African 
arena'.
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In this chapter, the major strands of Kenya's foreign policy in 
the region are outlined, and then more detailed studies are made of 
the abortive attempts at political federation with Tanzania and 
Uganda, the development and experiences of the East African Community, 
and the nature of policy after the collapse of the Community, Through­
out the period since independence, a major threat to Kenya's territorial 
stability came from Somalia, and this specifically affected relations 
with states to the north of Kenya as well as having a marked impact 
upon domestic policy and relations with other East African countries. 
Because of the significance of this dispute, this chapter carries a 
case-study of the policies towards Somalia and analyses the most 
important aspects of the conflict.
Regional Foreign Policy
Kenya's major aim in the regional arena could best be described 
as mutual good-neighbourliness. Kenyan leaders generally followed 
policies which aimed to provide and maintain a friendly environment 
for trade and keep to a minimum any differences over political or 
economic matters. Contacts between Kenya and other countries in 
eastern, as well as central and southern, Africa dated hack into 
the colonial period when nationalist groups from many countries 
worked together in the Pan-African Freedom Movement, which co­
ordinated the actions of the various nationalist organisations in 
the region.
In 1965, attempts were made to unite the eleven member states 
of the United Nations Economic Community for Africa sub-region in
2, Richard Cox, Fan-Africanism in Practice: P.A.F.M, E.C.S«A. 1958-196*4- 
(London, O.U.P,, 190^5 •
Bistem. Central and Southern Africa
Map ^ :1
D - Djibouti 
EG- Equitorial Guinea 
R - Rwanda 
B - Burundi
M - Malawi 
L - Lesotho 
S - Swaziland
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an 'Economic Community of Eastern Africa'.-' Although the states 
initialled an agreement in Lusaka, practical difficulties in drawing 
up the bases of the organisation halted its development. It was 
natural that after independence most governments, including the Kenyan, 
wished to tackle their own problems, but some semblance of regional 
unity was maintained through the Eastern and Central African States 
Summit meetings, which originally were held annually, but after I97O 
were held every two years.
Kenya's regional foreign policy of promoting mutual good-neighs 
bourliness was well served by this loose association of states because 
it meant that all the states met together frequently to air their 
grievances and co-ordinate policies. Jive separate committees were 
established to help with the implementation of regional policies on 
a g ricu ltu re  (headquarters in Sudan), industry and energy (Zambia), 
transport and communications (Ethiopia), trade and tourism (Central 
African Republic) and human resources (Uganda). Further benefits 
emanated from the association in that it was a leading protagonist in 
the attack on the white minority regimes of southern Africa, being 
responsible for the 'Lusaka Kinifesto' of 1969,^ and this allowed Kenya 
to play a significant, active role in the liberation movement.
The importance and relevance of these Summits should, however, not 
be overstressed, because these meetings only helped to service the 3
3. Cherry Gertzel, Maure Goldschmidt and Donald Rothchild (eds.) 
Government and Politics in Kenya (Nairobi, Bast African Pub. * 
1969), PP. 60Ò-607. '
For text of Lusaka tenifesto see I. Brownlie (ed.), Basic D o nm^t«  
m  African Affairs ft**«. 0 U.P.. 1971), pp! g & S T  ¿ T g g r  
stand was that 'dialogue' could only take place after white South 
Africans had accepted black Africans as their equals.
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relations which developed from direct bilateral contacts between Kenya 
and its neighbours and did not replace them. The focus of Kenya's 
regional foreign policy was the East African Community, which between 
1967 and 1977 formally tied the country economically and, to a large 
extent, politically with Uganda and Tanzania. Kenya's relations with 
those more peripheral states were not as intense as with its Community 
partners, but increased over the years as trade with them expanded 
and Kenya tried to avoid being dragged down in the ailing Community 
by attempting to unite all of the region in a wider economic assoc­
iation similar to its counterpart in West Africa, the Economic 
Community of West African States (E.C.O.W.A.S.). The hazards facing 
Kenya's wider regional goal were many, but notably the long-standing 
border dispute with the Somali Republic and the sporadic war in the 
Horn of Africa, the lack of communications within the region as a whole, 
the irregular and irrational poll of President Idi Amin o f Uganda 
and, in the mid 1970s, Tanzania's closure of its border with Kenya and 
its attempts to forge a socialist sub-group to the south of Kenya.
Hone of these problems were satisfactorily settled at the time of 
jomo Kenyatta's death and so represented continuing issues in Kenyan 
foreign policy.
The Federation Issue
During the colonial period Kenya, Tanganyika and Ifeanda had close 
political and economic links and shared many common services. The 
British Government, in order to ease administration of these countries 
imposed common organisations on them notably for the sharing of 
facilities such as railways, postal services and shipping. All three 
’ countries used an interchangeable currency, yet despite these common 
bonds, federation was never implemented even though it was mooted on 
several occasions. Many of the African nationalists believed that the
colonial idea of divide and rule prevented federation, but they hoped 
to be able to succeed in this goal after independence had been granted 
to their respective countries. As it turned out, the independent 
states drifted further away front the goal of federation as years went 
by and each government looked towards national objectives before inter­
national, or rather supranational, aspirations. Cue high-ranking 
Kenyan official was to explain this failure later to this author by 
saying that the colonial period artificially stimulated the appeal 
for federation when the peoples and the countries of East Africa were 
so dissimilar.^
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In the early I96OS at least, the prospects for federation appeared 
to be good, but difficulties emerged which had their roots in the 
colonial period. The British Government and settlers of European 
descent had allowed the Kenyan economy to dominate the region at the 
expense of neighbouring Tanganyika and Uganda.^ Nairobi became the 
focus far many industrial and commercial operations, and the other 
countries, without a settler community of any size, suffered from this 
economic neglect. Consequently, at the time of independence, the 
Kenyan economy was far stronger than any other in the region while the 
weakness of the others was structurally determined by the colonial 
heritage. Kenyan policies naturally took full advantage of this 
situation, but were moderated by the necessity of maintaining such a 
relationship without duress or opposition from Tanzania and Uganda.
It was this fear of domination by Kenya which was a major factor *6
5» Interview with a high-ranking member of the Kenva w-fo-h ,London, 17 May I977. * nya Commission,
6, E.A. Brett, Colonialism and Underd(London, Hein^^nn, l9 ? z)~------ -gH^opment in Bast Af-H
Ill
in regional politics throughout the period under study. Apart from 
the colonial influence already mentioned, Uganda's land-locked position 
made the country very aware of its precarious relationship with Kenya 
because it was dependent upon Kenyan roads and railways for most of 
its trade. Similarly, Tanzania's northern industrial pocket was tied 
more to Mombasa and the Kenyan rail-link than to Dar es Salaam. Such 
an influential position in the region provided a strong impetus for 
Kenyan foreign policy to be geared to maintaining the status quo, while 
the influx of foreign investment to Nairobi after independence helped 
the country to remain dominant vis-à-vis its neighbours.
At the end of the colonial period, attempts were made to organise 
the various common arrangements into some form of stable grouping. 
Following the Baisman Report/ the East African Common Services 
Organi, sa t ion (E.A.C.S.O. ) was formed in I 96I  and became responsible 
for regulating the shared services. To offset Kenyan dominance of 
the regional economy, a 'Distributable Pool' was established through 
which a fixed percentage of each state *s Gross National Product was 
paid into, the pool and then distributed in equal shares. Kenyans 
hoped that participation in the pool would dissipate calls for greater 
redistribution, but the view that federation was the key to the problem 
prevailed, at least in official declarations, in the three states.
Dr. Julius Nyerere had promised in i960 to postpone Tanganyika's 
independence in order to allow Kenya and Uganda to gain their respective 
independences simultaneously with Tanganyika so that the three states 
could join together in a federation immediately afterwards. This 
offer proved to be unrealistic owing mainly to the problems of Co-
7, East Africa« Report of the Economic and Fiscal Commission (Cmnd.
1279, London, H.H.S.O., I961).
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operation and the fact that the dates for independence for Kenya and 
tfeanda were unknown. In June 1963» after Tanganyikan and Ugandan 
independence, hut before a firm date had been fixed for Kenya, Jomo 
Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere and Milton Cfbote of Uganda met in Nairobi 
and agreed to form a federation of states by the end of that year. 
Their declaration stated»
We share a common past and are convinced of our common 
destinies. We have a common history, culture and 
customs which make our unity both logical and natural.
Our futures are inevitably bound together by the 
identical aspirations and hopes of our peoples and the need 
far similar efforts in facing the tasks which lie ahead of 
each of our free nations. 8
The declaration stressed the Pan-African intentions of regional
integration which those favouring a continental union, notably Kwame
Ukrumah of Ghana, doubted, but a special demand placed near the end
of the declaration concerned the immediate independence of Kenya*
The ruling party has a! clear mandate for Independence 
and we must regard it as an unfriendly act if Britain 
uses the pretext of some minority interest or other 
to prevent Kenya joining the free nations at the 
earliest possible moment. We are closely involved in 
this matter now since a hold-up in Kenya's advance to 
Independence will hinder.the achievement of Federation 
to which we are committed. The three Governments, having 
agreed to the establishment of a Federation this year, 
expect the British Government to grant Kenya's 
Didependence immediately. 9
Through this declaration, Jomo Kenyatta used foreign policy - 
the goal of federation - to further the more immediate objective of 
independence far Kenya. Likewise, Kenya's two independent neighbours 
were co-ordinating their foreign policies to favour the Kenyan nation­
alists. This declaration was partly responsible for making the British 8
8. Colin Leys and Peter Robson (eds.), Federation in
Opportunities and Problems (Nairobi,~ X p ., l ^ J ,  p. -
9» P* 207. For another interesting discussion of thi««
see Joseph S. Nye, Pan-Africanism and wa*-h African I n t e ^ + f  i0d 
(Cambridge, HarvardUniversity Press, 19^ ) ----^  Intefrra-^rt"
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Government decide firmly on a date for Kenyan independence, but it is 
difficult to say whether it had any direct influence over the timing 
of the event. However, after Kenyan independence in December I963, 
the prospects of federation between the states diminished rather than 
grew, and this raised doubts as to the sincerity of the Kenyan leaders, 
as well as Nyerere and Gbote, for federation. Early in 1964-, the 
revolution in Zanzibar helped to spark off army mutinies in the three 
states. British troops were called in to suppress the mutinies, but 
whereas Kenyatta had little reluctance in taking this act only weeks 
after independence, Nyerere was acutely embarrassed by his actions 
and called upon O.A.U. troops, from Nigeria, to replace the British. 
There was no effort made to forge a united Elast African policy, and 
this event highlighted the differing perceptions held by Kenyatta and 
Nyerere of their former colonisers. The emergence of a revolutionary 
Zanzibar, soon pulled into a federation with mainland Tanganyika, 
further worried Kenyan leaders, especially as the island was auto­
matically allowed membership of any federal government.1®
Kenyatta*s apparent wavering commitment to federation in 1964 
caused repercussions on the domestic scene. On 18 June, the House of 
Representatives called on the government to increase its efforts to 
gain agreement with the country's neighbours. An amendment was carried 
by fifty-nine votes to twenty-two votes, against vehement opposition 
from Kenyatta and his Senior Ministers, setting a deadline date for 
federation of 15 August 1964. 11 Kenyatta was adamant that he was not 10
10. Ali A. Mazrui and Donald Rothchild, 'The Soldier and the State in
East Africa: Some Theoretical Conclusions on the Army Mutinies of 
1 The Western Political Quarterly, vol. xx (I96?), pp. 82- 96- 
also Michael Wolfers, Politics in the Organization of African Unity 
(London, Methuen, 1976), pp. 129-132. ' — ----1
11. Bast African Standard. 1 9  June 1964.
1
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going to allow pressure from the National Assembly to affect his 
control of foreign policy, though his reluctance to force the pace 
of federation raised doubts as to his commitment to this goal.
Further evidence to support this view appeared on 2 August 1964, 
when in a major speech at Kisurau, Kenyatta hinted that the federation 
declaration of June 1963 had been a ploy to hasten the country’s 
independence and was not to be taken as a literal policy statement.^ 
However, he did state that the government remained committed to 
federation, but in its own time, A statement to the National Assembly 
on 13 August regretted the inability of the government to reach 
agreement on federation, but concluded: 'The Government would like 
to take the opportunity of once again assuring the Parliament and 
people of Kenya that everything will be done to expedite the establish­
ment or formation of an East African Federation'.^
t
The country stood to gain substantially from any form of feder­
ation, In political terms, the Kenya African National Uhion 
(K.A.N.U.) was well organised and disciplined after the I963 election 
and so would have gained considerable strength in an elective Assembly. 
As the dominant country of the region, Kenya was sure to prosper in 
relation to its neighbours owing to its strategic and historical 
advantages, and so there was less need for national safeguards. And 
as a bonus, Kenyatta, as the elder statesman, was almost certain to take 
the role of President of the regional government. In economic terms, 
some form of regional arrangement was of paramount importance, because 
on average 25 per cent, of the toted exports were 'inter-territorial', 123
12, Ibid., 3 August 1964,
13. Statement by the Kenya Government on The Bast African Federate™ 
“ (Sessional PaperNo. 5 of 1964/65, Nairobi, Government Printer '
1964). ’
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that is with Uganda and Tanzania, while the most favourable balances 
of trade were with these two countries. It is important to note, 
however, that Kenya's dominant economic position within the region 
was not dependent upon having a federal relationship but merely upon 
the continuation of friendly political relations. Any enforced 
federation would only have exaggerated the stains between the countries 
and so would have been detrimental to the country's economic develop­
ment and prosperity.
There were, then, fewer difficulties for Kenya in a federation 
than for the other states, whose fear of being dominated would not 
have been totally laid to rest within a regional association. However, 
there is little concrete evidence showing Kenyatta and his colleagues 
to have been committed seriously and irrevocably to federation as 
their concern over national Issues took precedence over any others.
Talk of federation in the pre-independence period was perhaps based 
more upon the emotional appeal of Pan-Africanism and the pragmatic 
drive for independence than on any closely scrutinised plan for 
federation. After a vigorous nationalist struggle - Kenyatta had 
been in the vanguard of the movement since the early 1920s - the 
elite group felt it had deserved the spoils of government as well 
as the opportunity to tackle the country's problems as they felt best. 
The fact that the Kenyan economy was so strong could have caused 
problems, as the partners would have wanted to cut it back to some form 
of parity. Cn balance, therefore, Kenyatta preferred to wait and see 
what Tanzania and Uganda wanted to do and, in essence, he allowed these 
countries to ruin the chances of federation and kept Kenya more or less 
on the sidelines.
The major political opposition came from Uganda, which feared
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becoming a ’backwater' in East African affairs. Whereas Obote supported 
a truly federal arrangement, with sufficient checks on central control 
and a certain amount of state autonomy, he was wholly against the idea 
of a unitary government which he feared was what would come about. 1 *1 
As prospects for political unity dissolved, then the inadequacies of 
the current economic arrangements became increasingly apparent. Both 
neighbouring countries acted, though with varying vigour, to shift the 
balance away from Kenyan economic domination to shared benefit of 
regional trade. The Kampala Agreement of April 1964 (later modified 
at Mbale in 1965)1"* aimed to divert new industrial projects from their 
more obvious location in Kenya to the more deserving, though less 
economically propitious, regions in Uganda and Tanzania. These arrange­
ments failed to satisfy those who believed that Kenya continued to take 
the lion's share of the spoils of East African co-operation. In 1965, 
the Tanzanian Government decided to break away from the common currency 
arrangements and established its own currency. The Kenya Government 
was forced to a similar move and set up the Kenya Central Bank on 
10 February 1966^  to look after the country's financial affairs. The 
potential damage to the region from this split never fully materialised, 
partly because the currencies maintained fixed parity (at least 
officially), but the fact that Tanzania had taken such a unilateral 
act left an imprint on the minds of Kenyan decision-makers. 1456
14. Ali A. Mazrui, 'Tanzania versus East Africa. A Case of Unwitting 
Federal Sabotage', Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies vol 
iii, no. 3» November 1903, pp. 209-225; J.H. ¿roctor, 'The Effort* 
to Federate East Africa; A Post-Mortem', The Political Quarts!v 
vol. 37# no. 1 , 1966, pp. ¿*6-69. ‘ a
15. Arthur Hazlewood, Economic Integration» 
(London, Heinemann, 1975)» pp. 37-61. The East African ExpeH»#.™»
l6. The Central Bank of Kenya Bill, I966 (Kenya Gazette Supplement 
Number 10 (Bills Number 3), Nairobi, Government Printer, I966),
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In response to the deteriorating relations in East Africa,
President Kenyatta called at the end of June 1965 for a review of 
E.A.C.S.O.'s operations and discussions on economic links in general.1^ 
As a result of this request, a commission was established later in 
the year under the chairmanship of a Danish economist, Professor 
Kjeld Philip, to look into methods by which to improve the existing 
arrangements and eradicate the major problems. The terms of reference 
for this commission were as follows1
•To examine existing arrangements in East Africa for 
co-operation between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda on 
matters of mutual interest, and having due regard to 
the views of the respective Governments, to make agreed \ 
recommendations on the following matters 1
a) How the East African Common Market can be maintained 
and strengthened and the principles on which, and the 
manner in which, the Common Market can in future be 
controlled and regulated,
b) The arrangements necessary for effective operation • 
of the Common Market consequential upon the establish­
ment of separate currencies.
c) The extent to which services at present maintained 
in common between the three countries can be continued, 
and the form which such services should take.
d) The extent to which (if at all) new services can be 
provided in common between the three countries, and the 
form, which such services should take.
e) The manner in which the common services should be 
financed.
f) The extent to which the management of different 
services can be located in different parts of E ast 
Africa.
g) The legal, administrative and constitutional 
arrangements most likely to promote effective co­
operation between the East African countries in the 
light of the recommendations made under paragraphs 
a, b, c, d, e and f.
To submit their final report to the Governments not 
later than 1 Itey 1966. 18
The commission, composed of three ministers from each country, 
deliberated for several months on the problems, which were exacerbated 
in December 1965 over the different reactions to the Rhodesian 178
17. Hazlewood, op.cit.. p. 68.
18. Tom Mboya, The Challenge of Nationhood (London, Heinemann, 1970),
p. 2^3- *
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unilateral declaration of independence. In May 1966, the commission 
reported to the governments over its progress and following subsequent 
negotiations between the three Heads of State, a Treaty for East 
African Co-operation was signed in Kampala on 6 June 1967.1^
The Bast African Community
The treaty of June I967 established the East African Community, 
which highlighted the friendship and interdependence of the states 
but again left open the question of federation. An integral part of 
the Community was the Common Market, whose laissez-faire nature was 
tempered, to the advantage of Tanzania and Uganda, by two major 
innovations. A transfer tax was established which enabled the weaker 
countries to protect infant industries against competition from outside. 
In essence, this allowed Tanzania to tax products originating in both 
its neighbours, Uganda to levy it on Kenyan goods only, while Kenya 
was unable to make any use of the tax at all. The second innovation 
was for an East African Development Bank, which was to receive invest­
ment in equal shares from the three countries, as well as from outside 
the region, and then to provide loans on the basis of 22.5 per cent, to 
Kenya and 38*75 per cent, to each of the other two countries.^
The Kenya Government accepted these innovations as a sine qua non 
fo r regional agreement. I t  was more important to  retain  the co­
operation of i t s  neighbours than to antagonise them by opposing 
re d istrib u tive  p rin cip les. The moves made a t decentralisation away 1920
19. Treaty for Hast African Co-operation (Nairobi, Government Printer 
for E.A.C.S.O., 1967 ) ,
20. Kjeld Philip, 'Common Services for East Africa. A Model for Small 
Countries', The Round Table, vol. 58, no. 230, April 1968.
pp. 1 5 1 - 1 3 8 .
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from Nairobi under the Kampala Agreement were extended, with head­
quarters of corporations shifted to locations in Uganda and Tanzania, 
while the latter gained the headquarters of the Community at Arusha.
The figures in Table 4t2 highlight the importance of the Community 
partners to Kenyan trade. On average, as a percentage of trade with 
all African countries, the partners provided 80 per cent, of imports 
and received 70 per cent, of exports. Even in terms of total exports, 
the partners received between 15-30 per cent, of Kenya’s exports.
These economic figures translated themselves into the political necessity 
of a good-neighbours foreign policy, of which the Community was a 
formal manifestation.
The East African Community worked well in the late 1960s and 
attracted a great deal of interest from other potential members in the 
region. The relations between Kenya and its partners remained close 
and the Community worked to the advantage of all in promoting trade, 
development and friendly political ties. Although the Community 
survived until 1977» and for most of the time functioned smoothly, 
there was always an undercurrent of political tension which threatened 
to erupt and disrupt the Community. The foundation of the tension 
remained the problem left over from the colonial period, namely Kenyan 
domination in the region, despite the transfer taxes and other equal­
ising legislation. The Kenya Government refused to countenance further 
ideas that the country should hold back on development to allow the 
others to catch up, because this was clearly against Kenyan interests 
and was, in any case, not a practicable suggestion. Superimposed upon 
the fundamental inequality were the economic philosophies of the three 
countries. As shown in Chapter Three, Kenyan development was set firmly 
upon a capitalist programme chartered out during the colonial period. 
Tanzania and Uganda, on the other hand, were more committed through the
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Table 4,2
Trade with Tanzania and Uganda (percentages}
Tanzania
Inports Exports
A B C D
1968 27 3 37 14
1969 3 1 3 33 13
1970 34 4 34 14
1974 57 3 26 9
1975 72 3 27 9
1976 75 3 27 7
Ifeanda
Imports Exports
A B C D
1968 64 7 38 15
1969 60 6 41 16
1970 57 6 39 15
1974 21 1 40 14
1975 12 0.4 35 12
1976 5 0.2 32 8
a  - :% of total imports from African countries
B - % of total imports
c - of total exports to African countries
D -  #  of to ta l exports
Source* Adapted from S t a tis tic a l Abstract 1971 (N airobi, M inistry of 
Finance and Planning, 1971)j Kenya S t a tis tic a l Digest 
(N airobi, M inistry o f Finance and Planning), v o l. xv, no, 
December 1977.
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•Arusha Declaration* and ’Common ten's Charter' respectively to more 
socialist-inspired development paths which aimed to spread the wealth 
of the country to the lowest levels of society.21 2 In Kenya, though 
politicians promised differently, the vanan chi, or working poor, who 
perhaps constituted 90 per cent, of the population, saw little develop­
ment as compared with what could have been possible. The economic 
inequalities and divergent philosophies provided the bases of tension 
which, in the end, helped to bring the Community to its end.
By 19 7 0 , relations with Tanzania and Uganda were already at a low 
point. The test African University was broken up in July 1970 into 
its constituent national institutions, though an inter-university 
committee was established to make standards comparable. The govern­
ment was increasingly annoyed by the continual attacks on the country 
as 'imperialist' and 'capitalist* by the partners, and considered 
their lobbying in support of the detained leader, Oginga Odinga, to 
be too much of an incursion into the country's domestic affairs.
In September, Uganda decided to expel all non-Ugandan workers from the 
country in order to control the outflow of money in workers' remittances 
to Kenya and Tanzania. This move had serious repercussions on the 
Kenyan domestic scene as many thousands of workers were repatriated.2^ 
The dispute quickly spiralled, as M.P.s threatened to withdraw from the 
Community while Mombasa dockworkers decided to cut the life-line to 
Uganda by boycotting all goods bound for the country. President Milton 
Obote, in turn, warned that Uganda would retaliate to these moves by
2 1 . For outlines of these charters see Cideon-Cyrua M. Muttso and s  V 
Rohio (eds.), Readings in African Political Thn^M-. (r.ndo„ S,W* 
Heinemann, 1973), PP. 316-323 and pp. 330-379. L^ondon*
22. A.R.B., 1970, p. 1714.
23* AtPjB« (E .F .T .) .  1970 p. 1737»
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Table 4*3
Major Trading Partners In Africa (I969 exports)
£•000
South Africa, to Zambia 106.49
Kenya to Uganda 37.14
Kenya to Tanzania 36.59
Rhodesia to Zambia 31.60
South Africa to Mozambique 27.59
Uganda to Kenya 24.22
Algeria to Ivory Coast 13*70
Rhodesia to Malawi 12.50
Tunisia to Libya 12*30
Tanzania to Kenya 10.30
Source* A.R.B. (E.F.T.), 1972, p. 2291.
cutting the electricity supplied to Kenya. The Kenya Government acted 
swiftly to cool the situation down. The Minister for Labour, Mr. Mwendwa 
was conciliatory towards Ugandan actions and said that Uganda was with­
in its rights to expel the workers, because policies concerning nan- 
skilled workers were within national jurisdiction. Mwendwa believed 
as few as 3,000 Kenyans had been displaced, and so helped to settle the
breach without too much damage to Kenyan political and economic 
24fortunes.
Kenya's problems with its partners were dramatically increased in 
January 1971 when a coup d'etat in Uganda forced Obote out of office 
and brought to power General Idi Amin. Obote sought refuge in Car es
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Salaam where Tanzanian officials, joined by Zambian, protested bitterly 
against Amin's coup and the brutality which took place in Uganda in 
the subsequent months. The O.A.U. could not reach immediate agreement 
on what policy to take over Amin. An O.A.U. Council of Ministers 
meeting was postponed sine die on 1 March without recognising the 
Ugandan delegates, and so put off the problem for the June Summit 
to solve.
Kenyan foreign policy towards the Amin regime during 1971, and 
throughout most of the 1970s, aimed at total non-interference and dis­
regard. Technically speaking, because of the Community arrangements, 
Kenya did not have formal diplomatic representation in Kampala, and so 
the question of direct recognition did not arise. However, a month 
after the coup the Foreign Minister, Dr. Njoroge Mungai, said that 
General Amin's government had to be accepted as it had complete control 
of the country. Besides this formal stance, there was little official 
reaction in Nairobi to what was happening in Uganda. In March 1971, 
when General Amin claimed to have captured 75° weapons in Uganda which 
were being used to train a group plotting to overthrow the Kenya Govern- 
ment, he was politely ignored. The aim of this policy was to stay as 
neutral as possible in the growing verbal war between Nyerere and Amin, 
because any sign of bias towards either side would have had serious 
repercussions on Community trade and relations. Kenya, of all African 
countries, was the one best placed to put pressure on Amin because of 
Uganda's dependence upon the Kenyan communications link with the coast. 
But the importance of Uganda's trade with Kenya and the policy of non­
interference held by the Kenya Government, tempered by the knowledge 267
25. A.R.B., 1971» p. 2007.
26. East African Standard. 27 February 1971.
27. A.R.B., 1971, p. 20^7.
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that pressure could always be put on in the future, helped shape the 
policy of neutrality.
In July 1971» after the Tanzania-Uganda border had been closed, an
Assistant Minister in the Office of the President, Mr, Munyi, reiterated
the government's stance of impartiality, and stressed that the hope was
to maintain the Community over and above political differences between 
28the partners. The attempt to divorce economics from politics was 
consistent with Kenya's regional strategy, though non-interference was 
itself a political posture. Pressure from Kenyatta upon the two 
leaders prevented a total collapse, but the Community was unable to keep 
out of the political troubles. The Higher Authority of the Community, 
composed of three Heads of State, was due to meet in February 1971, but 
this meeting and all subsequent meetings were cancelled. In March, 
Tanzania restricted the flow'of money in or out of the country, and a 
week later the Kenyan authorities were forced to a similar move.^ The 
Kenyans again had to follow Tanzanian monetary changes in October 1971 
after President Nyerere had switched his country's currency from being 
pegged to sterling to the United States dollar. Because of the dollar 
devaluation, financial transactions with Tanzania caused a loss to Kenya 
of around 3 per cent,, and so Kenyatta (and Amin) decided to switch also 
to the dollar so bringing conformity again to the Community,^0
Kenyatta's attempts at playing the 'honest Broker '^ 1 succeeded in 
consolidating Community policy where otherwise the organisation might 28930*
2 8 . Ibid., p. 2 15 7 .
29. Daily Nation, 23 March I97I.
30. A.R.B. (E.F.T.), 1971, p. 2124.
31* Africa Confidential, vol. 12, no. 24, I971, pp. 4.5.
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have collapsed ranch sooner. However, the lack of initiative from the 
Authority and the insecurity of regional operations served to dis­
enchant member-states and the 'East Afrocrats', the body of civil 
servants entrusted with the task of maintaining the Community.
Criticism • within Kenya of the condition of the Community was increas­
ingly obvious not only within the press but also between government 
ministers. During a debate in the National Assembly in June 1975,
Mwai Kibaki, the Minister of Finance and Hanning, stressed the benefits 
of the Community to Kenya and called for continued faith in the regional' 
body. Opposing him was Charles Njonjo, the Attorney-General and one 
of Kenyatta's closest advisers, who was adamant that the country stood 
to gain more outside of the Community strait jacket.^ Discontent not 
only focused upon the Community arrangements per set but was also 
exacerbated by the deteriorating bilateral relations with partner 
states.
Relations with Uganda were marked by instability after the coup of 
1971. It was this instability which so angered ministers because it 
was difficult to plan consistent and coherent policies when the response 
to them was often irrational and unpredictable. The mass expulsion of 
Asians in 1972 embarrassed Kenya which had similar repatriation policies, 
though not so extreme. Politically, the country suffered from being 
tarred with the same brush as Amin's Uganda, but the severest problems 
resulted in the economic field. Kenyan Asians had a large measure of 
influence in the country's commercial sector, but the close links they 
had with Asians in Uganda were disrupted, so leading to the dislocation 
of their businesses in Kenya. 32
32. The Standard, 26 June 1975
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In June 1975» President Kenyatta attempted to mediate between 
Uganda and Britain over the question of Denis Hills, a British lect­
urer about to hang in Uganda, President Amin was abusive of Kenyatta's 
actions and claimed the Kenyan leader to be involved in an imperial­
istic plot against him. The government immediately reacted by 
impounding a supply of Soviet arms in transit to Uganda and only 
released them after receiving an apology. ^  This episode increased the 
anti-Amin sentiments of the Kenyan public, who had grown tired of 
indiscriminate killings of Kenyans in Uganda and the unpredictability 
of Ugandan actions.■ The extent to which public opinion, or certainly 
the press, was against President Amin's regime became evident in 
February 1976, when the Ugandan leader laid claims to certain areas 
of western Kenya which had been severed from Uganda during the colonial
' i l Lperiod. The question of boundaries and secession was a delicate
point in Kenya because of the numerous ethnic difficulties and the
border dispute with Somalia, and so opposition to the Ugandan claims
was guaranteed. President Amin over-stepped the mark on this occasion
because not only did he bring quite openly abusive rebuttals from
Kenyan ministers, but he also sparked off strikes among Mombasa dock-
workers against Ugandan goods, large-scale demonstrations, burning of
effigies of Amin and the pledging of support for any government action 
35against Uganda. Even the influential and respected Standard was
aroused to a near hysterical editorial in March*
Kenyans, in their teeming millions, recently held 
countrywide loyalty demonstrations and, in the 
clearest language, dared those frowzy gunmen across 
the border (some of whom raped Kenyan women and 
harassed our freedom fighters during the colonial era) 3*5
33. ibid., 28 and 30 June 1975.
3/f, The Guardian, l6 February 1976.
35. The Times, 20 February 1976.
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to try to snatch even an iota of our soil in which 
they were staking imperialistic claims in 1976. 36
Relations with Uganda were again strained to breaking point in 
July 1976 after the government had allowed passage of Israeli para­
troopers bound for the raid on Ritebbe Airport, Uganda, to rescue 
hostages held by Palestinians following an airplane hijack. President 
Amin threatened a war with Kenya in retaliation and killed about two 
hundred Kenyans resident in Uganda.3? The government broke from its 
normally restrained posture and, while not accepting the charges of 
connivance with the Israelis, said that President Amin was a 'beserk 
Hitler' who deserved everything that happened.^ Uganda's threat of 
wax was drowned out by the cutting-off of oil supplies by Kenya, and 
Amin soon came around to a peaceful negotiated settlement.^ It was 
important for the government to maintain trade with Uganda despite the 
hostilities because of the vast benefits involved, and this gave the 
impetus for some form of normalisation of relations. 36789
36. The Standard, 30 March 1976.
37. Financial Times, 12 July 1976.
38. The Guardian, 8 July 1976; also Colin Legum, 'Kenyatta gunning for 
Amin', The Obs erver, 25 July 1976.
39. The settlement was based upon what had been Kenya's pre-conditions 
for negotiation, namely*
1) Ugandan troops to be removed from the border.
2) Claims stopped on Kenyan territory.
3) Safety guaranteed of Kenyans in Uganda.
40 Threats of using force against Kenya to stop.
, 5) 'Hate and smear' campaign to stop.
6 ) Goods received from Kenya to be paid for.
7) Confiscation of goods en route to other countries to stop, 
see The Times, 28 July 1976.
The memorandum was signed on 6 August; ibid. t 7 August 1976. Also 
an editorial, 'Threat to Good Neighbourliness averted', Inside Kenva 
Today (Nairobi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting'), no Y3 ' — 
September 1976, p. 2. *
>
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If the partnership with Uganda was stormy and unpredictable, 
then the problems with Tanzania were, in comparison, more subtle and 
philosophical, though in the long term probably more damaging to the 
national economy. Tanzania's attempts to develop upon a solid found­
ation of self-reliance and socialism placed it in natural opposition 
to the general laissez-faire attitude of the Kenyatta government. The 
differing rate and direction of growth between the two countries were 
marked, but were magnified by the fact that they were adjacent countries 
and, as such, often used as examples of contrasting development. The 
fundamental differences of opinion placed strains upon political good­
will and many times threatened the Community's existence. Verbal war­
fare was quite common, with Kenya criticised an the 'man eat man' 
society with the favourite rebuttal that Tanzania was a 'man eat
liQ
nothing' society run by 'barefoot socialists'.
The political differences were also translated into economic
problems quite often at Kenya's expense. For example, the shared
4lincome tax arrangements had to be scrapped in 1973 because Tanzania's 
nationalisation policies meant that there were less taxes to be raised 
from private companies and this left Kenya paying an unreasonable 
proportion into the common fund. In 1974, Tanzania's pursuance of its
u.jamaa village collectivisation scheme caused tensions between the 
countries because President Nyerere ordered the expulsion of 10,000 
Kenyans who refused to be settled. A final example of the contrasting 
development policies can be made from the expulsion of the multi­
national corporation, Lonrho, from Tanzania in 1978. Lonrho was *412
kO. For example, see 'Back to Back. A Survey of Kenya and Tanzania' 
a supplement in The Economist. 11 J&rch 1978. *
41. A.R.B. (E.F.T.), 1973» p. 2678 and 1974, p. 3347.
42. A.R.B,„ 197/f, p. 3ff^o.
considered to have too many South African connections for Nyerere to 
accept, even though in Kenya the corporation was very influential, 
powerful and acceptable.
In December 197^, Kenya’s regional economic policies were 
seriously threatened by the closure of all roads in the north of 
Tanzania to heavy goods traffic. The lucrative trade with Zaire,
Rwanda, Burundi and, especially, Zambia was halted because goods 
travelled by road across northern Tanzania. The government feared 
that this was a deliberate attempt to divert goods away from Mombasa 
to the Tanzanian port of Bar es Salaam, and its fears were justified 
when in January 1975 the Zambian Government gave notice of its 
intention to switch all import/export trade to Dar es Salaam. This 
decision coincided with the opening of the TanZam railway (or TaZaRa, 
the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority, as it is now known) which » 
linked for the first time Zambia’s copper mining areas with that 
coast. J Kenya managed to maintain some measure of trade and transit 
facilities with Zambia by using air transport and smaller, but accept­
able, lorries. Trade was also aided by the fact that the port of Dar 
es Salaam was incapable of handling the increase of goods, and so 
Mombasa was the only viable alternative.
The final death-blow to the East African Community came in 
February 1977» with the government 's decision to break from East 
African Airways (E.A.A.) and set up its own independent airline, Kenya 
Airways. Political and economic reasons were behind this decision. At 
the political level, Tanzania wanted E.A.A. to continue operating to all 
its internal airports as an essential service to the people even though 43
43. The Standard, 6 December 197^1 A.R.B. (E.F.T.), 1975, p. 3383.
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this was a very unprofitable exercise, Kenyans opposed this and felt 
that the Tanzanians ought to provide their own service if they wished, 
but at their own expense, as Uganda had started to do in the previous 
year. The purely economic problems centred upon the question of debt 
repayment. East African Airways had been hampered on many occasions 
because of non-payment of debts. Ch most occasions, such as in
f tji1972, Kenya paid up promptly only to be held back by the slow action 
of its neighbours. In 1976 the World Bank suspended all loans to the 
Community because of outstanding debts, and these problems came to a 
head in 1977« East African Railways had a similar record of debts, 
and so the government pre-empted further trouble by establishing Kenya 
Railways and Kenya Airways early in 1977«^
The actions taken in establishing Kenya Railways and Kenya
Airway:..reflected the antagonistic relationship with the country's
partners and the frustration of working at an inefficient level. This
was the antithesis of the reputation Kenya was attempting to build
through its foreign policy of an efficient and business-like country.
The reaction of President Nyerere to Kenya's actions was swift as he
closed the border immediately between the two countries and sparked
off a scramble for possession of whatever Community assets each country
could find in order to strengthen the bargaining position at a later
date. By June 1977* the Community arrangements had collapsed.
Attempts at mediation by the Organisation of African Unity, as well
LA
as by Nigeria, Liberia and Ghana, all failed. In the budget for 
1976-77, the government refused to vote any money for the Community's 456
44. Daily Nation, 14 April 1972.
45. Ibid., 27 January 1977 and 4 February I977.
46. A.R.B., 1977, P. 4312.
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General Fund, and all services were taken over nationally. Kenya stood
to gain most by such a seizure in terms of acquiring equipment and
buildings, a large proportion of which were inside the country. In
June and July, Uganda and Tanzania made attempts to resuscitate the
Community by taking on the financing of it themselves,^ but Kenyatta
was adamant in striking out on a new foreign policy orientation, much
to the relief felt in many quarters in Nairobi that a final decision
\
had been made. The personal distaste felt between Amin and Nyerere, 
coupled with the lack of finances, made certain that little came of 
their attempts to maintain the Community.
One influential British newspaper summed up the episode by saying 
that 'the tragedy is that a naturally interdependent region should 
become further balkanised out of spite, jealousy and mismanagement'.**® 
Although these factors did piay a pert in the Community's downfall, it 
would perhaps be a fairer and more balanced commentary to say that the 
political and economic differences between Kenya and its partners 
proved, in the end, to be too great to overcome, but this does not take 
away the fhet that for many years the Community played an important and 
successful role in regional co-operation. In the end, the government 
realised that greater benefit lay outside the confines of a treaty 
agreement in ordinary bilateral ties. .
With the Community gone and relations with partners in disarray, 
the government looked to countries further afield in the region for 
closer ties. Those to the south and west were temporarily blocked by 
the closure of the border with Tanzania, but we shall return to these *48
4?. A.R.B. (E.F.T.), 1977* P« ^318.
48. The Times. 8 February 1977.
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later. To the north lay countries which had virtually no trade and no 
communications with Kenya, hut where great potential was obvious.
However, the serious drawback concerned the relationship with the 
Somali Republic, and the claims which that country had on neighbours. 
These claims upset the peace in the Horn of Africa and so prevented 
normal relations there, but they also threatened directly the stability 
and composition of Kenya, because of Somali claims to parts of northern 
parts of the country. This threat provided the most serious secession­
ist problem which the government had to face, and so it is necessary 
that this dispute with the Somali Republic be looked at in greater 
detail.
The Somali dispute» Background and Issues
The Northern Frontier District (N.F.D.) of Kenya had always been a 
problematical district for the British colonial administration. The 
British had only reluctantly penetrated the district to help counter 
further westward expansion of Somali nomads, to prevent Ethiopian 
cattle raids and to provide some sort of ’buffer* area between the 
tribesmen to the north and the prosperous white settler community td the 
south. The N.F.D. did not come under effective administrative control 
until 1919» when Wajir and Moyale were garrisoned by regular troops.
But even this move failed to pacify totally the Somali tribes.^
The tribesmen of much of the N.F.D. (particularly the eastern 
areas) were perceived to be distinct from those tribes further south. 
They were basically of Iferaitic origins and so were antagonistic to,
^9. John Brysdale, The Somali Dispute (London, Pall mil, 196^). Somali 
Republic technically refers to the territory merged from the former 
British and Italian possessions. However, here Somalia and the 
Somali Republic are used inter-changeably.
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and suspicious of, the Bantus of southern Kenya. The peoples of the
N.F.D. were partitioned, for security reasons, from the rest of Kenya, 
with movement to and from the district restricted to those in possess­
ion of a permit. This rigid control of movement reinforced the geo­
graphical disadvantages of the H.F.D. being remote from the heartland 
of the country. It also meant that the Somalis never came to feel to 
be an integral part of Kenya, and had virtually no interaction with the
tribes who were to dominate African politics within Kenya at independ- 
50ence.
The Somali Youth League (S.Y.L.) had formed in Mogadishu in I9*f3 
with assistance, rather ironically in a historical perspective, from 
Jomo Kenyatta. ^  The S.Y.L. attempted to bind together the Somali 
peoples of the Horn of Africa, but its activities were deemed to be 
dangerous by the colonial authorities and so it was banned from Kenya
<.
in 19*4-8 and its leaders exiled. The party was not allowed to re­
convene in the N.F. D. until i960» soon after the newly independent 
states of Somalia and British Somaliland had united in the Somali 
Republic. The flag of the Republic displayed a five-pointed star, 
signifying the ambition of Somalis to constitute a 'Greater Somalia', 
made up of five territories - Somalia, British Somaliland, French 
Somaliland (Djibouti), the Cgaden and the N.F.D.^2
\
50* SiliL* N.F.D» was often used to exile Kenya's African wniu< .
Tor^exanple, Thulor «as exiled in fCisnaju<£?fas S u S . Ä  ^ ’
Kenyatta spent some time in Maxalal. 3 wniie
51‘ £ “ , 1 9 6 8 ) ^ ’. U * “ 1”  WthPat M  (Nairobi. Bast African
•The Probien of the Northern Frontier Ästrirt o f ' x e ^ ^ c ’e 
£°* 1963. PP« ^8-60j I.M. Lewis, 'Fan-Africanism
and Pan-Somalism', T.J.M.A.S. 1 , 2 (1963) pp. ¿7-161. 1
The zestful renewal of Somali ambitions for a 'Greater Somalia' 
upset Kenya's African leaders who were naturally averse to any dis­
integration of what was soon to become independent Kenya. At the 
Lancaster House conference in 1962, no final solution was reached on 
the question of the N.P.D. A special delegation from the district had 
been allowed into the talks, thus showing not only the importance of 
the dispute but also the British Government's recognition of its 
importance. The Colonial Secretary, Mr. Reginald Maudling, promised 
an independent inquiry into the status of the N.P.D. *
This Commission would be appointed as soon as practicable 
so that its report could be available and a decision on its 
findings taken by Her Majesty's Government before the new 
constitution for Kenya was brought into operation. Mean­
while there would be no change in the status of the 
Northern Frontier District or in the arrangements for its 
administration. 53
Within Kenya, K.A.N.U. mobilised its forces to campaign against 
secession in the N.F.D. Tom Mboya gave instructions that 'the Party 
must begin a campaign in the province against the secessionists before 
the arrival in Kenya of the Commission to inquire into this matter'.-^’ 
K.A.N.U. had had little contact with the people of the N.F.D. owing to 
the restriction upon entry into the Northern Province. This severely 
hampered the campaign, but also gave K.A.N.U. valuable propaganda - 
as the Somali tribes had never been treated before as an integral part 
of Kenya, then they could not possibly be aware of the great benefits 
which the country had to offer them. African leaders would develop 
the N.F.D. rather than allow it to stagnate as the Europeans had done. 
When giving evidence to the N.F.D. Commission in Nairobi, K.A.N.U. 534
53. Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference. 1962 (Crand. 1?00, 
London, H.M.S.O., 1962).
5 4. Tom Mboya, The New Constitutional Framework (Nairobi, K.A.N.U., 
1962).
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leaders rejected any transfer of territory to the Somali Republic and 
threatened any such action with immediate Kenyan demands for the return 
of Jubaland.^
The N.F.D. Commission reported on 20 December 1962. ^  The report 
concluded that the tribes in the north-east of the district were in 
favour of secession, or eventual secession after a short period under 
direct British rule, to the Somali Republic. The rest of the district 
wished to remain in Kenya. Both sets of opinion were more or less clear- 
cut along the Muslim and non-Muslim line. The Somali tribes, then, 
favoured secession and their case received a sympathetic hearing in 
many quarters. For example, in Britain the Daily Telegraph wrote edit­
orially, 'Race, language and habit associate the northern tribes far 
more closely with the Somali than with the Kikuyu tribe. The only 
argument against secession ill Kenya is that it is politically inconven­
ient. * The newspaper accused the British Government of ignoring 'claims 
to secession from tribes that are small and weakly represented, while
at the same time paying great attention to those that use the panga
57and the petrol bomb'. It was widely feared in London at this time 
that. Somali secession would force Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia into war, 
and this was one of the main reasons why it was 'politically inconven­
ient ' for the British Government to allow secession.^® There was equal 
evidence to suggest, however, that Somalia would go to war if secession
55. Jübaland had been ceded in 1925 to Somalia as a token of British
Ä w V e a f / S  s s : the Gr- t ThlS -  « £ £
*  r ^ er
57. Daily Telegraph. 21 December I962.
58. Had been mentioned, for example, in The Times. 17 December I962.
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did not take place.
The report of the Regional Boundaries Commission was also pub-
59lished in London on 20 December.  ^ This Commission had had the major
task of drawing the boundaries of the regions to operate under the new
constitution. Many of the former provincial boundaries were adjusted
and new regions formed in order to reflect the interests and anti-
60pathies of each of the tribes. Though the Somali Government had 
received assurances that this Commission would not interfere in the 
N.P.D., opinions were, nevertheless, sounded in the district. The 
report stated*
... the Somali delegations seen by us in these areas were 
unanimous in their desire not to be included in any re g io n  
o f Kenya ...
In the circumstances we would have considered it right 
to create a region consisting of the areas almost 
exclusively occupied by the Somali and kindred people ...
Our terms of reference, however, restricted us to 
providing six regions ...
After anxious consideration, therefore, we have included 
the area concerned in the Coast Region. One of the 
considerations which led us to this decision was that if 
at some time in the future this area should cease to be a 
part of Kenya its excision from the Coast Region would not 
adversely affect the viability of that Region or seriously 
upset the pattern laid down for Kenya as a whole. 61
The Boundaries Commission had reinforced the results of the N.F.D. 
report, that the Somali tribes favoured secession. It had been conceded 
that the Somali-populated areas had been included in the Coast Region 
on the future possibility that these areas would ’cease to be a part of 
Kenya*. However, the Boundaries report had also recommended the form- 59601
59. Kenya* Report of the Regional Boundaries Commission (Cmnd. I899, 
London, H.M.S.O., 1962).
60. Ibid. For example, Nyanza was altered to allow the Kipsigis to be 
in the Rift Valley. Western Region was formed to split the Luo 
and Luyia.
61. Ibid.
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ation of a seventh region to account for the problem. Somalia sought
clarification of the intentions of the British Government. Contrary
to its previous promises, Britain decided not to settle the N.F.D.
question before the new Kenya constitution was implemented. The
British Government was not agreeable to any form of secession before
Kenyan independence without the acquiescence of the country's leaders.
This, in effect, meant that there would be no secession at all. In
early March 1963, the new Colonial Secretary, Mr. Duncan Sandys, dealt
Somali interests the crushing blow when, speaking in Nairobi, he
6*3accepted the formation of the seventh region. The Somali Government 
broke off diplomatic relations with Britain.
Though the British bore the brunt of Somali anger, Jomo Kenyatta
made it quite clear that he and his colleagues fully supported the
•seventh region plan'. Qi 1^ March, Kenyatta stated that he would
•not entertain any secession or handing over of one inch of our
territory .... We will not give in to threats and intimidation. We
ALare going to rule this country and defend it. * During May, the 
general election was held in Kenya, though not in the newly-formed 
North-Eastern Region. The Somali Foreign Minister, Mr. Abdullahi Issa, 
was one of the first to congratulate personally Kenyatta on his 
electoral success. Kenyatta, at least, was hopeful that the proposed 
federation of East African states would solve the problem, even though 
Somalia had stated that a settlement was required before federation 
took place. 623*
62. Drysdale, op.cit., pp. 127-1^5•
63. ibid., pp. 140-1^1; also Africa Diary (New Delhi), I963, p. 1090.
¿if. East African Standard. 15 torch 1963.
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The Somali p o licy  of soothing Kenyatta while attempting to get 
Britain  to s lic e  o ff  the N.F.D. from Kenya was an impossible task, 
especially  since formal diplomatic channels between the two countries 
were closed. A fin a l opportunity, however, f e l l  to Somalia when 
further talks were held in la te  August in  Rome, a convenient neutral 
c ity . A token party of Kenyans, including Mboya, James Gichuru and 
Joseph Murumbi, was allowed into the talks as members attached to the 
B ritish  delegation. Any misgivings the Kenyans had that the N.F.D. 
would be handed over to Somalia at this la te  stage were allayed a t the 
f i r s t  session, when the B ritish  delegation stated that no decision would 
be acted upon without the f u l l  consent o f the Kenya Government. This 
was a great success because i t  confirmed that no secession would take 
place. L it t le  came from the conference as both Britain and Kenya re­
jected Somalia's plans either fo r joint Somali-Kenyan control o f the 
N.F.D. or fo r Uhited Nations intervention in the disputed te rrito ry .
Some observers remained convinced that i t  was wrong of the B ritish  
Government not to hand over the N.F.D. to  Somalia. For example, The 
Guardian wrote that, 'We think that i f  the B ritish  could summon up the 
nerve to  make the change, even a t th is eleventh hour, i t  would be 
doing a very good turn to Kenya as well as the Somalis. Otherwise th is  
w ill  be a running sore for years. ' D Such a move would only have 
damaged B rita in 's  relations with Kenya and would have had serious 
repercussions both fo r the white se ttle rs  in Kenya and fo r  the large  
European (mainly B ritish ) investment tied  up inside the country as a 
whole. I t  was c le a rly  more important fo r the B ritish  Govemement to 
back Kenya rather than Somalia. But the fa ilu re  o f the Rome talks 65
65. The Guardian, 30 August I963
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soured an already uneasy atmosphere existing between Kenya and
e i t  66Somalia.
The N.F.D. dispute was not in immediate terms about i«r»d per se. 
but rather the political significance of that land for domestic opinion 
in each country. The N.P.D. was virtually worthless being semi-arid 
desert sparsely populated by nomadic tribesmen, though after 1968^  
drilling began in the area for oil and radio-active minerals, but with 
little apparent success. The peoples of the N.F.D. were basically 
autonomous, never having been subdued totally nor having had to rely 
upon an outside body far their existence. The dispute, then, concerned 
people and politics, not economics.
Somalia's claim to the N.F.D. rested mainly upon the fact that the
area was covered to a large extent by tribesmen akin to those within the
Somali Republic. The N.F.D. Commission had reported that rally the
eastern parts of the N.F.D. supported secession, but Somalia claimed
the whole district. Leading Somali politicians would admit in private
that their claim was exaggerated, but this remained the official
68policy. There was little attempt made to produce evidence of the 
area being occupied by Somali tribes in pre-colonial times. The Somalis 
had, in fact, entered this area at much the same time as the colonial 6*8
66. Problems had arisen in July, when Somalia refused to hand back to 
Kenya two murderers on the grounds that there was no extradition 
treaty existing between the countries. A District Commissioner and 
a Tribal Chief in Kenya were the victims, the murders being attached 
to the secessionist cause.
This was the first case listed in the *Narrative of Events' 
document published in ife.y 1967, citing this as a provocation of 
Kenya (see below).
Financial Times, 6 September 1968.
68. Africa Confidential, vol. 6, no. 7, April I965.
administrators, the latter to prevent the former's expansion. Somalia's 
case was that their people were presently in the N.F.D. so. therefore the 
N.F.D. should he joined with Somalia. It was a problem of one nation 
being kept apart by artificial boundaries.
Pan-Somalism was described as a branch of Pan-Africanism, because 
once all Somalis had united in one nation, they would be able to play 
a major role in African affairs as a regional entity. One flaw in this 
argument, at least until 1967» was that Somalia was not totally committed 
to Africa. As a Muslim country, Somalia looked towards the Arab 
countries to the north for cultural affinity and had barely concealed 
disrespect for black Africans. To what extent this affected their 
position in Africa (and to what extent it was noticed) is difficult to 
calculate, but it could hardly have helped their cause.
The Kenya Government opposed the Somali claims. It saw Pan- 
Soraalism as a tribalist doctrine based upon the ethnic homogeneity of 
the Somalis. The Somali Republic aimed purely for territorial aggrand­
isement at the expense of Kenya. The N.F.D. was an integral part of 
the country, and so the problem was a domestic one concerning internal
security»
I f  anyone wishes to exercise his right of self- 
determination let him exercise that right by moving out 
o f the country if necessary but not seek to balkanise 
Africa any further under the guise of so-called self- 
determination. The principle of self-determination has 
relevance where FOREIGN DOMINATION is the issue. It has 
no relevance where the issue is territorial disintegration 
by dissident citizens. 69 69
69. Memorandum submitted by the Kenyan delegation to the O.A.U. Summit 
in May 1963» as quoted in Catherine Hoskyns, Case Studies in 
African diplomacy. Number Two. Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya dispute 
(Uar es Salaam, 0. U.P., 1969/» p. 39»
Kenyatta had to be firm with Somalia as any sign of generous states­
manship or weakness could have opened the floodgates to other tribes 
in Kenya, unhappy at their political fortunes and the demise of the 
majimbo regional constitution to seek some autonomous status outside 
of the control of the central government.
The clash of interests with Somalia was complete. The Somalis 
saw themselves engaged in a crusade, as a nation bestraddling borders, 
attempting to expand the artificial state boundaries to fit the nation. 
Kenyans were hoping to build up national cohesion, within the confines 
of the similarly artificial boundaries in which they found themselves. 
Both countries needed success to maintain support at home. Somalis 
had to change the border which Kenya was to fight so hard to keep.
International Implications
Within the rest of Africa, the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia dispute 
attracted great interest and was to some extent a test case on the 
thorny question of territorial borders. African opinion in general 
had shifted over the previous years as regards the question of front­
iers. In 1958» the All-African Peoples Conference in Accra had de­
nounced ’artificial frontiers drawn by imperialist Powers to divide 
the peoples of Africa, particularly those which cut across ethnic 
groups and divide people of the same stock', and called for 'the 
abolition or adjustment of such frontiers at an early date '.^0 By 
1963, many more states had gained independence in Africa and, con­
sequently, their politicians took a more conservative view of the 
territory they now possessed. The Charter of the Organisation of 
African Unity, drawn up in May 1963 at Addis Ababa, portrayed this 70
70. Mutiso and Rohio, op« clt., p. 3^5«
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change of attitude. Article in, 3, of the Charter requested »Respect
for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for
its inalienable right to independent existence».?1 a  resolution at
the first O.A.U. Summit in Cairo during July 1964 went further and
stated that the Assembly, 'Solemnly declares that all Member States
pledge themselves to respect the frontiers existing on their achieve-
72ment of national independence'.'
The Somalis stressed at the O.A.U. that their case was unique 
and would not set a precedent. They were the only 'nation* to be 
split among several states. The Kenyan case was, however, stronger 
and gained easier support. Pears of secession were high in Africa, 
especially after Tshorabe and the Congo secession and what was developing 
between the regions in Nigeria. Most states shared a similar problem 
with Kenya of 'minorities ', and if a precedent for secession were 
set, then the whole continental structure could have fallen apart.
Kenya's attempt at nation-building needed success to inspire the other 
»new nations' of Africa. However influential the Organisation of 
African Unity might have been, both Kenya and Somalia used it only 
occasionally to bolster up their own individual positions. The O.A.U. 
was never a primary source of peace keeping. Both countries preferred 
direct negotiation as the problems were too close to 'national 
interests ' to be passed over to a third party.
Somalia had a similar territorial dispute with Ethiopia concerning 
73the Ogaden region. like Kenya, Ethiopia had possession of the 7123
71. Ibid., p. 394.
72. Ibid., p. *J06.
73. M.W. Mariam, 'The Background of the Ethio-Soraalian Boundary Dispute*.
T . J . M . A . S . , 2 ,  2  (19 6 4 ), pp. 18 9 -2 19 . . *
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disputed territory and so both countries shared an interest in main­
taining the status quo. In late September I963, the then Acting Prime 
Minister of Kenya, Joseph MUrumbi, paid a short visit to Addis Ababa 
and the two countries made agreements upon their own frontiers. A 
Kenya-Ethiopia defence agreement was announced in mid November, though 
it had been agreed upon as early as July. The ratification had to 
wait until after Kenyan independence/ but a united front against 
Somalia's expansionist policies was established. The text of the 
agreement was not made public, but it was known that both Kenya and 
Ethiopia had agreed to come to the aid of the other if attacked.
Though the 'attacker' was unspecified, the treaty was obviously 
aimed at preventing Somalia from undertaking rash military action.
It also had another advantage to Kenya which one scholar has pointed 
out. He realised that the pact ‘lessened the costs likely to be 
incurred by the increase in Somali armed forces by adopting the 
strategy of alliance in the hope that this would enable Kenya to 
avoid the alternative option - a costly and major expansion of the 
Kenyan armed forces to meet the apparent Somali threat'.^
The tension between the parties in East Africa was exacerbated 
by the rivalry of the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. The Somali Republic had 
received in late I963 a positive offer of £11-14 million in Soviet 
military aid. Somalia had been forced to turn to the Soviet Union 
after the West had only offered half of what had been requested. The 
global implications of the disputer then, were that the Somali Republic, 
badced by Soviet arms and Chinese aid, faced Ethiopia, supplied by the 745
74. The Times, 28 December 1963.
75. C.R. Mitchell, 'The Dispute over the Northern Frontier District of
Kenya 1963-1967. A Study in Strategies of Conflict Resolution'
(Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1971), p. 3.36.
United States with military hardware (the U.S. supplied an equal amount, 
approximately £14 million, to Somalia in economic aid) and Kenya 
largely supplied hy Britain/ By 1978, only the Kenya Government 
had maintained faith in its sponsor, as both Ethiopia and Somalia had 
switched backers, with the Soviet Union and Cuba moving to support 
Ethiopia, leaving Somalia no option but to seek assistance from the 
Vest. It would be wrong to suggest that the Great Power rivalry at any 
tin» over-shadowed the main dispute which was one about territory. The 
global powers were careful not to be drawn too deeply into the conflict 
and were prepared to remain interested, if not fully committed, on­
lookers on the scene.
The Border War
On Christmas Bay 1963, Kenyatta declared a State of Emergency in 
the N.E.R. The government completely sealed off the border with Somalia 
by means of a five mile prohibited zone stretching the full length of 
the frontier. The policing operation was helped by British troops on 
the ground, while the Royal Air Force (R.A.F,) flew in supplies.^ 
Kenyatta claimed that this action was aimed to stop the two thousand 
bandits, or shifta, operating against the country. Within a week of 
this, a domestic crisis blew up which threatened Kenyatta's control over 
foreign policy, when the Senate refused to grant its permission to the 
government to carry on the State of Emergency in the N.E.R. The House 
of Representatives had earlier given its overwhelming approval, but the 
Senate vote of twenty-three to fourteen only gave fractionally over 60 
per cent, support instead of the required 65 per cent. The major 
reason for the Senate decision was the anger of the minority K.A.D.U, 76
76. ’The Armies of Africa*, Africa Report. January 1964, pp. 8-18.
77. Wew York Times, 30 December I963. '
members that they had not been consulted in what was a national crisis. 
To« Mboya, as Minister for Constitutional Affairs, used his legitimate 
right to speak to the Senate. Mboya stressed the importance of the 
shifta manace to the nation, and requested the full support of all the 
Senate members. It was made clear, however, that the government would 
overrule the Senate and continue the State of Emergency as it considered 
that the Senate had no right to interfere. After Mboya's talk, a 
second vote was taken and the opposition remained silent to the ayes of 
the government supporters/ A serious domestic situation, less than 
three weeks after independence, was averted.
The government reaffirmed its intentions to develop the N.E.R.
when, on 2 January 19&4, a five year development plan for the region
79worth K£300,000 was announced. However, in late January, an army 
mutiny rocked the Kenya Government and forced Kenyatta to seek extra 
British assistance, both to help control the immediate insecurity and 
to lay down stable foundations for the new Kenyan army. The mutiny 
raised doubts as to the discipline of the army and to the overall 
authority and strength of the government to carry out its policies in 
the N.E.R. This question was mare or less solved, at least in the 
short term, by the influx of British troops which served to shore up 
the Kenyan position in the N.E.R, The mutiny indirectly strengthened 
Kenya's diplomatic hand, though not at the O.A.U., by providing a 
satisfactory excuse for maintaining a British presence in the country.
At the beginning of February, a full-scale war blew up between 7890
78. The Times and East African Standard. 1 January 1964,
79. East African Standard. 3 January 1964.
80. Mazrui and Rothchild, op. cit.
Ethiopia and Somalia. Kenya, though giving moral support to Ethiopia,
remained out of the conflict. Some two weeks before the fighting
broke out, Ethiopia and Kenya had sent a joint memorandum to the O.A.U.
accusing Somalia of 'pursuing a policy of territorial expansion at the
81expense of neighbouring states'. The issue was included on the agenda 
of the Second Extraordinary Session of the Council of Ministers, which 
convened in Dar es Salaam in mid February 196^. Kenya, Ethiopia and 
Somalia all reiterated their positions on the disputed territories.® 2 
The major task was to negotiate a ceasefire in order that talks be­
tween Ethiopia and Somalia could take place, and the conference called 
on them to do this.
The next Session of the Council of Ministers was held just a week
1
later in Lagos, and in the short time between meetings, the two 
countries had agreed upon a ceasefire. Little progress, however, had 
been made on the Kenya-Somalia dispute, and the O.A.U. Ministers were 
'Deeply concerned that the continuation of such regrettable incidents 
may aggravate tension between them and lead to hostilities the re­
percussions of which may seriously prejudice African Unity and peace 
in this Continent*. J The Ministers invited 'the Governments of Kenya 
and Somalia to open as soon as possible direct negotiations with due 
respect to paragraph 3 of Article III of the Charter with a view to 
finding a peaceful and lasting solution to differences between them', 
and called upon them 'to refrain from all acts which may aggravate or
Q£l
jeopardise the change of peaceful and fraternal settlement '.
1 k6
81. Africa Diary, 196^ , p. 1606.
82. Wolfers, op.cit.. pp. 132-1*10
0rSan*gat*c>T1 Ai>r^ can Unity Council of Ministers. Resolutions n-p
8**. Ibid,
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The Lagos resolution was to be taken as the starting-point for 
future negotiations with Somalia, but it had little immediate impact 
on the dispute. Militarily, Kenya tightened its grip on the situation. 
The increasingly obvious support of British forces was viewed with 
suspicion by Somalia. In March, Kenyatta gave permission for the 
British Navy to f l y  planes over Kenya from Mombasa harbour.®^ This was 
construed in Nairobi as harmless training exercises, but Mogadishu was 
quick to assess the potential threat of British planes in the N.E.R. if 
Somalia pressurised Kenya too much.
In May, Somalia accused British troops of being actively used in
fighting the shifta. The British actions were cleverly likened to
other simultaneous imperial missions in Aden and Rhodesia. Although
or
the government strenuously denied the accusations, the British were, 
nevertheless, closely involved in a support role as their political and 
economic interests were best served in helping Kenyan defence. In June, 
the government was informed that it was to receive K£60 million in aid 
from Britain, half of which was to be an 'independence gift'. Even 
James Gichuru, Minister of Economic Hanning, was staggered by British 
generosity. Military assistance included a £3.5 million gift of arms 
equipment, partly made up in air craft - six Chipmunks, eleven Beavers 
and four Caribou, A further gift of K£1 million was towards the train­
ing of Kenya's forces by the British Army and R.A.F. Finally, more than
K£6 million worth of military property, including the modem Kahawa base,
87was presented free to Kenya.0' 8567
85. Africa Confidential, vol. 5, no. 6, March 196^.
86. The Guardian, 18 Ifey 1964-.
87, East African Standard, June 196 ,^
Of more immediate consequence to the Somali dispute, the British
were maintaining the airlift to the M.E.R. free of charge. This
operation, estimated to be costing £1,000 a day, led the East African
Standard to commentj ’The thought arises as to how Kenya could possibly
afford to conduct such a costly campaign on its own resources; and as
it could never do so, taking this one item an illustrative of the
drain, a political settlement of the dispute with Somalia is shown to
88be necessary just as soon as possible *. Diplomatically, however, 
relations had worsened. Ch 7 April, Somalia's representative in 
Nairobi had been ordered to leave the country within twenty-four hours. 
This rupture of diplomatic relations, not to be restored for almost 
four years, meant that normal negotiations between the countries became 
impossible and forced them into conveying their communications through 
third parties.
In stark contrast to the bitter relations with Somalia was the 
entente cordiale with Ethiopia, based on a natural friendship between 
the two veteran leaders but bound tighter in common animosity towards 
Somalia. Haile Selassie's State Visit to Kenya in June was greeted with 
sue* warmth that the Ehst African Standard wrote that 'it is not 
revealing any State secrets to refer to the liaison existing for some 
time between the authorities in Nairobi and Addis Ababa and between 
headquarters in the field in the campaigns on two fronts to resist the 
armed pressures from Somalia'. As well as the regular monthly defence 
meetings with Ethiopia, a permanent body was formed to co-ordinate 
joint policies on international, Pan-African and E&st African affairs.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid., 8 April 196^.
A communique released at the end of the State Visit said that ‘Full 
agreement was manifested on all questions that formed the subject of 
the talks ».^
At the end of 1965, after a year of »stalemate', a meeting was 
hastily arranged with Somalia in Arusha, Tanzania, after much prepar­
atory persuasion by President Nyerere. The talks took place during 
10-14- December, with Kenyatta present only in the latter half of the 
discussions, Hopes of a settlement soon evaporated, Kenya focused 
upon the shifta operations which were affecting normal life in the 
North-Eastern Province (the regions became provinces after the 
scrapping of the majimbo constitution in December 1964-), The govern­
ment wanted Somalia to condemn the shifta, cease to aid them and do all 
in its power to prevent their activities. This was the sine qua non 
for a normalisation of relations. The Somali Government would not 
move from its previous negotiating position and restated that self- 
determination for Somalis was the only practicable solution. The 
differences between the two sides could not, for the present, be 
bridged.^
In mid 1966, embarrassing domestic unrest heightened tensions with 
Somalia. The government openly accused Somalia of assisting the 
opposition Kenya People’s Union party, but both Gginga Odinga and 
Mogadishu denied this. However, deteriorating relations caused Mwai 
Kibaki, the Commerce Minister, to sever all trade with Somalia on 
21 June. The loss of revenue for Kenya by this move was greater than 
for Somalia? Kenyan exports to Somalia had realised K2600,000 in 1964
91. J-3 19^4.
92. See John Drysdale, »The Situation in December 1967* in Hoskyns, 
op.cit., pp.' 84-89. .
and K£h6z%000 in 1965, whereas imports from Somalia only amounted to 
K£9,000 in each of the two years.^
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Table b tb
Armed Forces in East Africa 1966
Kenya Somalia Ethiopia Tanzania Uganda
Defence Estimate 
U.S. dollars m.
10.2 6.7 3I.2 7.2 I7.O
Army 4,175 8,000 32,000 1,700 5,700
Navy 150 180 930 * -
Air Force 450 1,250 2,000 100 260
Police 11,500 5,000 28,000 1,350 . 5,500
note* There were over 300 British Officers on secondment to the Kenya
1
Army also.
Source* David Wood, The Armed Forces of African States (London,
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966).
In May 19^7» the Kenya Government issued a large document entitled 
'Narrative of four years of inspired aggression and direct subversion 
mounted by the Somali Republic against the Government and people of the 
Republic of Kenya*. This was the definitive Kenyan interpretation of 
the dispute, and copies of the document were sent to all Heads of State 
of the O.A.U. and to all member countries of the United Nations. The 
document warned that 'there comes a time when hostility, de facto if not 
de .jure, is so blatant that hopes of possible conciliation backed by the 
weight of all regional advice must fade and when terrorism is so enhanced 93
93. Financial Times and East African Standard, 22 June I966.
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that it nay no longer be contained within a policing operation'.^
The government stressed the significance of Soviet aid to Somalia as 
a major factor exacerbating the dispute. Somalia was quick to rebut 
this allegation and blamed Britain for causing the problem by not 
allowing self-determination in I963 and by providing military aid to 
Kenya since that date.
Even though the level of hostility with Somalia was rising to its 
highest pitch, there were contradictory pressures working for some sort 
of settlement. Both countries had exerted a great amount of energy on 
the dispute and, after four years, the strain was beginning to tell.
The cost to Kenya had worked out to about K£3 million annually and was 
estimated to be approaching KfA million in 1967?^ This was a large 
financial burden on a developing country, and would have been greater 
but for generous British aid. The army had also had a great deal of 
trouble prosecuting the war in the N.E.P. The shifts were fighting a 
guerrilla war and refused to be held in one position long enough to 
allow the army to engage in head-on battle. The government could not 
totally commit all its forces as this would have undermined the official 
comment that the shifta operations were organised by a mere handful of 
Somalis. Yet however many troops were pushed into the field, they 
could not come to grips with the problem. There appeared to be no 
outright military solution.
Somalia, similarly, faced many problems. The prohibited zone made 
it difficult for supplies and shifta to cross the border with impunity. 
Shops in the N.E.P. were no longer stocked from Somalia as lorries could *95
9*f, Quoted in New York Times and East African Standard, 3 Ifey 1967.
95. The Observer, 8 January 1967.
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not cross the border. The shifta were fighting in great hardship, with 
little aid and with little tangible reward. Morale was low, as exemp­
lified by the surrender of 340 shifta under an amnesty in mid July. ^  
Somalia's economy was in a poor state, only made worse by the dispute.
Aid from the Soviet Union had not been as forthcoming as expected, and 
would not have solved the problem in any case. Somalia had been receiv­
ing arms from several Arab countries, notably Egypt, but these were 
likely to diminish owing to the outbreak of the 'June war* with Israel. 
The consequent closure of the Suez Canal also affected Somalia. Finally^ 
the ruthless French manipulation of the referendum in March 1967 in 
French Somaliland (Djibouti), so maintaining it as part of the French 
Community, could not have encouraged those committed to ihn-Somalism.
It appeared that the Somali Government would have either to step up 
operations into a full-scale war, which seemed unlikely, or to seek a 
settlement.
An election in June 1967 in the Somali Republic produced a new 
government composed of Dr. Shermarke as President and Mr. Egal as 
Prime Minister. There was immediately a change of emphasis in Somali 
policies which 'was accelerated by the economic straits in which the 
incoming Government found itself, as well as the apparent failure of 
the previous policy of militant confrontation'.^ Egal aimed to clarify 
the policies of Somalia towards the border dispute. Propaganda attacks 
on Radio Mogadishu ceased as he tried to woo Kenya. On 8 August, Egal 
explicitly stated the Somali case*
We do NOT wish to annex the territory of any State 
• whatever nor to expand into such territory.
We DO intend to champion the cause of Somali terri­
tories under foreign domination, in order that they 967
96, East African Standard, 21 July I967.
97. Mitchell, op.cit., p. 7.4.
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nay attain sovereign independent status through the 
process of self-determination. 98
Efeal believed there to be a great difference between aggressive
expansionist policies supposedly followed by Somalia, and the 'true'
line of action which was merely to support Somalis who were fighting
for self-determination. Though Kenyans did not bother to speculate
over the metaphysics of the Somali policy, there was at least a slim
chan.ce of a settlement. E&al was from former British Somaliland and
had played a major role in the Somali nationalist movement of the 1950s.
This background, allied to his command of Qiglish, made him more
compatible with the Kenyan leaders. E&al was also a Ban-Africanist
and a believer in Bast African unity and federation. This was the best
opportunity for Kenya to end the dispute which had severely hampered
the country's development, and which had brought an estimated toll of
about 2,600 dead for both countries combined.^
1
The Truce
The fourth meeting of the O.A.U. Heads of State convened at 
Kinshasa in mid September 1967» Following an approach made to President 
Kaunda of Zambia by 2&al, Kaunda asked Kenya and Somalia to further 
talks in Lusaka to try to settle the border dispute. Both countries 
accepted and issued a statement, known since as the ’Kinshasa Declar­
ation'» informing the 0, A.U. of their decision. Notably, paragraph 
one stated that 'Both Governments have expressed their desire to respect 
each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the spirit of 
Paragraph 3 of Article III of the O.A.U. C h a r t e r A l t h o u g h  this 
statement only conformed to an O.A.U. principle, the fact that 98*10
98. Drysdale in Hopkins, op.cit.. p. 85,
99» International Herald Tribune. 29 August I967.
100. Hoskyns, op.clt., p. 82.
Somalia had reaffirmed this was understood to signify a change in the 
political atmosphere in Mogadishu.
President Kenyatta had decided not to take part personally in the 
Lusaka talks, apparently because of his dislike of air travel. However, 
at the direct request of Egal, Kenyatta agreed to lead Kenya's dele­
gation, and so the location was moved closer to Nairobi on his behalf. 
The talks took place in Arusha, Tanzania, at the end of October. Hopes 
for a settlement were this time high, especially since trade had already 
started moving between the countries without official, approval. After 
a couple of days discussion, a 'Memorandum of Understanding' was issued 
on 28 October. Signed by President Kenyatta and Premier Egal, wit­
nessed by President Kaunda, with. Presidents Nyerere and Obote as 
observers, this was a significant occasion in East African relations.
The primary clause of the memorandum was as follows j
Both Governments will exert all efforts and do their 
utmost to create good neighbourly relations between 
Kenya and Somalia, in accordance with the O.A.U.
Charter. 101
The memorandum contained little specific detail, lacked clarity and 
had no timetable. Both leaders had agreed on 'the gradual suspension' 
of emergency regulations in the border area, the 'consideration of 
measures' to facilitate better trade, and the formation of a working 
committee to meet 'periodically' to review the implementation of the 
agreements and to examine ways of finding a satisfactory solution 'to 
major and minor differences between Kenya and Somalia' . 102
The memorandum was only a 'symbolic truce' to ease tension and to 
be built upon in future negotiations. It was a compromise agreement
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that showed little advance on the diplomatic position at Arusha in 
December 19<$5. Though the memorandum paid lip-service to the Kinshasa 
declaration, a Kenyan concession meant that there was no direct re­
affirmation of Somali respect for Kenyan territorial integrity, some­
thing the government had always previously demanded,. The quid pro q u o 
was a concession by Egal that there was no mention of the Somali 'right' 
to be the protector of Somali interests in the North-Eastern Province. 
The Arusha memorandum was a tentative attempt to formalise the improv­
ing relations with Somalia, It was a sensible agreement as it set 
guidelines for action rather than a rigid framework.
The memorandum was met with approval in the country as it was, in
essence, a success against Somali subversion. In Somalia, Egal had a
difficult time defending himself from charges of selling-out the shifta,
and he continually stressed that 'it is our intention that the Northern
Frontier District problem be kept alive on the conference table without
making the N.F.D. people sacrificial lambs.... njr Government seeks to
foster an atomosphere suitable for negotiations at a round table. ,103
In mid December, Kenyatta had further talks with Egal in Kampala, again
under the guidance of Xaunda. They agreed upon the terms of reference
for the working committee to control future developments between the
two countries. During this conference, Egal made a formal application
on behalf of Somalia for admission into the newly formed East African 
104-Community. However, soon after this, Egal put into perspective his 
view of the detente with Kenya by saying that there had been no dis­
cussion whatsoever of the major differences between the countries, only
103. East African Standard, 2 November 1967. 
104-. Ibid., 16 December I967.
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an agreement that they needed to be discussed.10-^
l a  the New Year, the 'Arusha Honeymoon' brought a freshening of 
the atmosphere wit* trade and diplomatic relations stabilised. At the 
end of January, President Kenyatta could characteristically forgive and 
forget saying 'it is a matter of history that our relations in the past 
were tense. We have now embarked on a new era of friendship, under­
standing and co-operation.,l0^ Over the next twelve months, the sit­
uation in the N.E.P. improved so much that President Kenyatta felt 
confident in his government's ability to break down racial and ethnic 
boundaries and create a unified nation. Community projects, partic­
ularly in water supplies and education, were developed in the province 
while the emergency regulations were eased gradually until in October 
1969 they were dropped completely.10^
In Somalia, however, detente came unstuck in October 1969 when a 
coup d 'état took place after the assassination of the President. Egal 
was thrown out of office. The causes of the coup were domestic and
1 A Û
not connected to the dispute with Kenya. 0 The new military govern-/
ment confirmed the continuation of friendly relations with Kenya, but 
the security of detente was now in doubt. The maintenance of the 
'Arusha Honeymoon' depended primarily upon the mutual trust between 
Kenyatta and Egal. Friendship had grown between the countries, but 
little else. Certainly no final settlement had been reached as to the 
fate of the Somalis in the N.E. P., and none would ever be totally 
acceptable to Somalia without secession of the territory. *3
105* Somali News, 22 December 1967.
106. Africa Diary. 1968, pp. 383^-35.
107. East African Standard. 15 October 1969.
108. I.M. Lewis, 'The Politics of the I969 Somali Coup*. T,j m  i q
3 (1972), pp. 383-^8. ----- 10,
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East Africa after the Community
The truce with the Somali Republic held good during the early 
1970s, when attention was diverted towards the problems with the 
Community partners, Tanzania and Uganda. However, during I977 the 
issue was reopened with the renewed fighting in the Horn of Africa 
between Somalia and Ethiopia. Hostility was aroused in June 1977 when 
3,000 Somali troops attacked a border post at Ramu on their transit to 
the battle in the Qgaden. 7 The war between Ethiopia and Somalia had 
been sparked off partly by the Soviet Union's decision to back the 
Ethiopians rather than the Somalis. This helped to provoke the Somalis 
into another campaign against Ethiopia and at the same time led them to a 
rapprochement with the Vest, both to maintain the country's economy 
and to prosecute the war, which was now interpreted as 'holding back 
communism' in the Horn. Aid was forthcoming from the U.S.A. in 1977^^ 
and Britain in 1 9 7 8 , and, as shown in the previous chapter, this 
angered the Kenya Government intensely because it perceived the West 
to be now supporting the country's greatest enemy.
Defence of territory against aggression remained central to Kenyan
foreign policy, and the government continued to support Ethiopia despite
its Marxist orientation. As a government spokesman informed mej
The problems of the Horn of Africa created by policies 
of Somalia do not affect Kenyan foreign policy. Kenya 
is committed to the Charter of the O.A.U. which governs 
the question of boundaries inherited from the colonial 
history of Africa and therefore by definition Kenya must 
maintain its opposition to the policy of Somalia which 
seeks to create a Greater Somalia by acquiring neighbours' 
territories by force. This is a straightforward issue *1
109. The Times, 30 June 1977.
110. A.R.B., 1977, p. 4519.
111. Britain gave £2 million in aid; The Standard, 11 July 1978,
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irrespective of the ideological orientation of the 
countries concerned. 112
Kenya's positive opposition to Somali expansionism stopped short of 
committing the country to war, because this would have sapped the 
country's finances and diverted energies away from the country's major 
goal, namely economic development. And yet the country's Foreign 
Minister, Munyua Waiyaki, left no room for doubt during a visit to 
Addis Ababa in March 1973 when he said, 'We never want to be caught 
napping and we want the whole world to know about our determination to 
resist aggression this year, next year, or at any time in the future.
The outbreak of a full-scale war in the Horn of Africa, the 
continuing threat of attack from Somalia, and the unpredictability of 
Kenya's western neighbour, Uganda, all led to a rapid increase in the 
size of the country's Armed Forces in 1977. The government had always 
relied upon British assistance in times of trouble as well as for 
providing arms to the country, but after 1976 the United States of 
America and France began to take on some of this trade. Table 4»5 
shows the military balance in the region and the attempt made by Kenya 
to increase its own military potential in relation to its neighbours, 
through the purchase of military hardware during that year.
Kenyan foreign policy, while taking into account the changing 
military horizons, still focused upon the goal of opening up the whole . 
of the region to benefit the Kenyan economy. The East African Community 
had to some extent been isolated from those countries around it because 
of lack of communications, paucity of trading commodities and different
112. Letter to author from Charles G. Maina, Permanent Representative of 
Kenya to the United Nations, 19 June 1973.
113. A.R.B., 1978, p. 4772; also 'Somalia's five-pointed Star and Kenya', 
Africa, no. 80, April 1978, pp. 41-44.
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cultural/colonial backgrounds. The foundation of a reorientation of 
policy towards those states to the north came in June 19?311Z| when a 
tripartite agreement with Ethiopia and Sudan was signed which promised 
better communications and trade. The ousting of . Haile Selassie in 19/^ 
lost Kenyatta a close friend and ally, but also showed the President 
what could happen in Kenya if the calls for change were not met. Little 
change took place in Ethiopian foreign policy concerning the Somali 
and Eritrean situations, and the closure of the northern ports forced 
Ethiopia to seek a trade route through the south. A new road linking 
Addis Ababa with Nairobi, and from there the port of Mombasa, opened 
in June 1977 to make the expansion of trade feasible.11"* In 1973, Kenya 
gave a free gift of oil tankers to Ethiopia, thereby encouraging the 
country to take its oil from the Mombasa refinery.11^ A similar policy 
of attempting to increase trade was followed with Sudan, but although 
the potential is clear to see, only marginal successes were recorded up 
to 1973.
To the south of Kenya, the major aim of foreign policy was to
disentangle the country from the debris left behind by the Community.
The continued closure of the border with Tanzania left a question mark
against trade with that country as well as those further afield, notably
Zaire, Zambia, Rwanda and Mozambique. Despite these problems, trade
with Zambia maintained a healthy growth rate, while that with Mozambique
117trebled in three years. Relations with Tanzania, on the other hand, 
failed to improve after the border closure of February 1977» The
114. East African Standard. 25 June 1973. 
H5. A.R.B. (E.F.T.), 1977. p. 4310.
116. Ibid., 1978, p. 4839.
117. Ibid.
160
Table ¿h 5
Armed Forces In East Africa 1977
Kenya Somalia Ethiopia Tanzania Uganda
G.N.P. 1975 2.8 0.31 2.9 1.92 2.0
jf billion
Defence Expenditure 35 25 103 703 ly P
1976 $  m.
•
Army 6,500 30,000 50,000 17,000 20,000
Tanks
•
(to1*)! 300 Ito 3** 35
Air Force 800 1,000 2,000 1,000 1,000
Combat Aircraft 21 (+12**) 55 35 29
1 - 1972
2 - 197^
3 - 1975
¿f - Qi Order
Source! The Military Balance 1977-1978 (London, The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977)•
rupture between the two countries was a strange one, even by African 
standards, because even though tension was great throughout the period, 
there was never a sign that any form of military confrontation would 
take place, thus emphasising again the philosophical nature of the 
dispute. Many practical problems did result from the border dispute, 
notably in the loss of trade and the closure of the northern tourist 
circuit in Tanzania (including Mount Kilimanjaro, which Kenyan tourist 
information often portrayed as being in Kenya, much to Tanzanian anger)
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to travellers from Kenya. It appears that President Nyerere, even in 
1979» remained equally determined as he was in 1977 to teach Kenya a 
lesson.
' v,/
To the west of Kenya lay perhaps the most insoluble,, and frustrating, 
problem, which was that of President Idi Amin's regime in Uganda. 
Admittedly, Kenya's trade surplus with the country reached its highest 
point ever in 1977. tut the disadvantages offset this to a great extent 
in that large debts were outstanding frara Uganda and few Kenyans could 
be sure of safe passage in the country. In May I97Q, the airplane of 
the former minister, Bruce McKenzie, was blown up in mid air on a 
return trip from Kampala. Although no conclusive evidence could be 
found, the Kenya Government was convinced that Amin was behind McKenzie's 
death. A further difficulty caused by Amin's rule was that the 
Trans-Africa route, which passed through Uganda, was not used to its 
full advantage by Kenyans wishing to get to northern Zaire or the 
Central African Republic. The fall of Amin in I979 raised the curtain 
of gloom to the west and opened up fresh opportunities for Kenya, but 
this lies outside the scope of this work.
Kenya's regional foreign policy continued to be determined by the 
desire to keep mutual friendship in order to help promote the country's 
economy. After the Community's demise, no formal association of states 
existed in the region, but this in itself had little serious consequence 
for the economy; political friendship was the prerequisite, not a formal 
political association. During 1978» the government was involved in two 
sets of talks, which on the surface appeared to suggest a contradictory 
foreign policy but which exemplified the regionalist aims of the
118. 'The McKenzie Affair', Africa, no. 83, July 1978, pp. 3*K35.
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country. Under the auspices of the World Bank and its Swiss mediator, 
Dr. Victor Umbricht, attempts were made to settle the outstanding 
financial disagreements with the Community partners and share out as 
equally as possible the assets of the organisation, most of which 
were located in Kenya. * At the same time as the disengagement talks 
were taking place, ministers were working on plans to bring together 
all the countries of the region in a loose economic association. 1-20 
The aim was to have an association comparable with the Economic 
Community of West African States (E.C.O.W.A.S.), formed in 1975, which 
provided a forum for the sixteen members to discuss economic and 
political matters. Whatever the hopes were for the future, there 
was little evidence to suggest that E.C.O.W.A.S. or the proposed 
association in eastern Africa would impose too many restrictions on 
national independence.
The development of this wider association will remain the goal 
of foreign policy in future years, but it is most unlikely that an 
association as tight as the Community will emerge. The benefits of an 
eastern African association of states to Kenya will be small at first, 
because few of the countries have an economy equivalent in strength and 
dynamism to Kenya's. In the long* term, the prospects are very bright 
because of the country's geographical position and its present trend of 
being the stablest and most prosperous country in the region.
119. The Standard, 28 July 1978. Dr. Umbricht was appointed in 
January I978.
120. A declaration of intent was signed by nine countries in March 1978 
in Lusaka} A.R.B. (E.F.T.), 1978, pp. ¿+630-31« Further talks took 
place in June 1978 in Addis Ababa and were continuing; The 
Standard, 21 July 1978. For earlier discussions of this theme see 
A.M. O'Connor, 'A wider Eastern African Economic Union? Some 
Geographical Aspects', T.J.M.A.S.. 6, 4 (I968), pp. ¿+85-493. Also 
Hazlewood, op.cit., pp. l46-172.
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Conclusion
It is evident that the foundation of the East African Community 
was laid in the colonial period. The close co-ordination of the three 
territories, the shared cultural heritage, and the perception of a 
common bond between them all helped to provide the impetus for the 
attempt at federation in the early 1960s. This colonial heritage, 
however, had contradictory effects on Kenyan foreign policy. Cn the 
" one hand, it helped to influence friendly relations with the country's 
neighbours and allowed President Kenyatta to accept legislation which 
aimed to hold back or balance out Kenyan development in favour of 
Tanzania and Uganda. Cn the other hand, the whole orientation of the 
economy was based upon the domination of the East African market as 
had been the case during the pre-independence period. This policy 
provoked resistance from Tanzania and Uganda and, together with mutual 
political antagonisms, brought the Community to its end.
Generally within the wider East African arena, Kenya's policy of 
mutual good-neighbourliness helped to bring political and economic 
benefits, but the lack of communications and trade with neighbours 
further afield limited any possible successes. The border war with 
the Somali Republic, as well as the direct interest in the more violent 
war in the Horn of Africa, made for problematical relations with the 
north. The unpredictable nature of Uganda's President Amin, coupled 
with the drifting away of the understanding with Tanzania, leading to 
the border closure, also questioned the extent to which future Kenyan 
successes could be scored to the south.
Despite these problems, the government was committed to continue 
its attempts to promote links with all countries of the region, and it 
was hoped that some form of association would develop to facilitate
i m
these links. The economy, however, remained geared to the western 
economic system because of its 'underdeveloped* nature. The imports 
required for development, as perceived by the government, came from 
outside of the region. For there to be major growth of an integrated 
eastern African association, it is necessary for all the governments 
to redefine their country's economic policies. If such an event takes 
place and countries look within, rather than outside, the region for
- trade, then Kenya, and the neo-colonial interests in Kenya stand to 
9
have a strong economic future in the region.
r-x
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Chapter Five
Foreign Policy and International Organisations
The previous two chapters have focused upon Kenyan economic 
development, discussing the relationship between economics and foreign 
policy, and the importance of the East African arena in the orient­
ation of Kenyan politics. In this chapter, the area of study is 
widened to look at how foreign policy goals in the economic, political 
and social fields were pursued in international organisations, and 
specifically in the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity 
and the Commonwealth. By far the most important political goal sought 
in these organisations was a solution to the problem faced in southern 
Africa, and this forms a separate case-study in the chapter. But before 
a close examination of these issues is undertaken, it is important to 
outline Kenya's major objectives in international organisations as 
well as the style of diplomacy used to pursue these goals*
Diplomatic Style and Objectives in International Organisations
Kenya's foreign policy in international organisations could best be 
described as being of pragmatic radicalism. The use of the words 
'radical' and 'conservative' to describe African states' foreign 
policies at times clouds rather "than clears one's understanding of the 
subject. To be 'radical ' in African terms is not necessarily to be 
left-wing or communist, but helps to describe those states which have 
similar aspirations to bring down the white minority regimes in south­
ern Africa, to change the world economic order in favour of the devel­
oping countries, and to unite Africans in a loose brotherhood of nations. 
At times, Kenya was criticised as being 'conservative' because of the 
country's capitalist development strategy and its spuming of socialism, 
and yet it appeared to be clearly 'radical' in other aspects of foreign
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policy.
To avoid confusion, these terms are best omitted, though it is 
difficult to refrain totally from using them. The term pragmatic 
radicalism goes some way towards an accurate analysis of Kenya's 
international role. Policies were radical to the extent that they 
aimed to change the international status quo, and this helped Kenyan 
leaders to maintain their anti-colonial posture and friendly relations 
with the rest of Africa. But quite often the stand taken over a 
specific issue was 'positional' rather than 'positive', that is it 
expressed what the government would have liked to do rather than what 
it knew it could do. International organisations provided the ideal 
forum for Kenya's leaders to speak forcibly on many issues of concern 
and reach the widest audience possible. This declaratory policy 
showed that the government was not shirking its international 
responsibilities, and yet did not place any strain upon the maintenance 
of the country's de facto foreign policy.
Although Kenya played an active and committed role in international 
organisations, the government was always aware of the pragmatic 
considerations on policy.. Kenyatta was happy to play a quiet - he 
would have said 'mature' - role in a particular dispute where a more 
outspoken and aggressive stance would have damaged Kenyan interests.
So, for example, in I965 the President preferred to maintain diplomatic 
links with Britain after Rhodesian 'independence' rather than break them 
because of the damage such an action would have done to the economy. 
Conversely, Kenyan assistance to Israel in its commando attack cm 
Uganda in July 1976 was also pragmatic, because the government rightly 
calculated that little would be lost in terms of trade with Uganda or 
friendship in Africa, while a lot was gained in teaching President Idi
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Am in a lesson and diminishing the military threat to Kenya.
The Kenya Government was well aware of the country's limitations 
in pursuing a successful foreign policy. Tom Mboya, the leading 
minister of the 1960s, summed up this position most accurately in 
1964, but the overall picture remained the same throughout the period 
in question»
In nearly every case, the achievement of political 
independence has not seen a corresponding radical 
change in economic relationships. Many countries of 
Africa still belong to the franc zone, the sterling 
zone or the dollar area. A glance at the trade 
figures for any African country will show hew little the 
relationships with the former occupying power have 
changed in the economic field. Yet it is difficult 
to disentangle economic ties and political strings.
If we are dependent upon one country or group of 
countries as far as markets for our main crops are 
concerned, our diplomats, and hence our foreign 
policy, will be subjected to all sorts of pressures, 
both subtle and not so subtle. 1
The country's attempts to maintain a non-aligned position in 
international affairs were undermined, as has already been noted in 
Chapter Three, by its military dependence. The bulk of Kenya's 
weaponry was purchased from Britain, but in the mid 1970s the United 
States of America supplied some goods, including in 1976 a large order 
worth $ 7 5 million for the purchase of twelve Northrop F5 fighter planes, 
which were aimed to neutralise Uganda's airforce.1 2 Later in 1976, a 
U.S. frigate and P3 Orion anti-submarine/reconnaissance plane arrived 
in Mombasa from the American base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, 
and this was regarded as tacit support for Kenya in its 'cold war'
1. Tom Mboya, The Challenge of Nationhood (London, Heinemann, 1970), 
p. 236.
2. Financial Times, 30 June 1976.
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against Uganda.^ This reliance upon the West for weaponry and assist­
ance weakened further the ability to have true non-alignment in foreign 
policy and left the government to promote what could be classed as a 
'diplomatic' form of non-alignment only.
Through international organisations, the government was able to gain a 
wider audience for its foreign policy statements. In the short-term, 
there was a limit as to what the government could achieve, but in the 
long term the aim was to build up the economic strength of the country 
and so be able to gain some future influence in the internationali
system, though the policies to be followed then would be determined by 
the composition and ideology of the governing elite. The most import­
ant organisations in which the government worked were, as already noted, 
the United Nations, the O.A.U. and the Commonwealth. The European 
Economic Community increasingly received the attention of the gov****n- 
aent because of its significant role in the economy as well as its 
political stature in the western world. The objectives of Kenyan 
foreign policy as pursued in these international organisations could 
basically be divided into two broad areas - those with an explicit 
political motive, and those which were based mainly upon economic and 
social considerations. The political objectives were often those which 
engendered the most vocal support and earnest attention, especially 
when concerned with southern Africa, but the oil crisis of 1973 and 
the world inflation which followed helped to shift attention away to
3. New York Times and Financial Times. 13 July 1976. The British also 
supplied some weaponry at short notice, and a further agreement 
was made for *K) Vickers Mk 3 tanks. The U.S.A. has a security 
assistance agreement with Kenya, while Britain has overflying, 
training and defence agreements; see The Military Balance 1977- 
1978 (London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
1977) PP. 4>45.
169
the economic plight of the developing countries** and so gave some 
impetus for Kenyan policies in this field,
A qualification could be added to these two categories to high­
light those goals which only affected the international environment 
or ’milieu* as opposed to those which had a direct impact upon the 
country,-^ Kenya's support in the U.N. for the pacific uses of outer 
space had little direct impact upon the country, whereas the defence 
of the principle of territorial inviolability in the O.A.U. had a 
direct bearing on the dispute with the Somali Republic, Somewhere 
between these two poles was the policy on South Africa, Kenyan 
antagonism towards South Africa led the country to seek a change of 
attitude there, but this would not have had any direct effect upon 
Kenya which had few contacts with South Africa, However, perhaps in 
the long term, the emotional success would have been converted to more 
concrete results in terras of a new, influential trading partner.
Political Issues
At the global level, Kenyan energies were channelled through the 
United Nations and, to a lesser extent, the Commonwealth. At the U.N., 
many of the issues discussed had only a superficial relationship with 
Kenya, but the country's leaders nevertheless committed themselves to 
playing an active role in debates and decisions. Two areas, apart from 
southern Africa, on which the Kenyan delegations often spoke concerned
James myall, 'Foreign Policy in Africa! A Changing Diplomatic Land­
scape' in Peter Jones (ed,), The International Yearbook of Foreign 
Policy Analysis. Volume 2 (London, Groom Helm, 1975), pp. 166-208.
5, See James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, jr., 'The Role 
of Environment in International Relations' in James Barber and 
Michael Smith (eds.), The Nature of Foreign Policy: A Reader 
(Milton Keynes, Open University and idiinburgh, Holmes McDougall. 
197*0. PP. 86-9*f.
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the security of the continent. The first was to do with the possible 
nuclearisation of Africa. The Kenya Government feared the consequences 
to the continent if any country, especially South Africa, gained possess­
ion of nuclear weapons, and always exhorted other U.N. members to 
condemn such a possible occurrence.^ The second aspect on which Kenya 
took a firm stand in the U.N. was on the question of arras control. It 
was the opinion of the government that many of Africa's problems were 
caused because most countries were armed far above what was necessary 
for their defence, owing to an obsession for weaponry as well as the 
influence of major external powers/ In Kenya's own case, it was true 
that the country had a smaller armed force than its neighbours, but it 
was shown in chapter three that Britain's tacit and subtle forms of 
assistance at times of unrest strengthened the governing elite, and 
this fact undermined the credibility of Kenya's diplomatic position.
f
Kenya's concern over the militarisation of Africa was again
evident in July 1978 when, following the invasion of Zaire and the
consequent rescue operation of President Mobutu Sese Seko by Belgium
and France, there was talk of having an O.A.U. F ir e Brigade force to
keep the peace between states. Apart from the logistical difficulties
of such a force, the Kenya Government opposed the idea as an unnecessary,
and potentially dangerous, plan to increase military capacity in the
continent. Echoing government thoughts, The Standard wrote«
It would be a grave mistake - and, indeed, an act of 
betrayal - if the O.A.U. decided to set up a 'fire 
brigade' army of 'African mercenaries' whose sole 
mission would be to go to the rescue of any of the 
continent's shaky and unpopular regimes whenever
6 .  For example, see U.N. Yearbook 1965 (New York, United Nations,
1968) , p. 78.
7. » P* 9*h also U.N. Yearbook I966 (New York, Uhited Nations,
1969) . P- 31.
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they are faced with internal opposition. No super­
power is ever likely to invade any of Africa's 
emergent countries - and our assorted regimes must 
not deceive themselves that there's any other word 
for democracy. 8
At the O.A.U. Summit Conference in Khartoum in July 1978, the 
government approved a recommendation far the 'reactivation of the
O.A.U. 's Defence Commission in preparation for considering the need to 
establish an African military force under the supervision of the O.A.U. 
This showed that if there was to be any kind of African army, the 
government preferred it to be organised and controlled rather than on 
a purely ad hoc basis. The Kenya Government was aware that agreement 
upon the details of such a force would be difficult to reach, and this 
suited the government's interests because, like most of the continent's 
governments, there was a great reluctance to lose national control over 
so vital an issue as military force. An earlier example of the £c,v<?' 
aent's desire to retain sovereignty over its affairs came in 1974 when 
Kenyatta vehemently opposed the decision taken by the O.A.U. Adminis­
trative Secretary-General, Mr. N20 Ekangaki, that all African states 
should pass over to Lonrho their negotiating rights for oil.8 910 
Opposition from other states as well as Kenya forced a reversal of the 
policy.
The Kenya Government did perceive a major role for the O.A.U. in 
being a body through which grievances could be channelled and aired, 
and also as a mouthpiece of the African people on issues such as 
apartheid and global economic relations. To this extent, the O.A.U. and
8. The Standard, 11 July 1978.
9. Resolution 10dj A.R.B., 1978, p. 4914.
10. S. Cronje, M. Ling and G. Cronje, Lonrho. Portrait of a Multi­
national (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 197^)» p. 211. ~
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the U.N, were similar in that they both provided arenas for policy 
statements on the major issues of the period. The O.A.U., as a purely 
continental body, was allowed a role in peace-keeping and mediation 
between partner states, as well as institutionalising the rule of 
respect for territorial boundaries. Ch this rule, the Kenya Govern­
ment always supported the O.A.U. because it strengthened the bargain­
ing position in respect of the claim on the North-2hstem Province by 
the Somali Republic. However, the government never considered handing 
over the dispute to 0. A.U. arbitration, and this exemplified the 
consultative nature of the organisation as perceived by Kenya and most 
other African countries.
Southern A frica
Kenya was similar to other black African countries in considering 
the white minority regimes of southern Africa - South Africa, Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe) - and, before the mid 1970s, the remnants of the Portuguese 
empire in Angola and Mozambique, to be the greatest problem facing the 
continent. Kenyan leaders used the U.N., the O.A.U. and the Common­
wealth to condemn the 'racist* regimes and to call for action against 
them.
South Africa remained a permanent target of Kenyan foreign policy, 
but it was the continually changing situation in Rhodesia which often 
attracted the greatest attention, perhaps of all the British colonies 
in Africa, Kenya and Rhodesia were the most similar, notably for their 
substantial European population. It was natural that after a bloody 
struggle during 'Mau Mau', Kenyan leaders were greatly upset when the 
European minority, led by Mr. Ian Smith, declared unilaterally the 
independence of Rhodesia in November 1965. Immediately after this 
event, East African leaders met in Nairobi to consider how best to
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co-ordinate their policies.1 1 Little concrete progress was made on 
what action to take until early December, when the O.A.U. Council of 
Ministers decided that all the countries of Africa were to break 
diplomatic relations with Britain unless immediate action wa3 taken to 
bring down the rebel government. 1 2 13 An O.A.U. Action Committee, composed 
of Egypt, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Kenya, was established to 
follow up developments.
Even though Joseph Murumbi, the Foreign Minister, had apparently 
committed the country to break off relations with Britain, President 
Kenyatta and a majority of his colleagues opposed the plan. Kenyatta 
believed that it was a decision to be made by individual governments 
and not by the O.A.U. On 10 December 19^5» after consultation with 
the Cabinet, President Kenyatta announced that the government was not 
going to break diplomatic relations with Britain, but instead was going 
to intensify pressure on Britain to take action on Rhodesia.1-* There 
was clearly opposition to the announcement among members of the National 
Assembly, but upon the Speaker's ruling, the President presented his 
decision to a silenced National Assembly.
Kenyatta's defence of an apparent reverse of policy placed emphasis 
on the fact that President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia was against such a 
move against Britain because it would have placed an intolerable strain 
on Zambia. The Kenyan President also believed that if the country made 
a break with Britain, then divisions would form in the O.A.U. as not 
everybody would support the break. This obscured the fact that divisions
11. Dally Nation, 15 November 1965.
12. Ibid., 6 December I965.
13. Ibid,, 11 December I965.
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were inevitable, as not all countries would agree on either line of 
action, even though the O.A.U. had apparently reached unanimity a week 
before. As a final explanation, Kenyatta said that he was holding back 
from action in order to get full co-ordination with the region, but 
this proved impossible in the end because of President Julius Nyerere *s 
commitment to sever relations with Britain.^
Although the government’s decision was defended on fairly solid 
grounds, no mention was made of a fundamental fact which must have 
influenced the decision - that such a break with Britain would have had 
serious repercussions on the Kenyan economy and the rate of development. 
Efforts to get Britain to take action were, however, continued, and the 
government used the U.N. and O.A.U. for this purpose. In 1966 at the 
U.N. , Kenya again called for Britain 'to take all necessary measures, 
including in particular the use of force, in the exercise of its power 
as the administering Power, to put an end to the illegal regime Southern 
Rhodesia . ..'.^ As the dispute continued without a settlement into 
the 1970s, the government remained adamant that force had to be used 
against the white rebels, but hoped that the various nationalist groups 
could be reconciled around a conference table. In 1972, the Pearce 
Report, sponsored by the British Government, showed that the black 
population of Rhodesia did not favour the settlement drawn up at that 
time, and the report was welcomed by Dr, Njoroge Mungai, the Foreign 
Minister, because it exposed 'the intimidation against the African 145
14. In the end Tanzania, Ghana, Algeria, Congo Brazzaville, Guinea, 
Mali, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan and United Arab Republic broke 
off relations with Britain; see Michael Wolfers, Politics in the 
Organization of African Unity (London, Methuen, 1976), p. 158. 
Kenya did, however, join a walk-out at the U.N. when Mr. Harold 
Wilson, the British Premier, addressed the General Assembly;
East African Standard, 17 December 1965.
15. UiiL. Yearbook I 966. op.cit., p. 115.
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majority by the rebel regime'.
In 1973» Kenya used its position in the u.N. Security Council to
good effect to keep up the diplomatic pressure on Britain as well as to
give direct warnings to Rhodesia. Following the closure of the border
between Zambia and Rhodesia, and sporadic clashes between troops,
Mr. Otiero-Jori, Kenya's Permanent Representative at the U.tf., stated
unequivocally that 'the States of Eastern Africa and all the members
of the O.A.U. were determined to resist any aggression against Zambia.
The Council could be assured that if there were such aggression, all
O.A.U. members would dust off their rusty guns and go out and defend
the honour and dignity of Zambia. Kenyan hostility to Smith's
Illegal regime continued throughout Kenyatta's period of office. In
1977» "the government supported the O.A.U.'s decision to recognise the
Patriotic Front as the only representatives of the Zimbabwean people.
As Dr. Munyua tfaiyaki, the Foreign Minister, said, 'the important
thing is that the fight against Smith must go on and it is the Patriotic
18Front which is doing the fighting'. It was a natural consequence of 
this stance that the Kenya Government rejected the 'internal settle­
ment' worked out by the Rhodesian Front party of Ian Smith and prominent 
African leaders, including Ndabaningi Sithole and Bishop Abel Muzorewa. 
Waiyaki said in July 1978 at an O.A.U. meeting*
... the expulsion of their representatives from 
Khartoum should at least give them a little inkling 
as to the degree to which Africa is hurt by their 
recent betrayal of Zimbabweans and of those who in 
their region continue to suffer from colonialism, 
apartheid, armed occupation and racial subjugation. 19 16789
16. Daily Nation, 25 May 1972.
17. United Nations Monthly Chronicle, vol. x, no. 4, April 1973* P* 8.
18. 'Kenyans will not eat rhetoric', Africa, no. 73, September 1977, 
p. 3
19. The Standard, 12 July 1978.
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The hostility shown to the rebel government in Rhodesia was 
naturally extended by Kenyan leaders to the minority regime in South 
Africa. For all of the intense anger this country aroused, African 
states made little progress in their attempts to force a change there. 
Kenya had had links with South Africa during the colonial period owing 
to the influence of the settlers, many of whom were of South African 
origin. The loss of trade at independence, estimated at K£2 million,20 
as well as the loss of further potential trade with South Africa was a 
serious consideration for policy-makers, but was clearly outweighed 
by the personal distaste for the regime as well as the desire to 
maintain close political and economic ties with the rest of black 
Africa.
The Kenya Government realised that the West held the key to the
South African solution in that western economies could make or break
the country. Kenyatta noted this in 196 *^
Yet the countries of the West, and Britain and the 
United States in particular, pay lip-service to our 
cause, while they go on underpinning the South 
African economy by their investments, their buying, 
and their sales .... By refusing to participate in 
workable sanctions against South Africa, the countries 
of the West are creating a situation in which violence 
becomes the only answer. 21
The main reason why Kenya and other African states could do little to 
pressurise the West was because of the weakness and -dependency of their 
economies. However, by the mid 1970s, African countries, led by Nigeria, 
were beginning to have greater confidence in their economies and started 
to threaten the West. The Vice-President, Daniel arap Moi, spoke in 
such a vein at the Commonwealth Conference in May 1975*
20. Cherry Gertzel, Maure Goldschmidt and Donald Rothchild (eds.), 
Government and Politics in Kenya (Nairobi, East African Pub.. 
1969). P. 37^.
21. Jomo Kenyatta, Suffering without Bitterness (Nairobi, Bast African 
Pub., 1968) ,• pp. 22^225.
177
We wish, therefore, to remind those outside powers who 
reinforce the e v il philosophy of apartheid by pursuing 
economic objectives that in the long run th eir own interests  
w ill be in jeopardy unless they are prepared to change 
th eir attitude and promote p o litic a l liberalism , ra c ia l  
harmony and s ta b ility  in  that region. 22
As fa r  as direct negotiation with South A frica  was concerned, the 
Kenya Government opposed the concept of 'dialogue' as f i r s t  proposed by 
President F e lix  Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast. The government agreed 
that negotiations could take place, but only a fte r  South A frica had 
conceded to the principle of majority ru le, and th is had been the basis 
o f the Lusaka Manifesto. The government realised that South A frica 's  
own practice on 'dialogue' paid l i t t l e  attention to aiding the position  
of the black majority and only served to anaesthetise the opposition of 
many neighbouring African s ta te s .2-^  Kenya's h o s tility  to apartheid 
went to the extent of opposing O.A.U. effo rts to  negotiate with Southi
Africa over the future of Rhodesia in 1975, but this hard-line stance 
was moderated at the Commonwealth Conference of 1975 after pressure
oji
from the 'fro n t-lin e ' states.
Generally speaking, the Kenya Government concentrated i t s  attention  
on the economic development o f the country, and so over the question of 
southern A frica  the government chose to take a secondary ro le behind 
the 'fro n t-lin e * states. I t  was true that Kenya was a  regular 
contributor to  the O.A.U. Liberation Committee as well as such bodies 
as the U.N. Programme fo r Education and Training of South Africans
22. Daily Nation, 2 May 1975*
23. 'Dialogue' was attacked by Kenya from the time it was introduced in 
1972; see, for example, U.N. Yearbook 1972 (New York, United Nations,
1973), P. 79.
2^. Derek Ingram, 'Rhodesia: African Leaders rely on Vorster',
Gemini News Service. G2 391, 2 May I975.
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abroad, while many of the more vocal states of Africa regularly failed 
25to contribute. But the government rarely took any initiatives on 
southern Africa, prefering to follow, rather than lead, others. Upon 
reflection, this should be considered as a realistic assessment of the 
southern African question because for all the diplomatic effort 
exerted by more committed nations, little progress was made. The 
government preferred to put its effort into developing Kenya.
The split within the O.A.U. over the question of 'dialogue*^ 
began to manifest itself within the Kenya Government in 1978. The 
Foreign Ministry, under Dr. Waiyaki, maintained the official opposition 
to South Africa, but the influential Attorney-General, Charles Njonjo, 
made pronouncements on the need to open up channels of communication, 
as well as diplomatic representation in Pretoria, in order to break 
down the racial barriers. Such a split was disturbing, but it 
appeared unlikely that Njonjo's views would become official ideology, 
because of the likelihood of both external and internal opposition. 
There was all along, however, tacit acceptance of indirect contacts 
with South Africa through the support for the presence of large multi­
national corporations in Kenya. For example, Lonrho, with all its 
southern African connections, had over fifty subsidiaries in Kenya as 
well as having a nephew of President Kenyatta as the first African
pO
director in London.
As far as dealings with the liberation movements were concerned,
2 5 .  Wolfers, o p .c lt. . pp. 1 7 3 - 1 7 9 ;  U.N. Yearbook I 966, o p ,c it . . p. 9 3 .
26. Mayall, op.cit.
2 7 .  A .R .B . . 19 7 3 , pp. 49^7*49^8.
28. Cronje et al., op.cit., pp. 3 7 -3 8 .
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the government usually favoured reconciliation between groups. This 
reflected the country's own experience in bringing together K.A.N.U. 
and K.A.D.U. at the time of independence. Kenyatta then supported 
dealing severely with any further opposition, as had occurred with the 
K.P.U. In June 1975» the Kenya Government managed to bring together the 
three rival Angolan liberation movements to sign a 'Hakuru agreement', 
though this soon broke down.2^ In 1976, the government voted at the 
O.A.U. for reconciliation of the parties rather than for the sole 
recognition of the M.P.L.A. Similarly over Zimbabwe, the government 
recognised the Patriotic Front, but hoped for talks between the national­
ist groups before independence was granted.^
To sura up, then, concerning’Kenya's policies towards southern 
Africa, the government remained committed in its opposition to the 
white minority regimes and the attempts made by them to seek legitimacy 
in African eyes. The government, however, fell short of taking a 
leading role in the liberation struggle, prefering to concentrate its 
energies upon the specific issues affecting Kenyan development. South 
Africa was a political and emotional problem, and not necessarily an 
economic one for Kenya to handle. It was the economic factors, notably 
in Kenya’s links with the West, which prevented Kenya, and the continent 
as a whole, from scoring greater successes in southern Africa.
International Economic Issues
While political issues were continually in the forefront of dis­
cussions in international organisations, the 1970s witnessed a growing 
awareness of the pressing need to alter the economic relations between
29. A.R.B., 1975, P. 3705.
30# Tinned Nations Monthly Chronicle, vol. xiii, no. 10, November 1976, 
pp. 67-6ü.
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the countries of the world. The voice of the developing countries was 
institutionalised in the ‘Group of 77%  which "by the mid 1970s had 
grown into a group of well over one hundred states.
The Kenyan economy provided a typical example of a developing 
country's economy where major earnings came from exports of primary 
products. It was natural, therefore, that the government strove to 
improve the terms of trade between rich and poor nations and supported 
measures to ease the problems of price fluctuations of primary products 
in order to maintain a steady flow of finance for development schemes, 
Great hope was pinned on the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (U.N.C.T.A.D.) to formulate an integrated commodity scheme, 
as well as the Stabex scheme of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) 
started under the Lomé Convention of 1975«^  Although some small gains 
were made for the Kenyan economy from the E.E.C., the overall res.ulU 
were poor and led the Foreign Minister to comment at the U.N. that 'the 
progress of the negotiations towards the achievement of the new inter­
national economic order had been very disappointing*,^
The economy had benefited since I969 from links with the E.E.C. 
through the association agreement signed with the East African
31. For the background to these schemes see Geoffrey Goodwin and James 
ifeyall, 'The Political Dimensions of the U.N.C.T.A.D. Integrated 
Commodity Scheme*, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 
vol. 6, no. 2, Autumn 1977» pp« 146-161; see also Duncan Nderxtu 
Ndegwa, 'The Developing Countries and the Quest for a New Inter­
national Monetary Order' in Barbara Allen Roberson (ed.), North- 
South Dialogue. Problems and Prospects of Developing Nations 
(London, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Special 
Edition 1978), pp. 66-80.
32. United Nations Monthly Chronicle, vol. xv, no. 10, November 1978
pp. 101-102. *
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Community. This had allowed many Kenyan goods into European markets
tax-free, but did little to break the predominant position of the
developed countries of Europe. For this to happen, Kenyans realised
that a radical change of opinion was necessary. But even given this
change, the government was aware that there would still be disparity
between states. As Mr. Eliud MWamunga, the Minister for Commerce and
Industry, said at the time of U.N.C.T. A.D. IV in Nairobi in 19761
The change in the institutional structure of the world 
trade need not create any apprehension in the developed 
nations because they will always have special advantages 
by virtue of their advanced knowledge of science and 
technology and their ability to re-orientate the pattern 
of their industrial production in a manner so as to leave 
enough scope to developing countries to manufacture the 
less complicated products and sell them to the developed 
nations.
Whereas U.N.C.T. A.D. provided hope for the future, the government 
strove to improve the economic position of the country by gaining 
immediate assistance from the international community. As has already 
been shown in chapter three, the proportion of total aid provided by 
international or multilateral sources increased dramatically during 
Kenyatta's years in office and eased the dependence on bilateral 
assistance. For example, the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (i.B.R.D.) alone invested some ^604.6 million between 
I969 and 1975 in Kenya.
The other major source of international assistance not touched 
upon already was the Commonwealth. Membership of the organisation had 
political relevance to Kenya and other members because it gave greater
33» Simon Mbilinyi, 'East African Export Commodities and the Enlarged 
European Economic Community', The African Review, vol. 3. no. 1 1973, PP. 85-110. “ *
34. Kenya Export News, vol. 23, no. 258, May 1976, p. 9.
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opportunity to pressurise Britain on the question of South Africa. It 
also contained a number of countries amenable to persuasion to take 
Asians who were expelled from Kenya because of being non-citizens.
Above all, the Commonwealth was seen as a collection of diverse partners 
who would strive to help each other economically. This meant that the 
richer countries of the developed Commonwealth would be able to provide 
finance and technical assistance to Kenya and other poorer members.
This is how Tom Mboya, when Minister for Economic Hanning and Develop­
ment, saw the Commonwealth's attraction:
If in the past the Commonwealth has derived its strength 
from similarities among its members, it must find its 
purpose in the future among the existing and emerging 
differences. Our similarities are the basis for 
association and indeed a source of strength, but it is 
our differences that can lend purpose and meaning to 
our future joint endeavours. In brief, the Commonwealth 
must be transformed from a social club into a purpose­
ful society for mutual aid and assistance. 35
Even though the level of assistance for Kenya from Commonwealth countries
(apart from Britain) was fairly low,^ the Commonwealth remained an
organisation in which the government could pursue its economic policies.
International Prestige
All states, to some degree or other, aim to win respect from other 
states in the international system. It is difficult though, to isolate 
the major factors concerned with international 'prestige', but success 
in one or more fields - economics, political stability, military 
prowess, cultural activities - would normally give some measure of 
prestige. It is the contention here that the Kenya Government 
consciously strove to promote a favourable image of Kenya to gain
35« Mboya, op.cit., p. 2^2.
3 6 . For example in 1972 Comonwealth countries (excluding Britain^
provided no more than 5 per cent, of the total bilateral aid to 
Kenya; see chapter three. xo
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status and prestige among its fellow African countries, as well as to 
make an impact on the world scene.
Kenya's reputation for non-involvement in the affairs of other 
countries as well as its own record for political stability helped to 
bring respectability to its overall diplomatic position and status. Its 
pragmatic and generally moderate policies in international affairs 
helped to bring the country respect in most of the major diplomatic 
centres of the world. Of course, moderation and respectability are 
themselves political attributes which have to be treated with caution 
because of their subjective assessment. But the country's growing 
political stature as well as its ability to maintain planned economic 
(if openly capitalist) growth brought major gains to Kenya as Nairobi 
became accepted as one of the most important diplomatic centres in 
Africa. In an age of major international conferences, the completion 
in September 1973 of the Kenyatta Conference Centre gave Kenya the 
largest and most sophisticated centre in Africa.^ The new Nairobi 
Airport opened in 1978^ (later renamed the Jomo Kenyatta Airport) 
and the modern hotel facilities indicated a positive attempt to become 
the foremost diplomatic centre in Africa, aiming -to overtake Addis 
Ababa and Johannesburg.
By the mid 1970s, the country had proved its capacity to host 
major international meetings. In 1972, Kenya hosted the All-Africa 
Trade Pair and then went on to become the first African country to host 
the assemblies of the World Bank in 1973, U.N.E.S.C.O. in I976 and 
U.N.C.T.A.D. also in I976. During this period the United Nations-
37. Africa Confidential, vol. 14, no. 20, October 1973, pp. 5-7.
38. Africa, no. 80, April 1978, pp. 82-103.
Bavironment Programme (U.N.E.P.) was established with its headquarters 
in Nairobi, the first Ü.N. body to be based in Africa. Eleven other 
international organisations had major regional offices in Nairobi, as 
shown in Table 5*1, thus lending credence to the view that Nairobi was 
becoming the regional focus. In 1977, some seventy-nine diplomatic 
missions were accredited to the Kenyan capital, a figure which showed 
the regional significance of the country. ^
Another important area where Kenyans gained prestige for their 
country was in sporting successes scored in international competitions. 
Kenyans were particularly good at long-distance running, where the 
benefit of living at high altitude in the Rift Valley Province and 
similar areas gave them a physiological advantage over most other 
competitors. The rewards from athletic successes were largely intangj- 
ible, but undoubtedly created a friendly and sympathetic outlook 
towards Kenya abroad. The fact that names such as Kip Keino and Henry 
Bono (a man who held four world records simultaneously in 1978) were 
known world-wide made people aware of Kenya's existence.
The government was well aware of the political usefulness of such 
athletic successes and gave full encouragement to national represent­
atives. In December 196*f, it was a Kenyan Olympic athlete, Wilson 
Kiprugut, who unfurled the flag of the new Kenya Republic. President 
Kenyatta always took it upon himself to see off and welcome personally 
all Kenyan teams competing in major international competitions, so *62
39. Directory of Diplomatic Corps. May 1977 (Nairobi, Government Printer/ 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs ] 1977} • A comparative study of the perm­
anent missions in African capitals in 197^ showed Nairobi to have k6  
permanent missions, Kampala 27 missions, Bar es Salaam 44 missions, 
Lusaka 29 missions and Addis Ababa, home of the O.A.U. and U.N.E.C.A.,
62 missions? Christopher Clapham, 'Sub-Saharan Africa' in Christopher 
Clapham (ed.), Foreign policy making in developing states 
(Farnborough, Saxon House, 1977), p. 102.
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International Organisations in Nairobi
Table 5tl
1. United Nations Environment Programme (Headquarters)
2« Organisation of African Ifiiity - Inter-African Bureau for 
Animal Resources (Headquarters)
3. United Nations Development Programme
4. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (African Office)
5. The World Bank (I.B.R.D.) and Affiliates
6. United Nations Children's Fund
7. Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United 
Nations
8. World Health Organisation
9. United Nations Information Centre
10. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
11. League of Arab States
12. The Commission of the European Community - 
Source* Directory of Diplomatic Corns. May 1977, op.cit.
emphasising the fact that the athletes were ’'ambassadors' of Kenya. By
coincidence. President Kenyatta's last formal engagement before his
death in August 1978 was to greet Kenya's team which had done so well
at the recent All-Africa Games in Algiers and the Commonwealth Games 
l\0in Edmonton.
The use of boycotts of major international sporting competitions
*t0. Hilary Ng'weno, The day Kenyatta died (Nairobi, Longman, 1978), pp U wl2«
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by African states in order to isolate South Africa became prominent 
in the 1970s and put the Kenya Government in a dilemma as to whether 
to support boycott calls or to stay in the competitions to win medals 
and prestige for the country. In 1976» the Olympic Games in Montreal 
were boycotted by virtually all of Africa because of New Zealand’s ties 
with South Africa. Kenya's reluctance to boycott the Games was well 
known, but after the O.A.U. Assembly of Heads of State came down 
firmly in favour of a boycott, the government decided to conform.^1  
On this occasion, the national goal of gaining prestige and glory was 
forfeited in order to support the international aim of isolating South 
Africa.
At the Commonwealth Conference in 1977, all members agreed upon 
the so-called Gleneagles Declaration which stated that it was 'the 
urgent duty of each of their Governments vigorously to combat the evil 
of apartheid by witholding any form of support for, and by taking every 
practical step to discourage contact or competition by their nationals 
with sporting organisations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa or 
from any other country where sports are organised on the basis of race, 
colour or ethnic origin'. In 1973, the government decided not to 
back a Nigerian call to boycott the Commonwealth Games in Mmonton, 
and so showed how delicate a topic such boycotts were.^ How the 
government reacts to future boycott calls will depend very much upon 
political calculations made at that time.
Jfl. Stephen ’./right, 'Are the Olympics games? The Relationship of
Politics and Sport', Millenniumt Journal of International Studies.
vol. 6, no. 1, Spring 1977» pp. 30-44. "
kZ. Commonwealth Heads of Government, The London Communique (London,
Commonwealth Secretariat, 1977), pp. 21-22. *
43. The Standard, 28 July 1978.
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One sporting meeting which should be certain to take place is the 
All-Africa Games, and Kenya again showed its perception of the signif­
icance of sport by agreeing to host these Games in 1982. ^  The decision 
to build a major new sports complex in Nairobi gave the People's 
Republic of China an opportunity to regain a foothold in Kenya. The 
Chinese agreed to build the facilities, as they have already done in 
countries as far afield as Zanzibar and Sierra Leone.^ This under­
lined the fact that even in sports, Kenya was dependent upon outside 
powers for assistance. Many of the Kenyan athletes were at American 
universities which often made it difficult for Kenya to make them 
appear in certain competitions. Therefore, to some extent Kenya's 
future progress in international sports will require the assistance of 
more developed countries.
Conclusion
The aim of this chapter has been to analyse Kenyan foreign policy 
as pursued in international organisations. It has shown that these 
organisations provided Kenyan leaders with a much wider arena in which 
to promote policies, and also gave the opportunity to speak out against 
the injustices caused by the economic and political domination of the 
world by the developed countries. Foreign policy was pursued in a 
manner of pragmatic radicalism, where pragmatic considerations tempered 
the radical nature of policy, Kenya was able to maintain formal 
diplomatic non-alignment while keeping aligned with the West in 
crucial economic and political matters.
The most important issues towards which attentions were directed
44. 'Kenya to the Rescue', New African, no. l*fl, May 1979» P» 70.
45. Ibid.
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concerned southern Africa. Kenya sought to work through the U.N.,
O.A.U., .the Commonwealth and even the Olympic Games to bring majority 
rule and justice to this part of the continent. The government also 
worked through and with these organisations, as well as the European 
Economic Community, to improve the economic and social conditions of 
the country.
The government aimed to attract recognition for its controlled 
economic growth and moderate political nature in order to gain prestige 
for the country. This gave tangible rewards in that international 
organisations and conferences were attracted to Nairobi, which developed 
into one of Africa's, and the world's, leading diplomatic centres.
This also provided the impetus for gaining aid and trade from countries 
impressed by Kenya's maturity. The prestige of the country was further 
enhanced, though in a more intangible manner, by the sporting success 
of its athletes.
Finally, President Kenyatta sought to maintain an active role in 
African and world affairs through international organisations, but 
a role which did not detract from, and was complementary to, the 
country's desire to gain recognition and stature, both politically and 
economically, in the international arena.
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Chapter Six
Foreign Policy in the Kenyatta £rat a Conclusion
The previous chapters have dealt with Kenyan foreign policy on 
a thematic "basis. This provided a means to understand the various 
levels, or areas, of foreign policy and to allow for comparison, for 
example, betwoen the content and style of policy in the regional arena 
and the wider global arena. This chapter draws together the various 
areas of foreign policy and provides some conclusions as to its overall \ 
perspective. The chapter first analyses the major determinants of 
Kenyan foreign policy, and then goes on to outline the fundamental 
goals of the state and how policies were implemented to achieve those 
goals. Finally, it discusses the merits of calling this period the 
'Kenyatta Era*, and looks at the prospects for the future of Kenyan 
foreign policy.
Determinants of Foreign Policy
It is without doubt true that less work in the field of foreign 
policy analysis has been done for developing countries than for the 
developed world. Many hazards face the political scientist who attempts 
to undertake a study of an African country. The general store of 
information is miniscule as compared with the abundance of data on the 
developed world. Transport and communications within the country are 
also often poor, while media coverage is normally censored and lacking 
in critical commentary, fti some occasions, the foreign scholar is even 
denied access to the country, thus placing his study in serious 
difficulties.
Cb the whole, this picture is a true one, but like all general­
isations there are specific instances which show a different picture.
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Scholars are'now adapting theories devised for the developed world to 
help our understanding of African countries. 1 Developed countries 
themselves are, perhaps reluctantly, 'becoming more interested in Africa 
and so seek more information about the continent, finally, African 
scholars are now emerging in greater numbers and naturally strive to 
understand the workings of their own national governments.
The newness and the weakness of African states have led to the
continent often being classified as a monolithic unit. I. William
Zartman, while deliberately exaggerating his perspective, summed up
the African predicament admirably*
African^ states are generally ruled by and for an urbanised, 
westernised minority administering national revenues which are 
based on small agricultural or mineral surpluses....African 
governments are highly centralized, executive-dominated, and 
much heavier in the bureaucratic and technocratic output sector 
than in the party and mobilization, input sector. 2
Zartman, in the same article, went on further to sum up the major
problems remaining in Africa as border disputes, southern Africa and
apartheid, and economic dependency. Zartman was well aware of the
dangers of simplification and generalisation, but concluded that African
states have enough things in common to warrant this.
It is most likely that greater differences between states will 
emerge in time as each state pursues its own foreign policy and more 
analyses of states are undertaken. There are similarities in the 
policies of African states, but at the same time each country responds 123
1. See especially Christopher CLapham, Foreign Policy making in develon-
lng states (Famborough, Saxon House, 1977)* ^
2. I. William Zartman, 'Africa* in J. Rosenau, K. Thompson and
G. Boyd (eds.), World Politics (New York, Free Press, 1976), p. 58O.
3. Ibid., pp. 591-592. .
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to a unique combination of internal and external factors. Two major 
approaches can be used to help provide detailed information and to 
give the impetus for comparative work, through which the quasi- 
monolithic African shell will be cracked open. For want of better 
titles, the labels ’scientific* and ’classical* are used. Both 
approaches concentrate upon the determinants of foreign policy, and 
so aim to show how and why policies are made, as well as their imple­
mentation and subsequent response.
The 'scientific' approach is best expounded by the works of 
Michael Brecher and his associates.** Brecher's model is centred upon 
five internal and five external variables, and these are used to help 
explain why certain policies and not others are adopted by states.
Bach variable, such as military potential or relationship with the 
super-powers, is dealt with in turn in a taxonomic manner until all 
aspects of the operational environment axe covered. Brecher then 
treats the ten variables to a second scrutiny, but this time from a 
psychological perspective, that is the environment as perceived by 
the decision-makers. After a full discussion of the factors determ­
ining a policy decision, Brecher's model then m -Hs upon the analyst to 
compartmentalise the decision into one of four areas - military/ 
security, political/diplomatic, economic/developmental and cultural/ 
status.
It is the practical, rather than philosophical, problems which 
have so far hindered the further use of this model. Full utilisation
Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg and Janice Stein, 'A framework for 
research on foreign policy behavior’, The Journal of Conflict ’ 
Resolution, vol. xiii, no. 1, I969, pp. 7.5-101,• Michael Brecher,
The Foreign Policy System of Israel» Setting, Images and Processes 
(London, O.U.P., 19?2). : —  -----“-- - -
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puts a heavy premium upon quantitative material - newspaper reports, 
government speeches - which in the Kenyan and general African contexts 
is insufficient and unreliable. A study by K.A. Good of Kenyan 
foreign policy in the early years after independence utilised parts 
of what was to become the Brecher taxonomy but as a series of static 
pigeon-holes rather than an organic framework.-’ Brecher himself 
attempted to operationalise his model in a second study of his on 
Israel,^ but the problems of complexity of the model and paucity of 
data in the African context led one scholar of Egypt to trim the 
model to suit the problems encountered in his study.^ Dawisha's 
actions in simplifying the model highlighted a paradox - that the 
model's virtue lay in both its rigorous taxonomy of factors and its 
availability for comparative studies, and yet it is too sophisticated 
a model to be used for most, if not all, African countries at this 
present point in time.
While appreciating the need for scientific a n a ly s is  and learning 
from Brecher *s analytical precision, this study of Kenyan foreign 
policy has belonged firmly to what could be teemed the »classical' 
tradition. This approach is a more generalised one, concentrating upon 
the intrinsic issues which affect and shape foreign policy rather than 
on more specific and specialised variables. The danger of this approach 
is that it becomes easy to explain away foreign policy actions on a 
single factor, such as economic dependency or the colonial heritage,
5. K.A. Good, 'The Kenyans and their Foreign Policy. Pressures, Images 
and Decisions' (Ph.D. thesis, McGill University, 1969. Lodged at 
School of Oriental and African Studies). This thesis was obviously 
influenced by Brecher *s research at McGill University.
6. Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (London. o.u.P
1974). ~ " ' -------- '
7. A.I. Dawisha, E gypt in the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign
Policy (London, rtecmillan, 1976J. ” n' *
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or else to slip into the habit of labelling policies as ‘radical* or 
•conservative*, 'capitalist* or ‘socialist*, without actually to
grips with their full meaning. Bearing these pitfalls in mind, it is 
possible to draw up a list of factors which have traditionally been 
used to explain the foreign policy-making process of governments in
Q
Africa, Olajide Aluko, in a recent book, has listed five major 
determinants of foreign policy* colonial history and heritage, 
economic dependency, ideology and perceptions of an elite group, 
internal political pressures, and the external environment. In order 
to maintain a consistent pattern in the study of African states' 
foreign policies, this chapter holds to Aluko's classification and 
so provides material for future potential comparative studies carried 
out within a similar framework.
The Colonial Heritage
The colonial period and its heritage are probably the most 
significant determinants of Kenyan domestic and foreign policies. 
Although colonialism lasted for the comparatively short time - in 
historical terms - of about seventy years, it structured and shaped 
what is today known as Kenya. During the colonial period the various 
tribes were brought together, willingly or unwillingly, into a 
territorial unity and a common language, English, was forced upon 
them. Like most African states, therefore, Kenya was an artificial 
creation of colonialism and one to which Africans found it difficult 
to relate. Ho firm answer can be made cn the merits or demerits of the 
colonial exercise. Most attack colonialism, quite justifiably, as an 
inhuman exercise and attribute the problems of the continent today to 8
8. Clajide Aluko, The Foreign Policies of African States (London 
Hodder and Stoughton, 19??;. " --- v *
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the colonial penetration. Those who look for something useful and 
good emanating from it point to the fact that the continent developed 
more rapidly than could have been possible otherwise, and that the 
colonialists left a lingua franca to unite the various peoples, as 
well as railways, schools and hospitals.
A3 far as Kenya is concerned, there is little to be gained now 
in debating the pros and cons of colonialism, but it is best to 
concentrate upon what the heritage of colonialism was in Kenya, 
especially where it affects our understanding of the foreign policy 
process. In the economic sphere, the colonial heritage played an 
important role in shaping the country's foreign policy. The 
communications network revolved around the Highlands and Nairobi, 
where the vast majority of European settlers were to be found on the 
best farming land in the country. After independence, the emergence 
of the neo-colonial economy, to be described below, was naturally 
attributed to the colonial presence and control of the economic life 
of the country. The fact that the Kenyan economy had grown strong 
during the colonial period, owing mainly to the presence of the 
settlers, helped Kenya during the 1960s to expand into, and play a 
dominating role in, the East African arena. The assurance of these 
markets for Kenyan goods came in 1967 with the formation of the Bast 
African Community. The impetus from being the predominant market 
during the colonial, era allowed Kenya to dominate economically the 
East African Community, although this superiority was itself a 
contributive factor to the Community's eventual demise.
The political system in post-independence Kenya also was shaped to 
a large extent by the colonial experience. The country took on a multi­
party democratic system in 1963 and never legally blocked the formation
195
of opposition parties, though after 1969 Kenya was to all extents and 
purposes a one-party state. The colonial period had witnessed rule by 
bureaucracy through many local administrators. At independence,
Kenyatta took over this apparatus intact and used it to rule, thus 
by-passing the elected representatives of the people in the National 
Assembly. The continuing presence of many European civil servants and 
advisers in most ministries in Nairobi further exemplified the 
colonial links as well as raised questions about the influence such 
expatriate personnel had on the policies of the new nation. This is 
a difficult question to answer with confidence, but their presence must 
have had at least a subtle influence upon policy decisions by helping 
to shape the attitudes and perceptions of the leading African bureau­
crats. The smooth transition of power at the time of independence 
provides evidence for the view that the incoming African leaders had 
much in common with their predecessors and so slotted quite easily 
into the political, social, economic and bureaucratic structures 
left in the colonial heritage.
Colonialism also played a part in moulding the more intangible 
features of Kenyan foreign policy. The ‘emotional • or ‘radical • nature 
of the foreign policies of most African states can be explained in 
relation to the opposition and rejection of colonialism. The experience 
of the colonial period produced a reaction towards making highly 
moralistic and egalitarian pronouncements in world affairs which 
generally proved impracticable and naive in the international politics 
of the 1960s and 1970s. The shared humiliation of the continent led to 
a policy of Pan-Africanism, which meant various things to different 
people, but to the Kenyan leaders gave some measure of commitment to 
and alliance with the common pursuit of independence throughout the
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continent from political and economic subjugation.^ Kenya's hostility 
towards the white minority regime in southern Africa could mainly be 
explained in terms of its own bitter experience of foreign domination.
The weakness of the new country in face of the strength of the 
former colonial power - as well as the rest of the developed world - 
was not missed by Kenyatta who realised that the country's policies 
upon such issues as southern Africa could not be easily implemented. 
This made many aspects of foreign policy 'declaratory', and led to a 
certain amount of frustration at the country's incapacity to alter the 
international environment. This also pushed Kenya into closer co­
operation with the rest of the continent - both in the United Nations 
and the Organisation of African Unity - and at the regional level, 
through the association of states in eastern Africa.
It is impossible to deny the importance of colonialism in the 
composition and direction of the country's foreign policy after inde­
pendence. The colonial heritage, in its broadest sense, can be seen 
to be the central determinant of foreign policy as well as the one to 
which all the other determinants related. And yet the status of the 
colonial heritage is a paradoxical one, in that the government strove 
after independence to break away from the colonial past as an unwanted 
evil, but at the same time wished to emulate its achievements.
Kenyatta attacked the colonialists for what they did in the country 
and the rest of the continent, yet wished to maintain the closest links 
possible with the colonialists after independence. In short, the 
Kenyan elite felt an emotional antagonism towards the colonial
9« At independence, a Ministry for I^n-African Affairs was established 
but its general inactivity led to it becoming absorbed into the * 
Office of the President.
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heritage, but, through active policies, recognised, the benefit of such 
links for the development of the country.
Economic Dependency
It is a common assertion that the African continent, no sooner 
free from the bonds of colonialism, was subjected to the more subtle 
though no less constraining force of neo-colonialism. The mood of 
optimism of the 1960s, when most African states gained their independ­
ence from colonial bondage, was replaced by a hardening dissatis­
faction at being dominated by the stronger states of the world, and 
in particular those of the West. As seen by the late Kwame Nkrumah, 
'the essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to 
it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of 
international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus 
its political policy is directed from outside. * ^  The objective 
of neo-colonialism is, according to its opponents, to sub-divide and 
■balkanise Africa into weak, insignificant units and prevent any 
political initiative which would attempt to eradicate this system.
It is against this background that the foreign policy posture of 'non- 
alignment* can be judged.
Kenyan political leaders always maintained that the country's 
foreign policy rested upon the principle of non-alignment, but 
President Kenyatta was aware of the delicate balance between economic 
aid and economic dependence, and how this in turn affected the 
orientation of policy*
In the party manifesto we made it quite clear that non-alignment
did not imply non-commitment. We cannot stand aside when issues
10 Kwame Nkrumah, 'A Redefinition of Neo-Colonialism* in Gideon-Cyrus
* M. Mutiso and S.W. Rohio, Readings in African Political Thought 
(London, Heinemann, 1975)» P« ^15«
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confront Africa or the world....But let me say it quite plainly 
today that Kenya shall not exchange one master for a new master.,.. 
We welcome genuine friendship "but we detest flattery. We welcome 
co-operation and assistance, but we shall not be bought or black­
mailed. We may be underdeveloped, and our people may walk 
barefoot, but we are a proud people....it is natural that we 
should detest Western colonialism, and associate the word 
imperialism with the West. But if we are truly non-aligned we 
must not avoid making friends with those Western countries who 
extend an honest hand in the field of co-operation and trade.
To do this is just to prove that we are not free and cannot 
separate good from bad. 11
The implementation of such a chimerical policy was open to criticism 
from many quarters. The opposition leader, Cginga Odinga, was one of 
many to be aware of the fact that it was difficult to say exactly 
whether the government chose to maintain contacts with the West, 
so rejecting aid from the last in a free and open-handed manner, or 
whether this policy was imposed upon Kenya by its continued economic 
dependence upon the West. Kenyatta naturally intimated that the 
government's policies were freely chosen and not dictated, but it is 
worthwhile evaluating and balancing the evidence to present as object­
ive an assessment as possible.
The issue of economic dependency touches on many other areas, such 
as the influence of colonialism and the ideology of the governing elite. 
Keeping these factors in mind, the pattern of trade and aid partnerships 
as discussed in chapter three lend credence to the view that Kenyan 
policy was locked into the neo-colonial machinery of the western powers. 
A vast proportion of aid and trade links throughout the period in 
question were with western states and the lack of any attempt to alter 
this relationship added further weight to the view that Kenya was 
unable to break the neo-colonial stranglehold. The blatant military 
weakness of Kenya vis-à-vis its neighbours also made the country seek 1
11. Jomo Kenyatta, 'Kenyatta's Views on Non-alignment' in Mutiso and 
Rohio, ibid., p. 6U9.
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assistance from external forces at tines of crisis, thus weakening 
the capacity for independent action.
Several other factors can be considered, however, which put into 
perspective the nature of the neo-colonial state. Firstly, during 
the period as a whole, Kenya’s dependence upon bilateral aid decreased 
quite significantly as the country sought assistance from multi­
lateral sources with less explicit political strings attached.
Secondly, it appears that little co-ordination took place between 
donors of aid, and so allowed ample opportunity to diversify, and play 
off, donors and so limit the level of political control. A third 
factor to note is that despite the problems facing the economy, a 
growth rate of some 7 per cent.- a year was averaged during the first 
decade after independence. Much of this growth was as a direct result 
of foreign assistance, both governmental and private, but there is 
little or no evidence to suggest that it was in sectors not desired 
by the Kenyans themselves.
A fourth point to be considered is the level of dependence in 
Kenya as compared with other states in the continent. For example,
Kenya was not dependent upon external links to the same extent as 
Zambia, which was continually forced to trade, against its will, with 
South Africa in order to survive. Kenya was also in a stronger position 
vis-a-vis Tanzania, which lacked the economic base which the Kenyans 
inherited from the whites in 1963* However, as compared with the oil- 
rich country of Nigeria, the Kenya Government realised it did not have 
an equal amount of political clout and room for manoeuvre as did the 
Nigerians.
The term economic dependency, then, must be handled with some
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caution, but it is difficult not to agree with the conclusion of
Colin Leys that Kenya was a neo-colonial society with all that implied
12for foreign and domestic policies. However, the all-embracing nature 
of the neo-colonial thesis can provide answers for almost everything 
and so is difficult to counter. For example, if the government decided 
to nationalise a foreign company it could be said to be buying off the 
masses with piecemeal reform in order to protect its position as a 
comprador group. Conversely, if the government did not nationalise 
that same foreign company it would be because external forces were 
more important considerations at that time than the masses, and so the 
government acted in league with foreign capital interests. How to 
counter such a philosophy - though it is one to which this thesis 
adheres - is problematical. It. appears, though, that the emphasis 
must be placed not only upon the relative strength of the economy but 
also upon the ideology and commitment of the indigenous elite, some­
thing to which we shall now turn.
mite Ideology
The foreign policy of any country is partly determined by the 
ideology of the governing elite group. By elite is meant a small 
group of people who take the major decisions in society, often to 
their own advantage yet rationalised to be in the interest of the 
nation as a whole. The elite group formulates policies upon its 
perception of what should be done, given certain conditions in the 
internal and external environments, and holds to an ideology, composed 
of guidelines and policy preferences, as a yardstick by which to work 
as well as a means to explain its choice of policy to the people. 12
12. Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya. The Political Economy of 
Neo-Colonialism. 1964-1971 ¿London. Heinemann. 1975).
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It would not be. an over-statement to conclude that the ideology 
of the governing elite after independence was largely one conditioned 
by colonialism. The economic dependency of Kenya forced the govern­
ment to take account of western interests, but the ruling group of 
Kenyatta and his closest advisers all shared a sympathetic attachment 
to western values and ideas, brought about largely by their condition­
ing in a western environment. Most of the leading members of govern­
ment had spent some time in Britain and the united States of America, 
and some had been educated there. Although there was a possibility 
that such an experience would turn them against the West, it was 
evident that familiarity with the West had brought respect and 
admiration, and shaped the Kenyan elite's ideas and values to reflect 
and emulate the West. In this respect, Kenya was similar to many of 
the former French colonies, which maintained a close affinity with 
France even after independence, and this at times raised criticisms 
against Kenyan leaders as the 'lackeys * of the West. Such accusations 
must be handled with some care, as close examination of most African 
countries would reveal closer ideological association with the West 
than many indigenous leaders would like to admit.
The Kenyan leaders held to the belief that they were the best
equipped for the task of running the country and formulating its
foreign policy. This superiority emanated from educational, social
and economic advantages which had largely been gained during the
colonial period. As one scholar has written*
Rule by an elite for the sake of administrative and economic 
efficiency, and because the masses are unfit and possibly 
dangerous, are strongly held images. Antipathy for revolution 
is the associated notion. Kenyatta's repeated denunciations 
of 'feu feu' as 'a disease which must never be remembered* 
and his praise of 'orderly government', Mboya's subscription 
to the theme of 'forget the past', Njonjo's sincere incompre­
hension of the idea that, as he put it, 'beggars might be 
found in parliament', the Kenyan government's official
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statement that it 'intended to avert all revolutions 
irrespective of their origins', and the admission by 
Mkai Kibaki, that 'austerity programmes were laughed 
at in high placesestablished the dual image of 
elitism and suspicious concern for the mass of Kenyans. 13
The view propounded that the elite group ruled for the good of 
the nation was a tenuous one, as it was very difficult to define the 
national 'good* or 'interest'. Furthermore, there were various elite 
groups, or 'functional pyramids' as Marshall R. Singer ran» them,1** 
within Kenyan society which overlapped and occasionally competed with 
each other for control of the governmental apparatus. The political 
elite could be delineated as the Cabinet which was the major co­
ordinating force in the political system. However, within the Cabinet 
there was what could be classed as an Inner Cabinet of Kenyatta's 
closest friends, and so it might be more accurate to define this group 
as the political elite. This inner circle also displayed an ethnic 
foundation, and so tribal affiliation was an important factor in one's 
membership of this elite group.
Surrounding this small political elite were several other elite 
groups which at times became part of the top decision-making group.
The bureaucratic elite was an obvious supplement to the political 
elite in that its support and confidence was required to govern 
successfully. As a result of the Ndegwa Report of 1970, civil 
servants in Kenya were allowed to take part in business activities 
alongside their other duties, and so this group also had an influential 
role to play within the economic sector. The business elite group was 
composed largely, though not exclusively, of the Kikuyu and had many 134
13. Good, op^cit., p. 5^9«
14. Marshall R. Singer, 'The Foreign Policies of Small Developing 
States' in Rosenau et al., op.cit., p. 279.
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contacts with the governing elite. Many members of the political 
elite were, in fact, wealthy businessmen and so shared a common 
understanding and desire for profitable enterprise. Superimposed 
upon these overlapping groups was the ethnic element, in that those of 
one tribal group could at times be more influential in getting policies 
adopted than those from other groups. This was either because that 
particular tribal group dominated the decision-making process, or else 
its support was needed to consolidate national unity. The most 
important competing elite group during the period in question was the 
political leadership of the Kenya People's Union (K.P.U.). This group's 
opposition was largely ideological, but in the end was forced back onto 
tribal support from the Luo people.
The main thrust of the K.P.U. 's ideological attack concerned the 
path of economic development which the government was following. The 
K.P.U. 's argument was that the capitalist development strategy was an ' 
elitist one, in that only a small minority of the people stood to gain 
anything at all. The K.P.U.'s programme was basically a populist 
one, but it failed to catch on significantly, owing to general apathy 
and the determination to prevent it gaining support by the government, 
who perceived it to be against the national - and their own elite 
group's - interest.
At the East African regional level there was some measure of 
ideological affinity between the respective elite groups of the three 
countries. The colonial experience gave them all a shared desire to 
build up national strength and to work through the U.N. and O.A.U. for 
the aid of apartheid in southern Africa and for economic justice in 
the world. At the specific level, however, there were serious dis­
agreements between the governments. Tanzania, under President Julius
204
Hyerere, aimed to follow a socialist path of development. This was 
anathema to the Kenyan leaders, and this ideological divergence was a 
major factor in the collapse of the Community. The anarchical condition 
of Uganda post-1971 also greatly upset the Kenyans, although it was not 
until President Idi Amin laid claims to Kenyan territory, a very 
sensitive topic within Kenya, that Kenyatta’s government waived all 
diplomatic finesse and engaged in a verbal onslaught on Amin. But in 
general, the East African arena gave a typical example of Kenyan 
foreign policy, in that economic gain was the fundamental branch of 
the ideology and the governing elite was responsible for the maintenance 
and selection of such policies, irrespective of the views of other - 
groups or the public, when articulated through the media, as a whole.
Internal Political Pressures
Chapter two discussed the domestic political structure in relation 
to the foreign policy process. It is the intention here to recap 
briefly on the points made previously, and also to broaden the scope 
of the study to encompass a wider spectrum by looking at the economic, 
political and social forces which provided the impetus for internal 
pressure on governmental policies.
The formal authority to make foreign policy lay with the President, 
who was assisted by a small group of advisers. Around the President 
were various interest or pressure groups which, as a rough rule of 
thumb, had less influence upon decision-making as the size of the 
group increased. The most significant group was an Inner Cabinet of 
trusted, mainly Kiambu Kikuyu, men who ware Kenyatta's close confidants. 
Although access to the President was not blocked, these aides normally 
provided the link between Kenyatta and other influential circles - 
bureaucracy, National Assembly, Cabinet, press - as well as the people
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as a whole. To talk of 'public opinion' as a factor in policy-making 
would be inaccurate as the vast majority of people had little interest 
or influence in politics. Even the National Assembly was largely 
insignificant as a foreign policy pressure group because the President 
held full power to act irrespective of the wishes of other groups. At 
best, the President was aware of what was, in a general way, the 
'people's wish', and attempted to accomodate this, but there was no 
political compulsion for this.
Tribalism and the military, both common features in the internal 
politics of many African states, had contrasting roles to play in Kenya. 
The military remained weak throughout the I96OS and 1970s and had no 
real influence in internal or external affairs, except the negative 
one of being a weak force. The reasons for this have been explained 
earlier, but rest mainly upon the lack of a serious external threat, 
the reliability of the former métropole to help in times of crisis, and 
the unreliability of the Armed Forces because of their tribal 
composition. Kikuyu domination of the political and economic life 
of the country - though not the military because of the former British 
reluctance to recruit the Kikuyu - produced ethnic hostility between 
various groups in society as well as governmental actions to prevent 
the worst excesses of tribalism. The most serious breach of unity 
came in the mid 1960s when the opposition party, the Kenya People's 
Union (K.P.U.), appeared to be backed mainly by the Luo people of 
western Kenya. The K.P.U.s raison d'être was ideological disagreement 
with the path of Kenyan development and foreign policy, but the 
government refused to be bent from its openly capitalist, development 
strategy, and cleverly manoeuvred the K.P.U. solely onto tribal support, 
thus making its eventual proscription easier.
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Internal pressure on the government emanated from several economic 
issues in Kenyan society. The desire for land at the time of independ­
ence forced the government to take steps to allow for some measure of 
redistribution among the tribes, while at the same time 
the friendship and confidence of the white settlers, and through them, 
foreign investors. Kenyatta managed to achieve some success here, but 
the 1970s witnessed continuing pressures from the landless for land, 
though this time to be taken from the African elite who had been able 
to take a disproportionate share. Alongside this contest for land was 
a similar wrangling for control of the modem commercial and industrial 
sectors. The emergent African bourgeoisie, mainly Kikuyu but not 
exclusively so, solicited the government to help provide opportunities 
for economic advancement. Like in neighbouring Uganda, it was the 
Asians who were eased out of their positions of influence in the 
comercial sector, though many still remain today. The Europeans
*c. .
engaged in larger financial enterprises were required to make basically 
cosmetic adjustments towards Africanisation, but they will come under 
greater pressure in the coming years from Africans, both on political 
as well as economic grounds.
Ch the whole, Kenya presented a fairly peaceful face to the world, 
as internal political pressures were through legitimate channels. The 
press was fairly free by general African standards, and elections were 
held regularly with results honoured. The political problems of the 
mid 1970s, including the assassination of J.M. Kariuki and the detention 
of several outspoken M.P.S, darkened the political record of Kenya and 
at the same time illuminated the continuing opposition, in some 
quarters anyway, to the domestic and foreign policies of the government.
External Environment
The final determinant of Kenyan foreign policy to consider in this
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classification is the external environment. The African continent 
is unique in that although it is a continent of weak states, it has 
no super-power overshadowing its existence as is the case in Latin 
America and Asia. This fact allowed Kenyan decision-makers some 
latitude in formulating foreign policy as no direct physical threat to 
the country existed from the developed world. Of course, the economic 
threat must be borne in mind, but it had a different role to play in 
that it was not a purely visible, direct threat.
Perhaps of more immediate importance to Kenyan leaders was the 
country's predominant position in the Bast African arena. The colonial 
era had placed Kenya in relative strength to its neighbours because of 
the influential white settlers in the colony. After independence, Kenya 
continued to dominate regional trade, helped by the development of 
Nairobi as the regional focus. This.,bad consequences for Kenyan foreign 
policy in that it angered the country's neighbours and caused Kenyatta 
to be aware of the risk involved in allowing the Kenyan economy to 
suffocate the weaker markets of its neighbours. This trend helped 
bring the Bast African Community to its knees, but the promise of a 
larger, but looser, association of states in the region can only 
further strengthen Kenya's regional status and position.
Kenya's geographical location an the Indian Ocean also had impor­
tant consequences for foreign policy. The deep-water port of Mombasa 
gave the country an opportunity to become a major transit centre for 
goods in and out of the landlocked countries of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Zambia and eastern Zaire. Mombasa also handled goods from countries 
to the north of Kenya, notably Ethiopia and Sudan. The problem of 
communications with these countries limited Kenya's greater trade 
expansion in the region, but given time the prospects appear bright.
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Another factor concerning the location on the Indian Ocean was that of 
security. Mombasa was an ideal port of call for ships in the Indian 
Ocean, and the British Navy had agreements with the Kenya Government 
for its naval vessels to dock there from time to time. The demise of 
the Simonstown agreement for naval security between Britain and South 
Africa combined with the increased presence of the Soviet fleet in the 
Indian Ocean boosted the strategic significance of Mombasa. The Kenya 
Government favoured the idea of western navies being present in and 
around Mombasa, but was, nevertheless, opposed to the idea of giving 
carte blanche to the West because of the desire to maintain its non- 
aligned posture in international affairs.
The absence of clearly defined territorial borders gave rise to 
problems with two of the country's neighbours, the Somali Republic 
and Uganda. The dispute with the Somali Republic has been dealt :rith 
in depth in Chapter Pour, but it can be noted here that the major 
problem arose from out of the fact that there were people of Somali 
origin in the Northern Frontier District of Kenya at the time of 
independence. The border between the two countries was a peculiarly 
artificial one, having no reference to either geographical or ethno­
graphic factors. Kenya's reluctance to secede the territory was based 
on the fear that other secessionary movements would similar
rights and thus would break up the nation. During the 1960s, the 
border war dragged on without solution, forcing Kenya into diverting 
precious resources into the war as well as calling on the help of 
British forces. In the 1970s the dispute took on mare ideological 
connotations when the Somali Republic appeared to switch allies from 
the Soviet Ulion to the United States of America, and left Kenya to 
maintain a defence pact with the Soviet-backed Ethiopia. This regional 
problem continued into the late 1970s.
The impasse with Uganda over its claim to Kenyan territory in 
the mid 1970s emanated as much from the vagaries of President Idi 
Amin as any serious geographical factor. Such was the reputation in 
Kenya of Amin at this time that the government did not perceive it to 
he a serious threat, hut one which nevertheless required a complete 
rebuttal. Kenya's geographical position vis-à-vis Uganda gave Jomo 
Kenyatta a good bargaining position as the country controlled the life­
line to Uganda. The antics of the Ugandan President did affect Kenyan 
foreign policy in that normal trade with Kenyan neighbours became 
difficult as some of the major road routes with other countries came 
through Uganda. Problems also arose as to how to treat the Ugandan 
regime - whether to ignore it as diplomatic rules demanded, or else 
to mobilise resources to bring the regime down. Kenyan foreign policy 
was committed to the farmer choice, bat the downfall of Amin in I979 
could only have brought relief to Kenyan policy-makers.
The final factor to consider in this section is the geographical 
nature of Kenya itself. Although not an external determinant, except 
in the sense that it was outside of the decision-makers » control, the 
geography of Kenya had important effects on foreign policy. With the 
mainstay of the country's economy agriculture, and with less than half 
the land of any use at all, there was a large amount of pressure, both 
financial and social, to make the best possible use of the land. The 
lack of mineral resources of any great quantity gave Kenya little 
variety even in primary products and left the country squarely at the 
mercy of the international market. In the mid 1970s, a world boom in 
coffee and tea prices gave Kenya very great returns, but by 1978 these 
had turned downwards and the economy suffered as a result. Kenya's 
heavy population density in the Highlands region, as well as the 
country's rapid population growth rate, forced the government to
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balance between large estates, which were financially advantageous 
but offered little employment, and small subsistence farms which 
offered the reverse. The government's decision to help both sides 
as far as possible naturally affected the country's foreign policy in 
terms of relations with external marketing interests and the financial 
rewards from agricultural exports.
The absence of oil in the country (though attempts were made to 
find some in the north) has had serious repercussions on foreign and 
domestic policies. The rise in oil prices following the O.P.E. G. 
revolution of 1973-74- left Kenya with a severe balance of payments 
deficit and forced Kenyan leaders into seeking better political, as 
well as économie, relations with the Arab states. The problems which 
Kenya faced were similar to all the other non-oil-producing countries 
of Africa, but there were special circumstances in which the country 
found itself. Cn the one hand, Kenya was more industrialised than 
many of its neighbours, and so the oil was more necessary for the 
Kenyan economy to keep moving than for the less-industrialised 
neighbouring countries. Oa the other hand, Kenya was itself an ex­
porter of refined oil to countries within the region and so it was 
able to offset slightly its losses by charging higher rates for its 
refined oil. However, the general result of the oil crisis was to 
depress rather than stimulate the Kenyan economy, and the problems 
of this are still with the country today.
Goals and the Implementation of Foreign Policy
The foreign policy of any country is conditioned by factors 
emanating from the internal and external environments. In the previous 
section, the determinants of Kenyan foreign policy were drawn together 
into five broad catagories to show the pressures and influences being
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exerted upon Kenyan policy-makers. These factors helped determine the 
broad parameters of foreign policy or, to put it another way, showed 
Kenyan decision-makers what was possible and what was impossible in 
the country's external relations.
This rather bald statement does require some interpretation and 
qualification as the Kenya Government was faced with a more complex 
situation than that. Firstly, although independence was achieved in 
1963 and a fresh political chapter opened, the government could not 
ignore the continuing influence of the colonial period in its foreign 
policy. The new government could not start afresh, but 'fitted in' to 
the international environment around it and in the crucial areas of 
foreign policy, namely defence and economic development, continued 
largely with the policies of the colonial government. Secondly, it is 
accepted that the government acted cnly upon the capabilities at its 
disposal, or, as one scholar has written, what was its 'hand of cards 
by circumstances. There is no freedom to play a card not in the 
hahd^ Furthermore, perception was an important factor as the 
decision-maker was forced to select the best policy to follow, the 
best card to play, and it was not until after the event that it was 
known for certain whether it was the correct decision to make. The 
policies pursued by the government to obtain its goals were not 
•obvious' and could not be selected 'objectively*, but were chosen in 
a human environment of subjectivity and imagery.
The third qualifying point to be made is that many of the goals 
of Kenyan foreign policy were declaratory or rhetorical, rather than 
ones actually physically pursued by the government. This is not something 15
15. F.S. Northedge, 'Continuity, Change and the Aims of Foreign Policy' 
in James Barber and Michael Smith (eds.), The Nature of Foreign 
Policy» A Reader (Milton Keynes, Open University and Edinburgh,
Holmes McDougall, 197*0, P» 173*
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peculiar only to the weaker states of the developing world, but never­
theless is perhaps more conspicuous in that these states have less 
capacity to affect the will of other states, tony declaratory goals 
of Kenyan policy were long-term, where there was a declaration or 
statement of intent to do something. So, for example, Kenya*s aim to 
unite with the rest of Africa in order to wrestle economic power from 
the developed world was not something to be achieved overnight, but 
simply set the tone and level of Kenya's long-term policy, as well as 
satisfied the government and the Kenyan people that the country was 
following the correct course of action.
Many decisions in Kenyan foreign policy, for a fourth point, aimed 
not specifically to benefit the national interests per se. but more the 
general African or Third World environment, or 'milieu'.1^ It could 
not be raid that Kenya's support for the non-militarisation of outer 
space made any difference to interests integrally associated with the 
country. Likewise, Kenya's hostility towards the minority regimes 
of southern Africa was determined more by the continental aspirations 
for independence from colonialism and subjugation than from any 
specific, concrete gain to Kenya, although this could have emerged 
at a later date with the opening of trade relations with a black- 
ruled country.
The fundamental goals of Kenya were, in essence, territorial 
security and economic well-being. Territorial security had a double 
meaning for Kenya, because there was a need to repel both external 
and internal threats to the unity of the country. The major external 16
16. For a discussion of 'milieu' goals see Arnold Wolfers, 'The Goals 
of Foreign Policy' in Barber and Smith, ibid., pp. 179-182.
213
threats emanated, as outlined above, from the Somali Hepublic and Uganda. 
While the latter threat did not really materialise, the challenge to 
Kenya by Somalia was a serious one.
Kenyan fears of allowing the Somalis to secede highlighted the 
internal security threat that many of the Kenyan tribes - Somalis,
Masai and coastal groups in particular - felt uneasy at being forced 
to live with other tribes within the confines of the nation-state.
The government used the carrot and stick method to good effect in trying 
to engender the spirit of national unity. The carrot came mainly 
in the form of economic development to all areas of the country and 
the chance for every tribe to gain something from uhuru. The govern­
ment 's attempts met with some success, but there remained disgruntled 
sections of the Community, particularly those Luo in the West of the
country who suffered along with the political fortunes of Cginga 
17Odinga. ' Where the government met with a serious challenge to its 
authority, such as in 1969 and in 1975» then it was not afraid to use 
naked force to hold the nation together. Such tactics gained adverse 
reaction from some sections abroad, but did little to threaten the 
basic economic interests of the country.
The second goal of economic well-being was firmly linked to the 
first goal, in that the people of Kenya would feel greater attachment 
to the country if they were gaining something from it. This was the 
thrust of Kenyatta's argument with the Somalis and with the Luo people, 
that loyalty to the state would bring economic rewards. These rewards 17
17. Cginga Cflinga, Not Yet Uhuru (London, Heinemann, 1968); also David 
Court and Kenneth Prewitt, 'Nation versus region in Kenya* a Note 
on Political Learning', The British Journal of Political Science 
vol, 4-, part 1, January J.y/4, pp. 109- H 5. ----------- --------*
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however, could only be available with the steady growth of the economy, 
and to assure the country of this goal, Kenyatta firmly aligned the 
economy with the western capitalist system.
The implementation of Kenyan foreign policy is the final area of 
study to be looked at briefly in this section. The methods of 
implementation were not unusual by comparison to other African 
countries and could be classified under the following headings - 
diplomacy, economic methods, radicalisation of policy, propaganda and 
military pressure. Normal diplomacy was by far the most used method 
of implementation of Kenyan foreign policy. This was carried out 
through bilateral negotiations with other states as well as in inter­
national organisations. President Kenyatta *s retiring role in foreign 
policy and his dislike of foreign travel gave other Kenyan leaders the 
duty of representing the country at the highest levels abroad. This 
did not mean that Kenyatta was not in control of policy, but helped to 
present the picture of Kenya as a less-personalised regime than other 
neighbouring countries.
Economic methods of implementation of policy are normally assoc­
iated with stronger states. Kenya was at times a recipient of this sort * 
of treatment from developed countries, but the Kenyan economy was 
sufficiently developed for it to be used at times to strengthen Kenya’s 
position in relation to its neighbours, A good example of this was the 
relative ease with which Kenya halted Ugandan hostilities in 1976 by 
threatening to take up economic sanctions against that country. 
Similarly, Ethiopia and Zambia were both drawn into closer co-operation 
with Kenya because of the relative weaknesses and difficulties of their 
economies and the advantages which trade with the more stable Kenyan 
economy offered. The economic weapon was used effectively against Kenya
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over oil supplies by Arab states, thus pushing Kenya towards breaking 
off relations with Israel, as well as throughout the period after 
independence by the western neo-colonial interests operating in Kenya.
Radicalisation of policy and policy speeches was a further method 
by which Kenyan leaders sought to set out the country's foreign policy. 
The forums of the U.N., the Commonwealth and O.A.U. gave Kenya the 
opportunity to unite with its fellow African states and make pronounce­
ments upon major issues in international politics. Often the issues 
were beyond the level of Kenyan foreign policy in that the country did 
not have the capability to effect them. But this active strategy 
helped to satisfy the elite group that it was attempting something of 
note in foreign policy. The effect of such radicalised policies should 
not be over-stressed, but by the same token, continued vocal support 
far the blacks in southern Africa, for example, did have some role to 
play in modifying the West's stand on the issue. It is normally 
assumed, also, that violent speeches at the U.N. or elsewhere on'a
foreign policy issue helped to detract attention away from domestic 
18problems. This may well be the case elsewhere, but there is little 
evidence to support this in the Kenyan case, partly because of the ' 
President's low profile and also by the comparative absence of serious 
domestic troubles. Perhaps the Kenyan handling of the Ugandan territ­
orial border dispute in 1976 gives us the only example of the govern­
ment taking a very strong initiative in foreign affairs at a time of 
acute domestic problems in the political arena at home.
Kenya's resort to propaganda was not to the same extent as could 18
18. Henry A. Kissinger, 'Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy' in 
James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy 
(New York, Free Press, 1969)» PP. 261-275. “
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be said fear, say, i&ypt19 and Tanzania. 20 The government believed that 
actions were more important than words, that the best possible form of 
propaganda was the successful political and economic record of the 
country. Within East Africa, Kenya was known to scorn other states • 
attempts at socialism and attempted to win over these countries to its 
own form of development. Likewise in the wider international arena, 
the aim was to impress the developed world by Kenya *s efficiency and 
level-headedness and put distance between itself and the less developed 
the more backward - African states. This form of propaganda had its 
successes in attracting major international conferences to Kenya and 
gave foreign investors more confidence to invest in the country.
Finally, there is the military farm of implementation. Only the 
dispute to the north of Kenya (although marginally in the west also) 
called for a military form of foreign policy, though the government 
remained open to genuine diplomatic overtures. The ama.ii size of the 
Armed Forces gave them little weight in the domestic or foreign policy 
arenas, but the escalation of the Somali dispute in 1976-77, combined 
with the problems with Uganda, led to a large-scale development of the 
Armed Forces ' strength. By 1978 this had not in any way affected their 
relative strength in the political system owing to its basic stability, 
but it is impossible to say whether or not this will remain the case.
The Kenyatta Era
AS a final consideration in this thesis, it is worthwhile dis-
19. Dawisha, op.cit.
2Q. This is evident in the copious writings of Julius Nyerere
for example, Julius K. Nyerere o A  t * , e* See»
Salaam, O.U.P., 1968)1 Julius L ^yerere LeStm i^ -,63 (Dar es Salaam, O.U.P., I973), ^ eedo:n and Development
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cussing the merits of labelling Kenyatta's period in office from I963 
to 1978 as an 'era». By definition, an era must have a distinctive 
character marked by a fairly precise time-scale, and so this dis­
cussion must hinge upon three basic questions. Firstly, did Jomo 
Kenyatta play a distinctive role in the making and execution of Kenyan 
foreign policy? Secondly, would the country's policies have been 
markedly different if another politician had been President during that 
period? And thirdly, was there, or will there be in the near future, 
a radical shift in the composition and outlook of foreign policy 
consequent upon the death of Kenyatta? All of these questions are 
interrelated in themselves and also touch upon other related issues. 
They all, for example, lay emphasis upon the internal environment 
as an important variable in decision-making rather than on purely
external forces. Bit accepting the fluid nature of these questions, 
some progress can be made.
%
• A close examination of the role of the President in foreign policy 
decision-making was made in Chapter Two. It was shown that whereas 
most African Heads of State revel in the public limelight and play a 
leading role in political life, Kenyatta preferred a more retiring 
role. This fact presented difficulties in understanding the President's 
position in Kenya, but sufficient evidence was available to show 
beyond doubt that the President played the dominant role in the making 
of foreign policy. At times, through speeches, he also helped to 
defend policy, but as he grew older he preferred to let this burden 
fall on younger shoulders.
Perhaps Kenyatta's greatest feat was in providing for the peace­
ful transition from colony to independent state. The memory of 'Man 
Mau' combined with the tensions among the white settlers in the early
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1960s forced Kenyatta to go out of his way to placate the Europeans 
and impress upon them his desire, and the country's need, for them to 
remain in Kenya. That Jomo Kenyatta, the alleged leader of 'Mau Mau' 
and the anti-hero of the Europeans achieved this goal was remarkable, 
but it was even more so when it is put alongside his handling of the 
explosive land issue, and the hordes of landless Africans who sought 
free land at the time of independence. The fears of a revolutionary, 
anarchical Kenya in I963 had dissipated by I965, when Kenyan political 
and economic stability, within the western orbit, was assured.
Kenyatta was clearly the key figure in the orientation of Kenyan 
domestic and foreign policies in these early years, when he gathered 
sufficient like-minded figures around him to continue with these 
policies into the 1970s. Certainly Kenyatta was helped by historical 
forces in that he was tailor-made for his role in I963 as a former 
freedom fighter par excellence and that there was room to stamp his 
mark onto the developing, yet still embryonic, Kenyan nation. Whether 
another leader could have followed a different foreign policy and 
maintained widespread support calls for a speculative answer, but an 
examination of the other political leaders at the time of independence 
would draw a negative conclusion. Two other candidates only spring 
to mind, and both of them not from the dominant Kikuyu tribe but from 
the Luo people. This fact alone would have severely undermined their 
chances, but neither actor had the credentials of Kenyatta. Tom Mboya 
was a gifted politician and was a staunch supporter of Kenyatta's 
pro-western policies, but he would have upset the Kikuyu as well as the 
country's radicals and would not have been able to hold the country 
together. Cginga Giinga opposed Kenyatta's development policies, but 
loyalty to the President never forced him to the extremes of dissent. 
However, his inability to rouse the country during the late 1960s -
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admittedly with the national apparatus against him - showed also that 
he did not have total national backing.
Jomo Kenyatta, then, was the person who could commas -the most 
support in the country, and so he built on this popularity his power 
and influence to shape and control Kenyan politics. It was mare than 
anything else his own personality which helped to mould the deliberately 
quiet nature of foreign policy and its concentration on economic 
development, and yet at the same time maintain its concern for Pan- 
African unity and close co-operation with the Third World. Following 
the death of Kenyatta in August I978, the new President, Daniel arap 
Moi, showed little interest in changing the fundamental character­
istics of the country's foreign policy. President Moi visited Britain, 
thus expressing his desire to maintain the close association with that 
country. He also called for closer links with the European Economic 
Community and with Japan, and upon a visit to Addis Ababa, assured the 
Ethiopian Government of the Kenyans* resistance to Somali expansionism.
The new government of President Moi, therefore, showed little 
desire to break with the pattern of foreign policy laid out by Kenyatta. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this. Firstly, the country's 
foreign policy was established in such a dominant manner by Kenyatta 
that nobody wants change or. at least until the death of Kenyatta has 
long passed into memory, nobody wishes to alter or tamper with the 
prevailing pattern of policy determined by Mzee. the founder of the 
nation. This gives credence to the view that this was Kenyatta's era, 
and that it has and will extend into the future through the continu­
ation of his policies.
Secondly, it appears that the new President and his advisers are
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content to follow a similar foreign policy to the one of Kenyatta.
This is hardly surprising because there are no new faces in President 
Moi's government and all are men committed to the same values and 
principles as the former President. This is not to say that Moi is 
just the reincarnation of Kenyatta, because he has taken policy 
initiatives of his own since August 1978. But the new leadership feels 
satisfied with the success of the domestic and foreign policies during 
the 1960s and 1970s, and will continue to follow that tradition.
Thirdly, and finally, the internal and external environments 
within which the new government is now working remain the same as 
during Kenyatta's period in office. The need to maintain the economic 
links with the West to preserve development - as perceived by the 
government - remains as does the neo-colonial nature of the state. 
Kenya's geo-political strategy is fixed by the need to expand further 
its markets in eastern Africa as well as hold off secessionary threats 
from the north.
It is in the domestic arena that the greatest changes axe likely, 
and these will in turn affect the country's foreign policy. The 
growing inequalities in wealth within Kenya will increase unless some 
radical action is taken immediately. As this action seems unlikely to 
happen, it is probable that domestic unrest will increase and that the 
events of the mid 1970s, with political assassination and detentions 
without trial, will re-emerge. The outcome of these clashes will be 
vital to foreign policy, because if this populist movement gains the 
upper hand then the whole pattern of Kenya »s economic and political 
policies, as well as foreign policy, may change. That is for the 
future to decide.
221
APPENDICES
Appendix Che
The Kenya Government's definitive view of the country's foreign 
policy as contained in Kenya. An Official Handbook (Nairobi, Kenya 
Goverment/E&st African Pub., 1973), pp. 41-44.
Foreign Policy
Kenya became an independent state only nine years ago, and its 
foreign policy is, therefore, still formative. At first, Kenya needed 
time to develop a solid team of diplomatic personnel capable of identi­
fying the major issues of national interest and able to determine the 
extent to which these interests can be promoted in terms of economic 
development and world peace. Since independence, Kenya's relations with 
the external world have been handled with a great deal of caution, very 
much uncharacteristic of many African governments whose external 
activities tend to be openly aggressive on issues concerning de­
colonisation, liberation, non-alignment and other question connected 
with the yearning for complete independence. Kenya's policy, in 
effect, is one of quiet diplomacy.
At the approach of independence, many radical foreign scholars 
tended to agree that Kenya, having experienced an extreme colonising 
process that led to the outbreak of the I&u Mau in the early 1930s, 
would adopt an aggressively leftist-orientated stance in world affairs. 
This interpretation dominated the period shortly before, and immediately 
after, independence in December, 1963. By the end of 196^, it became 
evident that this interpretation had no foundation and that Kenya's 
relations with the outside world are governed by a strategy best 
conducive to peace and good neighbours.
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Basic principles
From the outset, non-alignment has been the basic principle of 
Kenya's foreign policy. Simply defined, it is non-commitment to any of 
the world's dominant ideological blocs, in particular, the West, 
clustering around the United States of America, and the East, so far 
championed by the Soviet Union, Kenya is fully aware that non-aligned 
states are characterised by varying degrees of underdevelopment. Ch 
the other hand, non-alignment does not mean non-commitment on all 
issues. What Kenya claims through non-alignment is a right to pre­
serve its hard-won independence, and its ability to judge world issues 
on their merit without undue external influence. This stand is, of 
course, a reaction against cold-war alignments where, to members of 
one camp, anything done by any member of the other camp calls for 
condemnation or distrust.
To Kenya, non-alignment means friendship to all nations of the 
world. This can be realized only on condition that such nations want 
our friendship and that friendship does not give the big powers a 
licence to choose enemies or friends for Kenya. The President of 
Kenya, Jfcee Jomo Kenyatta, has given particular emphasis to this 
principle. In other words, while Kenya may have economic, cultural 
and other ties with one or the other of the aligned major powers, she 
constantly guards against involving herself in agreements, military 
alliances or pacts that may limit her freedom of action or choice when 
called upon to talce a stand on international issues in which the major 
powers are involved.
Thus through non-alignment, .Kenya rejects military bases belonging 
to commited nations on her soil, and argues persuasively that mutual 
defense pacts between the aligned powers and the non-aligned states
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would force the latter, and Kenya in particular, into conditions 
requiring a show of military strength. As a peace-loving nation, 
Kenya's armed forces are not meant for offensive ventures hut for 
defensive purposes and the development needs of her people.
In its abhorrence of ideological conflicts and undue commitment
to the big powers, Kenya also exhibits her ardent desire for, and
commitment to, the pursuit of peace in the world, for in peace lies
security and a guarantee of national independence and sovereignty.
The devotion to world peace by Kenya as a young nation wan described
by Dr. Njoroge Mungai, Kenya's Minister for Foreign Affairs*
This positive attitude is based on fundamental considerations. 
Cold-war manoeuvres, overt or covert, accompanied by power 
blocs for convenience, military alliances for the promotion 
of ideologies and national self-interests, are repugnant to 
Kenya's stability and understanding. The government (of 
Kenya) shall not be party to any movement which tends to under­
mine or to render meaningless the concept of world peace. Nor 
shall the Kenya Government tolerate subversion on Kenya's u^il 
which even in the remotest sense, prejudices its declared policy 
of non-alignment and its national interest.
Thus, at one level, the concept of non-alignment is one way by which 
Kenya can reassert the principles of self-determination. It is upon 
this right that Kenya has consistently stated that no nation should 
have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another, a 
principle upheld by the Charter of the United Nations Organization 
and that of the Organisation for African Unity. Thus, foreign policy 
and its management are basic to Kenya's defense and economic develop­
ment, for before Kenya's economy develops to maturity, her foreign 
policy must remain flexible and forward looking. This, however, does 
not imply that Kenya cannot take positive and firm stands on world 
issues she considers critical to man's survival in a nuclear age. For 
it is evident that Kenya has taken definite stands on question of self- 
determination for all peoples still living under colonial rule, and has
accordingly stood for certain universal human conditions like human 
equality, and hence, its support for the United Nations irrespective 
of its limited power, and for other international organisations 
founded upon similar principles.
The Southern African question
As a country which won independence through a hitter struggle, 
Kenya supports the yearning of Africans, the majority, in South Africa 
and Rhodesia for self-determination. The "Southern African Question" ‘ 
is important to Kenya's national interest in that since the closure 
of the Suez Canal, Kenya gets the hulk of her supplies round the Cape 
of Good Hope, It is the country's main link with the Western world. 
Dependence on the southern sea route does not mean support for the 
racist regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. This is why Kenya 
opposed Britain's proposal to sell arms to South Africa in 1970,
Kenya took a firm stand on this issue, for if anybody's security is 
threatened hy South Africa's possession of destructive weapons, it 
will he the countries of East and Central Africa. This stand not 
only applies to British sales of arms to South Africa, hut to any 
other country in the world that supplies or intends to supply arms 
to South Africa or Rhodesia. For it is these armaments which continue 
to give confidence to racist minority regimes to suppress the majority. 
Through her membership in the United National Organization, the Common­
wealth and the Organization for African Unity, Kenya appeals to all 
countries and member states of these organisations to live up to 
the principles upon which these organisations are founded.
Good-neighbour policy
Kenya has through the good ofices of the Organisation for African 
Unity (O.A.U.), played a key role in creating a good-neighbour policy
225
in Eastern and Central Africa. Through the O.A.U., African states get 
to understand their "basic commitment to development through friendship 
and co-operation rather than the use of war and violence as mechanisms 
for settling disputes. Kenya hopes that this development, among 
others, will enable African countries to join together in the struggle 
for the total liberation of the entire African continent, and Angola, 
Mozambique, South-West Africa and Rhodesia in particular.
Critical to the good-neighbour policy is the promotion of 
regional economic groupings such as the Bast African Community.
In a speech made by Mzee Jomo Kenyatta in July, 1964, at the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the O.A.U. in Cairo, he 
emphasized the significance of regional co-operation in promoting 
African unity. Kenya's support for regional economic co-operation is 
best demonstrated in its unreserved support for the East African 
Community to enable it to strengthen regional trade and other shared 
facilities. This is a difficult task which demands maximum restraint 
by member states. This is significant in the sense that the East 
African Community through its Authority, has had to develop a better 
understanding towards conflict resolution as a means of strengthening 
the community. Kenya has taken a major lead in this development, one 
that goes hand in hand with the Kenya government's policy of peaceful 
resolution of international and domestic disputes.
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Appendix Two
Tom Mboya writing on the development of a foreign policy in his 
book The Challenge of Nationhood (London, Heinemann, 1970), pp. 236- 239.
Economically speaking, colonial Africa was merely an appendage 
of Europe. Ibis is no time to get involved in consideration of whether 
imperialism brought economic advantages to the colonies. What I am 
saying is that a fundamental motive of colonialism was that an empire 
provided a source of cheap natural resources for the metropolitan power 
and an outlet for its manufactured goods.
In nearly every case, the achievement of political independence has 
not seen a correspondingly radical change in economic relationships.
Many countries of Africa still belong to the franc zone, the sterling 
area or the dollar area. A glance at the trade figures for any African 
country will show how little the relationships with the former occupying 
power have changed in the economic field.
Yet it is difficult to disentangle economic ties and political 
strings. If we are dependent upon one country or group of countries as 
far as markets for our main crops are concernedj our diplomats, and 
hence our foreign policy, will be subjected to all sorts of pressures, 
both subtle and not so subtle. Similarly if those same countries supply 
us with a large proportion of our imports, the opportunities for 
pressure to be brought upon us in political matters will be so obvious.
If we trade with both the Bast and the West we shall be able to 
create for ourselves an economy which is not based entirely on the 
circumstances of one specific bloc. In the period of economic
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reconstruction we can avoid the situation of colonial days when we 
had to conform to one set of economic theories. We can build a struct­
ure of our own design, based on the principles of socialism, drawing 
what we consider appropriate both from the East and from the West.
Apart from the new economic structures needed, we need also to look 
at our political institutions. As we begin to develop these we are 
accused of moving too closely to the East. This is because the 
colonial period has left us with a structure of Western institutions 
and ideologies. As we abandon these for a way of our own choosing, 
those who see events only in their own blinkered Gold War terms will 
make allegations against us.
A3 the representatives of neutral nations, we must express our 
determination to devise such systems as we think fit without having 
them interpreted in terms of leaning Eastward or Westward.
Many African states are finding that the most appropriate form 
of political structure for their people at this time is a one-party 
state. It so happens that such a structure is also found in the 
communist state. It would be most short-sighted of the communist 
states if they rejoiced in this as a move by African states into their 
orbit and equally unobservant of western countries to see it as a move 
against them. It cannot be stressed too often that we are for Africa. 
These people must be made to realise that we want recognition that we 
are seeking our own way.
One Kay in which Africa can demonstrate its independence most 
clearly in by refusing to have a foreign military base of the major 
powers and their allies on its soil.
228
- . We in Kenya have taken steps to have the British base removed and 
it is already being dismantled. The speed with which this is being 
done and the alacrity with which British troops were withdrawn from 
Tanganyika after their brief assistance, indicates that the major 
powers have come to appreciate our feelings on this matter.
The question of military bases leads on to the general problem of 
nuclear disarmament. I think the Afro-Asian nations have made it 
quite clear that this is something which concerns them as much as it 
affects those powers which possess atomic weapons. If the horrors of 
a nuclear war were to occur we would all suffer. It might well mean 
the end of human life and our new nations would be denied the chance to 
show what they sire capable of achieving. In fact our people would 
hardly have had the chance to start living as men. This explains the 
extent of our investment in world peace.
yet so often when the major military powers discuss disarmament 
they are only interested in gaining tactical advantages and in scoring 
debating points over their opponents. They are so committed to the 
idea that world peace can only be maintained through nuclear deterrents 
that they have little room to look at disarmament from a dispassionate 
and non-involved point of view. The non-aligned states of Africa, Asia 
and elsewhere can desire for the lessening of world tension.
In their meeting, held at Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in I96I, rep­
resentatives from twenty-three non-aligned countries declared that it 
was essential they should 'participate in solving outstanding inter­
national issues concerning peace and security in the world, as none of 
them can remain unaffected by, or indifferent to, these issues. »
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An incidental benefit of disarmament would be that the skills, 
resources and manpower now wanted in preparing for destruction could 
be put to some positive use. Part of the efforts and resources could 
be diverted to succouring the sick and starving peoples of the under- 
developed countries.
It has been estimated by some people that one tenth of the expendi­
ture involved in armaments would be enough to raise the whole of the 
less-developed world to the level of a self-sustaining economy.
I have already spoken of our intention of keeping foreign armies 
out of Africa. This is closely linked with the idea of establishing a 
nuclear-free zone throughout the continent. That is to say that Africa 
should not be used as a testing ground, as a store or as a base from 
which atomic attacks can be, launched. In present terms we can achieve 
this by keeping our foreign bases. But with the development of nuclear 
weapons there is a terrible possibility that their ownership will 
spread. The more countries there are having atomic weapons, the more 
chance is there that they will be used and that a local conflict may 
spread into a world-wide nuclear war. The intention to declare Africa 
a nuclear-free zone is therefore a self-denying ordinance. It is some­
thing which the statesmen and diplomats of Africa will be concerned with 
in the immediate future. This question has been discussed by the O.A.U. 
and a resolution adopted accordingly.
But I am sure that Africa will need the use of nuclear power or 
energy for peaceful development. Our vast deserts and forests and 
some of our soil research and development could receive a real boost if 
we were able to share effectively in the peaceful use of atomic energy. 
Africa more than any other continent, needs to train scientists who can
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cope with our urgent development problems. I must therefore state 
very clearly that while we denounce and seek the control of nuclear 
weapons, we are anxious and must in fact insist on being able to benefit 
by this most precious of man's scientific achievements.
There is one fundamental aspect of foreign policy which I have not 
yet discussed, yet which is implicit in nearly all that I have said. 
This is the question of Bux-Africam unity. Those who belittle our 
achievements and mock our hopes should ponder how much constructive 
work has been done. Gan any other continent claim to have realised 
such unity of purpose and of action?
I can tell you that In this, as in all other diplomatic activities, 
there «ill he difficulties. Consider how limited h o  are in resources, 
in facilities, in individual men and women of experience and in the 
traditions of diplomatic activity.
Most African countries can only afford to establish representation 
in half a dozen or a dozen states. The total staff of our Ministry of 
External Affairs, in Kenya and overseas, is smaller than that of just 
one embassy of some of the big powers. Our poverty means that we 
cannot afford the technical facilities - the libraries, the tele­
communications systems and so forth - to the extent that we would like
to have them.
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Appendix Three
Opposition to the government's foreign policy came from Oginga 
Oiinga in his "book Not Yet Uhuru (London, Heinemann, 1968), pp. 28.5-
286.
I believe in making the democratic process work in the party, in 
government, among the people. We fought for uhuru so that the people 
may rule themselves. Direct action, not underhand diplomacy and silent 
intrigue by professional politicians won uhuru, and only popular 
support and popular mobilization can make it meaningful. This is one 
of my convictions repeated with, to some, monotonous regularity over 
the years. My second conviction is that at this time in history if 
Africa is to be really free, if we are to attain true economic 
independence - and let us remember that this stage is crucial for if 
we fail to attain true economic independence we will rob our political 
freedom of its lasting guarantee - we must follow a policy of non- 
alignment, of relations with both 'east' and 'west', with both capital­
ist and socialist countries. If our aid and investment come from one 
source only we can banish the prospect of pursuing an independent 
policy, for we will be brought under control by the withholding of aid, 
or by some other economic pressure. As an African nationalist I 
cannot tolerate an African regime dominated by either the 'west' or 
the 'east'. If non-alignment is used to justify relations with one of 
these worlds alone , it is not non-alignment. Kenya is still today 
largely part of the western sphere of interest and investment. To 
reach the non-aligned position we must break this predominantly western 
influence, and develop relations with the east. It was with the 
deliberate intent of making Kenya less dependent on the colonial powers 
that I have worked for relations with the socialist countries, and this, - 
not the development of relations with the west alone, is the true policy
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of non-alignment far Kenya. The fiercer the attacks on the socialist 
countries - and on me for visiting them - the more convinced I became 
that we in the colonial countries struggling for full freedom can find 
much in common with socialist policies and economic planning, and that 
if the colonial powers that have tried for so long to keep us inferior 
are so alarmed at our efforts to seek friendly relations with the 
socialist world, this must be the true path of non-alignment. Non- 
alignment, let us remember, means that we shall tie ourselves to no 
power bloc; and that while we shall not necessarily opt for neutrality 
on every issue, ours will be the freedom to decide.
The danger in Kenya has never been communism but imperialism and 
its remnants. I told the Tafmesca conference at Addis Ababa that the 
snake in the bush is less dangerous than the snake in our house, which 
is imperialism. Why seek a non-existent enemy when we already have a 
fight on our hands against the remnants of imperialism? If communism 
were to prove a problem in the future we would deal with it, I told 
the conference. Nothing had happened in Kenya between the 1963 Addis 
Ababa Pafmesca Conference and the end of 1964 and Jamhuri to make me 
change my mind that no communist forces were actively plotting against 
Kenya. I am convinced that the external vested interests at play in 
Kenya are not Communist forces, but the result of the involvement of 
an increasing number of politicians in British, American and West 
German commerce and big business.
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Appendix Four
Central Government Functions and Organisation as detailed in the Tv^dent's Circular No. 1 of 1967, 5 January 1967 and reprinted in 
Goran Hyden, Robert Jackson and John Ofcumu (eds.), Development Administration. The Kenyan Experience (Nairobi, O.U.P., 1970), pp. 3 ^ -3W. •
Office of the President
Functions
State House and lodges 
Cabinet Office
Administration, including provincial adminstration
Ministers - and Assistant Ministers - appointments and leaves of absence
Appointment of ambassadors
Organization of government
Kenya Flag and Coat of Arms
Kenya Seal
East African Community 
National Assembly
Civil Service - establishments, africanisation and training 
Public holidays 
Reception of visitors 
National fund
Ministers - and Assistant Ministers - terms of service and W r t . g
Honours and awards
Foreign policy
International organizations
Pan-African affairs
Kenya embassies abroad
International treaties, conventions and agreements 
Diplomatic privileges and immunities
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Protocol and credentials 
Consular natters
Note* Prom 1970, the last eight functions above were combined to form 
a separate Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The Vice-President's office and 
The Ministry of Home Affairs
Functions
Police
Internal security 
Prisons
Immigration, passports and visas
Alien refugees
Approved schools
Criminal lunatics
Firearms
Government chemist 
Lotteries and betting 
Probation services 
Registration of persons
Remand homes 
Repatriation 
Restriction 
Citizenship
Functions
Ministry of Finance
Supervision, control and direction of all natters related to 
affairs of the country, including*
Government expenditure, revenue and borrowing
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Taxation
Exchange control
Balance of payments
Banks and hanking
Custodian of government property
General economic policy in consultation with Ministers concerned in
. economic matters
Civil service - terms of service
Ministry of Economic Planning 
and Development
Functions
Development planning 
Co-ordination of economic matters 
population census 
Statistics 
Technical assistance
Ministry of Defence
Functions
Defence
Kenya Armed Forces 
Kenya Air Force 
Kenya Navy
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Appendix Five
Resolutions and Statements concerning the holder dispute with the 
Somali Republic.
Source* Organization of African Unity. Council of Ministers. 
Resolutions of Ordinary and Extra-Ordinary Sessions.(Addis Ababa,' General Secretariat of the o.A.U., I967).
The Council of Ministers meeting in Lagos, Nigeria, from 24 to 
29 February 1964, for it3 Second Ordinary Session.
HAVING heard the statements of the representatives of Kenya and of 
Somalia on the border incidents which have occurred between Kenya and
Somalia.
? *
RECALLING resolution ECI^Res.4 (H) of 15 February 1964 and 
particularly operative paragraphs 1 and 2,
DEEPLY concerned that the continuation of such regrettable incid­
ents may aggravate tension between them and lead to hostilities the 
repercussions of which may seriously prejudice African Uhity and peace 
in this Continent,
1
RECALLING paragraph 4 of Article III of the Charter,
1. REAFFIRMS paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution EQ0?es. (n) adopted 
by the Council of Ministers at its Second Extraordinary Session held 
in Dar-es-Salaam from 12 to 15 February 1964}
2. INVITES the Governments of Kenya and Somalia to open as soon as
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possible direct negotiations with due respect to paragraph 3 of 
Article III of the Charter with a view to finding a peaceful and 
lasting solution to differences between them}
3. INVTTE them further to refrain from all acts which may aggravate
the situation or jeopardise the change of peaceful and fraternal 
settlement and to report on the results of these negotiations to 
the next Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the 
Organization of African Unity.
Pull text of statement given by Mr. Joseph Murumbi, Minister for Exter­
nal Affairs, at Arusha, Tanzania, on thé 14 December I965. As reported 
in East African Standard, 15 December I965.
Discussions between Heads of State and the Governments of Kenya 
and Somalia took place in Arusha last night. The President of Tanzania, 
Dr, Nyerere, who convened the meeting at the request of the Somali 
Government, presided.
The Kenya delegation was led by President Kenyatta and included 
the Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Murumbi, the Minister for Home 
Affairs, Mr. Moi, the Minister of Education, Mr. Koinange, the Attorney- 
General, Mr. Hjonjo, and the Secretary of the Cabinet, Mr. Ndegwa,
The Somali delegation comprised President Osman, the Prime 
Minister, Mr. Hussein, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dualeh, 
and the Minister of State for Somali Affairs, Sheik Farah.
The purpose of the meeting was to make a move toward the normal­
isation of relations between Kenya and Somalia in accordance with the
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l9 6 k  O.A.U. resolution passed in Lagos, Nigeria, calling upon the two 
countries to neet and settle their differences by peaceful means. The 
first meeting was arranged in Cairo, but proved abortive because of 
Government changes in Somalia.
Nevertheless, it was in the spirit of the Lagos resolution that 
Kenya responded to the invitation by President Nyerere to hold further 
talks, and being inspired by the need for brotherly relations between 
the African states in the spirit of the Charter of the O.A.U., Kenya 
put forward the following points as a basis for discussion and as a 
prerequisite for the normalisation of relations between the two 
countries *-
1. Firstly, the Government of Somalia should condemn the shifta in 
the north of Kenya and, secondly, cease to aid in any way nor supply 
aims to the shifta.
2. The Government of Somalia should cease all hostile propaganda 
directed towards inciting the shifta against the Government of Kenya.
3. The Government of Somalia should instruct their administrative, 
army and police units to co-operate with their opposite numbers across 
the border in order to jointly suppress shifta operations.
4. After a period set by mutual agreement for the implementation of 
the above, and if there was evidence of no shifta incidence on the 
Kenya side, the Government of Kenya will consider the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the countries.
5* Meanwhile, both Governments will immediately use all forms of 
publicity, radio and otherwise, to make it known that they are against 
violence and are determined to use all possible measures to suppress 
the shifta operations in the North-Eastern Province.
After prolonged discussions it became clear to the Kenya dele-
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gat ion that the intention of the Somali Government was to revive old 
arguments for territorial expansion by incorporating certain areas in 
Kenya into Somalia.
This is in clear conflict with the O.A.U. resolution calling upon 
»ember States to respect and accept State boundaries as at the time of 
independence.
In these circumstances the Kenya Government could not see how 
the discussions could proceed, and made it clear that Kenya will not 
allow any part of its territories to be dismembered, and will defend 
her territorial integrity by every means.
The President of Kenya wishes to take this opportunity to pay 
tribute to both President Nyerere and Vice-President Kawawa for their 
assistance in conducting the two meetings with the Somali delegations.
“ Bet w t  111 the «f » « * . •
Also reprinted in Bast African Standard. 3 May 1967.
Bearing in mind the advised reservation, by the Government of the 
Republic of Kenya, of the inherent right of self-defence in confronting 
a situation fully described, it should be re-emphasised that the Kenya 
Government maintains its readiness under proper and fruitful conditions 
to participate in negotiation leading to conclusion of a peaceful
settlement.
In*view of the Government of the Kenya Republic, the following 
would be prerequisites to the opening of such negotiations1
1. The Government of the Somali HepuKlic should renounce all terri­
torial aspirations in respect of the six stipulated administrative 
Districts of Kenya, declaring concurrently its readiness to recognise -
a) that the "northern frontier District" of Kenya is an integral
and ¿e .jure part of the Kenya Republic;
b) that this recognition implies the laughing of an era of 
peaceful ana constructive coexistence between Kenya and Somalia,
2. The Government of the Somali Republic should overtly disband the 
widely publicised ’High Command of the Northern Frontier District 
Liberation Movement' in Mogadishu,
3. The Government of the Somali Republic should take immediate 
measures -
a) to halt the supply of arms and ammunition, plastic land mines 
and demolition material to shifta gangs;
b) to recall from Kenya as much of this equipment and material - 
including land mines - as may be practicable, by available means;
c) to ensure henceforth that no arms, ammunition or explosive 
supplies be permitted to move into Kenya from Somalia.
4. The Government of the Somali Republic should close down the shifta 
training centres at Bula Hawa, Bur Hache, Belese Cogani and Lugh, 
converting these camps and bases to such internal purposes as the 
Somalia Government may see fit.
5. The Government of the Somali Republic should recognise the right of 
those Somalis who are citizens of Kenya - whether residing in the six 
stipulated Districts or elsewhere - to live in peace under the laws of 
Kenya and in accordance with the leadership and guidance of their 
political and religious leaders and chiefs,
6. The Government of the Somali Republic should affirm that Somalia 
and Kenya - both as free and sovereign States - must henceforth conform 
with the equal scruple to resolutions of the Organisation for African
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Unity (sic.) applying to -
a) recognition that the boundaries of States at the tine of 
independence be accepted and held inviolable by all O.A.U. 
members;
tb. primary need to deal with ali disputes through measures of 
conciliation and negotiation;
c) the impropriety of such activities as subversion end hostile 
propaganda calculated to disrupt relationships between free and 
e q u a l member States.
7. The Government of the Somali Republic, as precursor to permanent 
cessation of all hostile propaganda between Mogadishu and Nairobi, 
should express readiness to join with the Kenya Government in broad­
casting some jointly agreed policy declaration condemning violence in 
the N.F.D. and looking forward (within a context of peaceful co­
existence) to an era of constructive economic and social development.
Given action and/or agreement on these seven points, thenj- 
8* The Kenya Government would at once be prepared to discuss with 
the Government of the Somali Republic the re-opening of diplomatic 
relations between the two States, to facilitate the completion of all 
immediate negotiations together with ensuing examination of all con­
structive elements of an era of peaceful co-existence.
9. The Kenya Government would at once be prepared to consider the 
removal of the existing ban on trade transactions between the two 
States, and revocation of the ban on air movements between Kenya and 
Somalia.
10. The Kenya Government would be prepared to join with the Somalia 
Government in drafting a mutually agreed report to the Organisation for 
African Unity (sic.), declaring that a dispute which had existed between 
the two member States had been settled by peaceful means.
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11. The Kenya Government would be prepared to nominate represent­
atives for discussions with appointed representatives of the Somalia 
Government - at any mutually agreed level - on means of co-operation 
between the two States in matters of economic and social development 
on both sides of the border.
These matters might include communications networks, water supp­
lies, range management and veterinary control, local administration 
and social welfare, including education and health services, frontier 
formalities, crime prevention and other items of practical mutual 
interest.
Source: Daily Nation, 18 September I967.
f
The Assembly of Heads of States and Governments meeting in its 
fourth ordinary session in Kinshasa, Congo, from 11 to 14 September
19^ 7i
Desirous of consolidating the fraternal links that unite us, 
recalling further the attempts that have been made by the Governments 
of Kenya and Somalia at Arusha in December I 965, through the good 
offices of a s  Excellency Julius K. Nyerere of the Republic of Tanzania;
Mindful of the new and welcome initiative taken by a s  Excellency 
President Kenneth D. Kaunda of the Republic of Zambia in Kinshasa 
during the fourth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of states
and Governments;
Notes with pleasure the joint declaration mutually and amicably
S^ 3
reached betvreen the Governments of Kenya and Somalia, as represented 
by the Vice-President Daniel arap Koi and the Prime Minister Mohamed 
Ibrahim Egal, respectively, through the good offices of the President 
of Zambia, which reads as follows*
1. Both Governments have expressed their desire to respect each other's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity in the spirit of paragraph 3 of " 
Article III of the O.A.U. Charter;
2. The two Governments have farther undertaken to resolve any out­
standing differences between them in the spirit of paragraph ^ of 
Article III of the O.A.U. Charter;
3. The two Governments have pledged to ensure maintenance of peace
and security on both sides of the border by preventing destruction of 
human life and property; .
k .  Furthermore, the two Governments have agreed to refrain from 
conducting hostile propaganda through mass media such as radio and 
the Press against each other; ^
5. The two Governments have accepted the kind invitation of President 
Kaunda of Zambia to meet in Lusaka, during the later part of October 
1967 in order to improve, i n t e n s i f y  and consolidate all forms of co­
operation.
Resolves to express its sincere gratitude and congratulations to 
President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia as well as the Governments of Kenya 
and Somalia for their positive efforts to overcome differences in a 
fraternal manner;
Requests the Governments of Kenya and Somalia, as parties to the 
declaration, and the Government of the Republic of Zambia, as host and 
convenor, to submit a progress report on the proposed meeting in 
Lusaka to the Secretary-General of the O.A.U.
Source» East African Standard. 30 October I96?.
Meeting in the Arusha Town Hall, the Kenya President and the 
Somalia Premier expressed their desire to consolidate the Kinshasa 
declaration on Kenya-Somali relations and recognized the need to 
restore normal and peaceful relations between Kenya and Somalia.
They have towards this end reached agreement on the following 
points:
1. Both Governments will exert all efforts and do the utmost to 
maintain good neighbourly relations between Kenya and Somalia in 
accordance with the 0.A.U. Charter«
2, The two Governments agree that the interests of the people of 
Kenya and Somalia were not served by the continuance of tension 
between the two countries.
3« They, therefore, reaffirm their adherence to the declaration of 
the O.A.U. conference at Kinshasa, a copy of which is attached to this 
memorandum of understanding.
l \ . In order to facilitate a speedy solution to the development and 
to ensure maintenance of continued good relations, both Governments 
have agreed to»
A. The maintenance of peace and security on both sides of the 
border by preventing the destruction of human life and property?
B. Refrain from conducting hostile propaganda through mass media such 
as radio and press against each other and encourage propaganda which 
promote the development and continuance of friendly relations between 
the two countries;
C. The gradual suspension of any emergency regulations imposed on
e ith e r side of the border;
jj The reopening of diplomatic relations between the two countries;
2^ 5
E. A consideration of measures encouraging the development of 
economic and trade relations;
P. The appointment of a working committee consisting of Somalia,
Kenya and Zambia, which will meet periodically to review the imple­
mentation by Somalia and Kenya of points agreed in this document and 
also to examine ways and means of bringing about a satisfactory 
solution to major and minor differences between Somalia and Kenya.
They (Somalia and Kenya) invite the President of Zambia to witness 
this memorandum of understanding.
Appendix Six
Pull text on the Kenya Government's decision not to break dinln 
aatic relations with Britain in 1965 following the failure to a c t 1
its declaration of 'independSce • ° £  reported in the Daily Nation. 11 December 1965.
Since the declaration of O.D.I. the Kenya Government has been in 
dose contact with other African States to ensure concerted action 
asainst the rebel regime in Rhodesia. The Government has also brought 
pressure on the British Government to take decisive action to crush 
the rebellion and lead the country to majority rule.
The Kenya Government must make it clear that responsibility for 
the present conditions in Rhodesia lies with the British Government. 
The British must use force to restore constitutional government and 
create the necessary conditions for democratic majority rule, in uur 
efforts to help our brothers in Bhodesia we have called for unity and 
positive action by all the nationalist forces in Rhodesia.
The Kenya Government has considered the resolutions passed by the 
assembly of Heads of State and Government at its meeting'ln Accra in 
October this year. The Government has severed all trade and economic 
relations with Rhodesia and has stopped all money transactions between 
Kenya hanks and Shodesia. We have in addition decided to refuse to 
recognise any travel documents issued or renewed by the illegal 
Government. We have further out off all communication channels 
including telegraphic, telephone, tele-printer and radio-telephone 
and all air services with Rhodesia.
The Kenya Government has all along been concerned that actions
taken are coordinated Kith cur m a t  African neighbours and especially 
Zambia.
It Kill be remembered that a meeting of representatives of the four 
states took place in Nairobi recently. The Kenya Government remains 
fully committed to the decisions taken at that meeting and Kill 
continue to consult Kith the governments concerned on any new develop* 
aents or changes in measures to be taken, we believe that Zambia-s 
interests must be taken into consideration at all times since »e must ' 
help her safeguard her sovereignty.
The recent meeting of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers proposed 
that all African countries sever diplomatic relations Kith Britain 
on December 15. if by that time Britain has not crushed the rebellion. 
The Kenya Government supports all O.A.U. resolutions and efforts and 
will remain a faithful member of the organisation.
It. is, however, obvious that since this resolution was announced 
there have been conflicting reactions by various African States.
This means that action taken would not be effective and could in fact 
be abortive. We are particularly concerned that the Zambian Govern­
ment has expressed serious doubts about the wisdom of breaking diplo­
matic relations with Britain. We believe that any action taken must 
advance the cause that we are supporting in Rhodesia,
Division among African States could have serious repercussions, not 
the least of which would be the threat to the O.A.U. itself, in the 
circumstances, the Kenya Government has now decided to consult more 
fully with our East African neighbours including Zambia and the other 
African States to determine the best action to take. We feel that
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unilateral action by an African State would not meet the situation.
Appendix Seven
The Cabinet: January 196Hr
The Prime Minister« Jomo Kenyatta 
Home Affairs« Oginga Odinga
Justice and Constitutional Affairs« Tom J. Mboya
Finance and Economic Planning« James S. Gichuru
Minister of State (Prime Minister's Office)« Joseph Murumbi
Education« J.D. Otiende
Local Government« S.O. Ayodo
Commerce and Industry* Dr. Julius G. Kiano
Works, Communications and Power« D. Kwanyumba
Labour and Social Services* Eliud N. ifrrendwa
Natural Resources* L.G. Sagini
Health and Housing« Dr. Njoroge Mingai
Information, Broadcasting and Tourism: R. Achieng-Cheko
Minister of State for Fan-African Affairs« Mbiyu Koinange
Agriculture and Animal Husbandry* Bruce R. McKenzie
Lands and Settlement« Jackson H. Angaine
The Cabinet« January 197^
President and Commander-in-Chief* Jfeee Jomo Kenyatta 
Vice-President and Minister of Home Affairs* Daniel T. Arap Moi 
Minister of State at the President's Office* Mbiyu Koinange 
Foreign Affairs* Dr. Njoroge Mungai 
Finance and Economic Planning« Mwai Xibaki 
Defence* James S. Gichuru
Agriculture and Animal Husbandry« Jeremiah J.M. Nyagah 
Health* Dr. Zachary Chyonka
Local Governraenti Dr. James C.N. Osogo
O
Power and Communications! Isaac E. Oraolo Qkero
Labour; ELiud N« Mwendwa
Tourism and Wildlife; Juxon L.M. Shako
Lands and Settlement; Jackson H. Angaine
Housing; Paul J. Ngei
Attorney-General; Charles Njonjo
Minister of Information and Broadcasting; Robert S. JTatano 
Natural Resources; William 0. Qnamo 
Co-operatives and Social Services; Masinde Muliro 
Commerce and Industry; Dr. Julius G. Kiano 
Education; Taita A. Towett
The Cabinet; January 1973
President and Commander in Chief; Mfcee Jomo Kenyatta 
Vice-President and Minister of Hone Affairs; Daniel T. arap Moi 
Minister of State at the President's Office; Mbiyu Koinange 
Foreign Affairs; Dr. Munyua Waiyaki 
Finance and Economic Planning; Mwai KIbaki
Defence; James S* Gichuru
\
Agriculture; Jeremiah J.M. Nyagah
Health; James C.N. Osogo
Local Government; Robert S. Matano
Power and Communications; Isaac E. Omolo Okero
Labour? James Nyamweya
Tourism and Wildlife; M.J. Cgutu
Lands and Settlement; Jackson H. Ahgaine
Housing and Social Services* Dr. Zachariah T. Onyonka
Information and Broadcasting; d .M. Mitinda
Natural Resourcesi S.S, Oloitiptip 
Co-operative Developmenti Paul Ngei 
Commerce and Industry: Eliud T. Mwamunga 
Education: Taaitta Towett 
Water Development: Dr. Julius G. Kiano 
Attorney-General: Charles Njonjo
The Cabinet: October 1978
President and Commander in Chief: Daniel T. arap Moi
Vice-President and Minister for Finance: Mr. Mwai Kihaki
Defence: Mr, James Gichuru
Natural Resources: Mr. Mbiyu Koinange
Agriculture: Mr. J. Nyagah
Health: to. James Osogo
Lands and Settlement: Mr. Jackson Angaine
Labour: Mr. James Nyamweya
Attorney-General: Mr. Charles Njonjo
Water Development: Dr. Julius Gikonyo Kiano
Power and Communications: \ to. Issac Omolo Ckero
Local Government: to. Robert to,tano
Housing and Social Services: Dr. Zacharia Chyonka
Education: to. Taita Towett
Foreign Affairs: Dr. Munyua Waiyaki
Information and Broadcasting: to. Daniel Mutinda
Commerce and Industry: to. Eliud Mwamunga
Tourism and Wildlife: Mr. Matthew Cgutu
Home Affairs: Mr. Stanley Oloitiptip
Co-operative Development: Mr. Paul Ngei
Works: to. Nathan Munoko
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Economic Planning and Community Affairs; Dr. Robert CuJco 
Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of 
the Civil Service* Mr. G.K. Kariithi
i
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Appendix Eight
Some physical and financial statistics*
Total Area of Kenya* 582,646 sq. km.
Population at 1969 census* African 10.733,202
Asian 139,037
 ^ European 40.593
■ Arab 27,886
Other 209,503
10,942,705
Estimated Population in 1977* 14,337,000
Exchange Rates* Before 1967, £1 was equal to K£l (one Kenyan pound)
or 20 Kenyan shillings.
In 1967, £1 was equal to 17.10 shillings.
In December 1973 the rate was*
£1 *» 16.003 shillings 
$  *• 6,900 shillings
In December 1977 the rate was*
£1 - 15.207 shillings✓
gf « 7-9 7^ shillings
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